Ross v. Runyon, Civ. A. No. 92-2332.

Decision Date27 July 1994
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. 92-2332.
Citation859 F. Supp. 15
PartiesHarvey ROSS, Plaintiff, v. Marvin RUNYON, Postmaster General, U.S. Postal Service, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Donald Thomas Bucklin, Rawle Andrews, Jr., Ann M. Beimdiek, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Washington, DC, for plaintiff.

Claire M. Whitaker, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SPORKIN, District Judge.

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Remand or for Summary Judgment. Based on motions filed by the parties and responses thereto, as well as oral argument, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted, and both Defendant's Motion for Remand and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied.

1. General Background

In this action, brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the "1991 Act"), as codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, Plaintiff Harvey Ross alleges that the United States Postal Service ("Postal Service") discriminated against him on the basis of his race (African-American) when it failed to promote him to the position of Mail Equipment Shops technician in October 1989.

Plaintiff joined the Postal Service in 1987 as a general mechanic (grade 5) after working for 11 years at a variety of non-governmental jobs installing, repairing, and maintaining electrical and electronic systems. He received his initial training at the U.S. Navy Electrical and Electronic School, and benefitted from several related, specialized courses subsequent to his initial training.

On August 25, 1989, the Mail Equipment Shops ("MES"), a section of the Postal Service, posted Vacancy Announcement No. 2077 for the Bargaining Unit position of MES technician, level C-09. The MES is charged with making mail bags, pouches, locks and keys for the Postal Service, and the MES technician is responsible for repairing and maintaining the heavy equipment to keep the operations functioning.

Plaintiff Ross and six other people submitted applications for the MES technician position. To qualify for an interview for the position, each applicant was required to achieve a passing score on the mandatory Postal Test 500 ("PT 500"). Six of the seven applicants passed the PT 500 and qualified for an interview. Plaintiff achieved the highest score on the exam. Of the six applicants, four were African-American, one was Caucasian, and one was Asian-American.

The six qualified applicants, including Plaintiff Ross, were then scheduled for individual interviews with the selecting panel, which consisted of three members: (1) Robert Black, the selecting official, who was responsible at the time for the general administration of the MES operations (African-American); (2) Audrey Simmons, a production/planning specialist who was the primary user of the heavy equipment that the MES technician would have to maintain (African-American); and (3) Terry Cox, the General Supervisor of Maintenance, who was in charge of the technical operations of the plant (Caucasian). The panel interviewed the applicants individually, and rated them on the qualification standards for the position set forth in Qualification Standard 6753a to the Postal Service EL-303 Handbook.

The selecting panel interviewed Plaintiff on October 13, 1989. By his own admission, Plaintiff was ill on the day of his interview and nervous. The panel also reviewed Plaintiff's application form, as well as the Supervisory Appraisal form completed by Plaintiff's immediate and second line supervisors: Reginald Carnegie and Steve Cohout. Plaintiff was only recommended "with reservation" by both men, and his supervisor, Reginald Carnegie, noted on the appraisal form that Plaintiff had only "fair human relations and poor attendance."

At the end of the interview process, the composite scores of each of the six applicants were as follows:

                Applicant       Score   Race
                Arthur Taylor   179     Caucasian/American
                George White    164     African/American
                Kevin Perkins   152     African/American
                You Yang        150     Asian/American
                Harvey Ross     149     African/American
                Thomas Atkins   135     African/American
                

Because he had obtained the highest total score, Arthur Taylor was selected for the position of MES Technician. Plaintiff Ross, who was ranked fifth overall, was notified on October 23, 1989 that he had not been selected.

Asserting that discriminatory animus had severely tainted the selection process, Mr. Ross filed a formal complaint of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") Office of the Post Office, Southern Maryland Division. Harvey Ross v. Anthony Frank, Postmaster General, USPS, USPS No. 2-C-1104-90. After exhausting his remedies at the administrative level, Mr. Ross filed a complaint of discrimination with this Court.

2. Defendant's Motion for Remand

According to the Postal Service, Mr. Ross' claim is not fit for judicial resolution and should be remanded to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). A review of the administrative process in this case is necessary to understand the basis for this claim.

The record indicates that Ross originally sought to file an EEO complaint based on racial discrimination. However, an EEO counsellor at the Southern Maryland Postal facility erroneously advised Ross that he could not file a race-based EEO complaint. Instead, the EEO counsellor recommended that Ross file an EEO complaint alleging discrimination based on his national origin — Afro/American Jamaican. Accordingly, on December 27, 1989, Plaintiff filed a formal complaint of national origin discrimination with the EEO Office of the Post Office, Southern Maryland Division. Harvey Ross v. Anthony Frank, Postmaster General, USPS, USPS No. 2-C-1104-90. After the agency issued a Proposed Disposition finding no discrimination, Plaintiff Ross requested an administrative hearing before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Ross v. Frank, EEOC Case No. XXX-XX-XXXXX. Prior to the hearing, Ross was advised that the correct basis of his complaint was most likely racial discrimination. Thereafter, Ross formally amended his complaint to state a claim of racial discrimination. On March 20, 1991, Administrative Judge Burgess, before whom Plaintiff's administrative complaint was argued, issued a Recommended Decision finding no racial discrimination. The Postal Service adopted the Recommended Decision in its final Agency Decision on June 4, 1991. On June 19, 1991, Plaintiff appealed to the Federal Operations Office of the EEOC, Ross v. Frank, EEOC Appeal No. 01912931, which found no discrimination "based on national origin." As a final step to obtain an administrative remedy, Plaintiff filed a petition for reconsideration with the EEOC, which was denied on April 9, 1992.

According to Defendant, the case must now be remanded to the EEOC because the Postal Service determination addressed racial discrimination while the EEOC's determination addressed national origin discrimination. This Court disagrees. The issue of racial discrimination was properly before the EEOC, and after carefully reviewing the entire record, the EEOC made a final determination in the case, and denied a petition for reconsideration. Nothing in the record suggests that the EEOC did not review the entire record before it and every allegation raised. The EEOC's determination was complete and final. Thus, nothing in the record suggests that this case is not fit for judicial review.

3. Parties' Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
A. Summary Judgment Standards

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading are not enough to prevent the issuance of summary judgment. The adverse party's opposition must be supported by affidavits or other competent evidence setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e).

The governing standards for the issuance of summary judgment were set by the Supreme Court in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In Celotex, the Court explicitly recognized that a full-blown trial is a drain on resources to be avoided if and when the non-moving party's position cannot be substantiated through affidavit or other competent means:

Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to "secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 1.....
Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.

Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 (citation omitted).

The non-moving party is "required to provide evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find" in its favor. Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C.Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing Celotex, supra). For this case to go to trial, Mr. Ross must provide evidence of his prima facie case which would be admissible at trial. If the Postal Service provides evidence that Ross did not receive the promotion because, among other things, he did not score as well as other applicants during the interview process and he had a history of...

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