Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa
Decision Date | 15 April 2016 |
Docket Number | Case No. 14–CV–484–TCK–PJC |
Citation | 180 F.Supp.3d 951 |
Parties | Abigail Ross, Plaintiff, v. University of Tulsa, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma |
John Spencer Bryan, Steven James Terrill, Bryan & Terrill Law, PLLC, Tulsa, OK, John Clune, Hutchinson Black and Cook LLC, Boulder, CO, for Plaintiff.
Amy Nicole Bennett, John David Lackey, John Richard Paul, Paul & Lackey PC, J. Patrick Cremin, Johnathan Louis Rogers, Hall Estill Hardwick Gable Golden & Nelson, Tulsa, OK, for Defendant.
Before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on all remaining claims (Doc. 95). For reasons explained below, the motion is granted.
While a sophomore at the University of Tulsa (“TU”), Plaintiff Abigail Ross (“Ross”) reported to the Tulsa Police Department (“TPD”) and the TU Dean of Students, Yolanda Taylor (“Taylor”), that TU student Patrick Swilling, Jr. (“Swilling”) raped her on the night of January 27, 2014. Swilling was a member of the TU men's basketball team. TU Campus Police (“TUCP”)2 conducted an investigation, and Taylor held a student conduct hearing. Taylor found insufficient evidence that Swilling had violated TU policies prohibiting sexual assault. Subsequently, the Tulsa County District Attorney's office elected not to file criminal charges against Swilling. Ross left TU mid-semester in 2014. TU permitted Swilling to remain on campus and re-enroll the next year.
Ross filed this civil suit seeking damages from TU under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (“Title IX”) and Oklahoma common law. Ross asserted six claims for relief: (1) violation of Title IX based on TU's deliberate indifference to prior accusations against Swilling; (2) violation of Title IX based on TU's deliberate indifference to Ross's own complaint against Swilling; (3) negligence per se based on violation of Title IX regulations; (4) negligent failure to protect Ross from sexual assault by Swilling; (5) negligent supervision of Swilling; and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). On July 2, 2015, the Court dismissed Ross's negligence per se claim. TU moved for summary judgment on all remaining claims.
On April 4, 2011, the United States Department of Education Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) issued a nineteen-page letter known as the “Dear Colleague Letter” (“DCL”). This letter explains that “[s]exual harassment of students, including sexual violence, is a form of sex discrimination prohibited by Title IX.” (DCL, Ex. 9 to Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J., at 1.) The DCL was prompted by “deeply troubling” statistics of sexual violence on college campuses and was aimed at “ensuring that all students feel safe in their school, so that they have the opportunity to benefit fully from the school's programs and activities.” (Id. at 2.)
The DCL supplements the OCR's Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance published in 2001 and provides “additional guidance and practical examples regarding the Title IX requirements as they relate to sexual violence.” (Id. ) With respect to a college's investigation, the DCL explains that “[r]egardless of whether a harassed student, his or her parent, or a third party files a complaint under the school's grievance procedures ... a school that knows, or reasonably should know, about possible harassment must promptly investigate to determine what occurred....” (Id. at 4.) With respect to a college's hearing process, the DCL encourages a preponderance of the evidence standard and discourages allowing students to personally question each other. The DCL is silent as to a crucial issue in this case—whether the decisionmaker should consider prior allegations of sexual violence against the alleged perpetrator that do not result in a conviction or other finding of responsibility. However, the DCL does provide that “prior complaints” against an accused student should be considered in deciding whether and how to proceed when a subsequent victim of that student requests anonymity. (Id. at 5.)
TU's general policy governing procedures for all student conduct hearings (“General Procedures”) provides:
(Ex. 8 to Pl.'s Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J.) The General Procedures can be trumped where specific policies allegedly violated “carry their own procedures.” (Id. at Art. II.D. (emphasis added).)
TU has a specific policy governing sexual violence (“Sexual Violence Policy”), which was revised after issuance of the DCL. It provides:
Because the University stands against [sexual violence] and intends to be in compliance with Title IX, the University will take prompt, decisive action to: investigate allegations of sexual violence; initiate the disciplinary process if appropriate, and issue appropriate sanctions against any student found responsible for acts of sexual violence whether the behavior occurred on campus or off campus.
(Ex. 21 to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J.) The policy provides instructions for reporting sexual violence, stating that “[s]tudents who are the recipients of sexual violence are encouraged to report the incident to appropriate University officials such as Housing staff members, Campus Security, a faculty member, and Health Center and Counseling Center staff and to do so immediately.” (Id. (emphasis added).)
It also sets forth “Courses of Action,” which include follow-up medical assistance, counseling, filing a university complaint, and assistance in filing criminal charges. The section entitled “Filing a University Complaint” largely tracks the DCL and provides:
(Id. (emphases added).)
Summary judgment is proper only if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Zamora v. Elite Logistics, Inc., 449 F.3d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir.2006). The Court resolves all factual disputes and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. However, the party seeking to overcome a motion for summary judgment may not “rest on mere allegations” in his complaint but must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The party seeking to overcome a motion for summary judgment must also make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of those elements essential to that party...
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