Rossow v. Jeppesen
| Docket Number | 1:23-cv-00131-BLW |
| Decision Date | 03 November 2023 |
| Parties | KEEVA ROSSOW, Plaintiff, v. DAVE JEPPESEN, Director, Idaho Health and Welfare, in his official capacity, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
Before the Court is the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's motion to dismiss (Dkt. 13). For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion in part and deny the motion in part.
In 2021, Keeva Rossow, after giving birth to her child, tested positive for
THC. Comprehensive Safety Assessment, Def. Ex. B, Dkt 13-2. The hospital reported the positive test to the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare due to the concern that Ms Rossow's child may also test positive for THC. Id. A child protective services worker investigating the report talked to Ms. Rossow and she admitted to using marijuana during her pregnancy to alleviate physical and psychological symptoms. Comprehensive Safety Assessment, Def. Ex. B, Dkt. 132. Based on the positive test and the conversation with Ms. Rossow, the case worker then issued a Comprehensive Safety Report substantiating the report of neglect and assigning her a level two designation under Health & Welfare's regulations. Police Report, Def. Ex. A, Dkt. 13-2; Comprehensive Safety Assessment, Def. Ex. B, Dkt. 13-2.
When a report of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment is substantiated, the conduct is assigned a level of risk. See IDAPA 16.06.01.563. “Prenatal use of any controlled substances. . . except as prescribed by a medical professional” receives a level two designation. Id. An individual who receives a level two designation “has been determined to pose a medium to high risk to children and will remain on the Child Protection Central Registry for a minimum of ten (10) years.” Id. After ten years, the individual may petition to have their name removed. Id.
In a letter to Ms. Rossow, the Department informed her that it had substantiated the report and she would be added to the Central Registry for at least 10 years due to the level two designation. December 2021 Letter, Def. Ex. C, Dkt. 13-2. Ms. Rossow filed a request for administrative review within the required 28-day window. The report was reviewed by a family and community services administrator, and Ms. Rossow was notified in a second letter that the administrator upheld the report as substantiated. February 2022 Letter, Def. Ex. D, Dkt. 13-2. The second letter informed her that her name was automatically added to the Central Registry, but she could file an appeal, which she did. Id. A fair hearing officer conducted a telephonic hearing before, again, upholding the report as substantiated. Preliminary Order, Def. Ex. E, Dkt. 13-2.
Ms. Rossow filed a class action complaint against the Department on behalf of herself and others similarly situated alleging violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as violations of the Idaho Constitution. The Department has moved to dismiss all of Ms. Rossow's claims.
A complaint must plead “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when it pleads facts that allow the court to “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 556. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id.
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “Detailed factual allegations” are not required, but a plaintiff must offer “more than . . . unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusations.” Id. (cleaned up). That is, a plaintiff must provide specific facts supporting the elements of each claim and must allege facts showing a causal link between the defendant and plaintiff's injury or damages. See Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
The Court must dismiss a cause of action if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court accepts the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged.” Yoshikawa v. Seguirant, 41 F.4th 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2022) (citations, quotations, and alteration omitted). Here, where the facts are largely undisputed, the motion to dismiss turns on whether Ms. Rossow has stated a cognizable legal claim.
The Department asks the Court to take judicial notice of several documents from Ms. Rossow's administrative proceeding. The Court agrees that it is proper to do so. Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may consider matters that are subject to judicial notice. Mullis v. United States Bank, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1897). The Court may take judicial notice “of the records of state agencies and other undisputed matters of public record” without transforming the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 866 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the Court takes notice of several documents that form the record of Ms. Rossow's administrative proceeding: a Coeur d'Alene Police Report (Def. Ex. A, Dkt. 13-2), the Comprehensive Safety Assessment prepared by the Department (Def. Ex. B, Dkt. 13-2), two letters from the Department dated December 20, 2021, and February 10, 2022 (Def. Exs. C & D, Dkt. 13-2), and the Decision and Preliminary Order entered in Ms. Rossow's appeal (Def. Ex. E, Dkt. 13-2).
Ms. Rossow's procedural due process claim alleges the Department did not provide her with sufficient process before placing her on the Central Registry. A procedural due process claim has two essential elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections. Brewster v. Board of Education of Lynwood Unified School District, 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court must first determine whether the plaintiff possessed a constitutionally protected interest. Brown v. Oregon Department of Corrections, 751 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2014). If not, the inquiry ends. If the plaintiff shows they had a liberty or property interest of which the government deprived them, the Court must then consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether the plaintiff received the process they were due. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560 (1974).
Ms. Rossow claims that the liberty interest at stake is the harm to her “good name, reputation, honor, or integrity.” Response at 6, Dkt. 19. Such reputational harms are actionable only where the reputational harm “[i]s accompanied by some additional deprivation of liberty or property.” Chaudhry v. Aragon, 68 F.4th 1161, 1171 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Miller v. California, 355 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2004). Under this “stigma-plus test,” a plaintiff must show they “suffer[] stigma from governmental action plus alteration or extinguishment of ‘a right or status previously recognized by state law.'” Humphries v. County of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1185 (9th Cir. 2008) () (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711-12 (1976)).
“[B]eing labeled a child abuser by being placed on the [Central Registry] is unquestionably stigmatizing.” Id. at 1186 (internal quotations omitted). Both the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court have concluded that the inclusion on a list “imputing criminal behavior to an individual” is stigmatizing. Paul, 424 US. at 697 (); see also Miller, 355 F.3d at 1178 (); Fikre v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 35 F.4th 762, 776 (9th Cir. 2022) (). Ms. Rossow's placement on the Central Registry thus unquestionably satisfies the first prong of the stigma-plus test.
To satisfy the second, “plus,” prong of this test, Ms. Rossow must show that her placement on the Central Registry creates a “tangible burden” on her “ability to obtain a right or status recognized by state law.” Humphries, 554 F.3d at 1188; see also Paul, 424 U.S. at 711. This prong is satisfied where “as a practical matter, the law creates a framework under which agencies reflexively check the stigmatizing listing-whether by internal regulation or custom-prior to conferring a legal right or benefit.” Humphries, 554 F.3d at 1188.
Placement on the Central Registry creates a tangible burden because certain agencies and employers check the Central Registry “before making employment foster care, or adoption decisions.” Complaint at ¶ 41, Dkt. 1. The Department itself clearly articulated the consequences of being placed on the Central Registry in its first letter to Ms. Rossow: ...
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