Roszell v. National Union Fire Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 17 June 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 90-900,90-900 |
Citation | 602 So.2d 87 |
Parties | Charles ROSZELL, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NATIONAL UNION FIRE INS. CO., et al., Defendants-Appellants. 602 So.2d 87 |
Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Charles A. Riddle, Marksville, for plaintiff-appellee.
Gold, Weems, Bruser, Sues & Rundell, Dee D. Drell, Alexandria, for defendants-appellants.
Before DOUCET, YELVERTON and KNOLL, JJ., and HOOD * and MARCANTEL, ** JJ. Pro Tem.
The resolution of this worker's compensation case on appeal turns on the trial court's initial determination that Charles Roszell, Jr. proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered a work-related accident while he worked as a roughneck for Butler-Johnson, Inc. The trial court found that Roszell carried his burden of proof, and awarded Roszell temporary total benefits from August 28, 1987, to October 1, 1988, together with supplemental earnings benefits thereafter in accordance with LSA-R.S. 23:1221(3). After considering the closeness of the issues presented, the trial court denied Roszell's claim for penalties and attorney's fees.
Butler-Johnson and National Union appeal. Although they enumerate six assignments of error, all of them hinge on their assertion that the trial court erred in finding that Roszell suffered a work-related accident.
Roszell answered the appeal, contending that the trial court erroneously calculated his supplemental earnings benefits.
The learned trial court provided excellent written reasons for judgment detailing the facts of this case which we adopt herein:
Butler-Johnson and National Union contend that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding that Roszell proved that he suffered a work-related accident.
Concerning this very issue, our Supreme Court recently reversed this court in the case of Bruno v. Harbert Intern. Inc., 593 So.2d 357 (La.1992), and reinstated the trial court's findings of an accident. In so doing, the Supreme Court stated at pages 360-361:
"As a threshold requirement, a worker in a compensation action must establish 'personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.' LSA-R.S. 23:1031 (emphasis supplied). The applicable statutory definition of 'accident' is 'an unexpected or unforeseen event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury.' LSA-R.S. 23:1021(1). While that definition was amended after the occurrence of the accident involved in this case, the governing law in a compensation action is that which was in effect at the time of the alleged injury. Nelson v. Roadway Express, Inc., 588 So.2d 350 (La.1991).
Louisiana courts consistently have interpreted the work-related accident requirement liberally. Williams v. Regional Transit Authority, 546 So.2d 150, 156 (La.1989). Indeed, it is well-settled in Louisiana that an 'accident' exists when 'heavy lifting or other strenuous efforts, although usual and customary, cause or contribute to a physical breakdown or accelerate its occurrence because of a preexisting condition.' Cutno v. Neeb Kearney & Co., 237 La. 828, 112 So.2d 628, 631 (1959); Nelson, supra (collecting cases). Moreover, Louisiana courts view the question of whether there was an accident from the worker's perspective. Williams, supra.
Despite the liberal construction of the statute afforded the worker in a compensation action, the worker's burden of proof is not relaxed. Prim v. City of Shreveport, 297 So.2d 421 (La.1974). Rather, as in other civil actions, the plaintiff-worker in a compensation action has the burden of establishing a work-related accident by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.; Nelson, supra. A worker's testimony alone may be sufficient to discharge this burden of proof, provided two elements are satisfied: (1) no other evidence discredits or casts serious doubt upon the worker's version of the incident; and (2) the worker's testimony is corroborated by the circumstances following the alleged incident. West v. Bayou Vista Manor, Inc., 371 So.2d 1146 (La.1979); Malone and Johnson, 13 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, Workers' Compensation, Section 253 (2d Ed.1980). Corroboration of the worker's testimony may be provided by the testimony of fellow workers, spouses or friends. Malone & Johnson, supra; Nelson, supra. Corroboration may also be provided by medical evidence. West, supra.
In determining whether the worker has discharged his or her burden of proof, the trial court should accept as true a witness's uncontradicted testimony, although the witness is a party, absent 'circumstances casting suspicion on the reliability of this testimony.' West, 371 So.2d at 1147; Holiday v. Borden Chemical, 508 So.2d 1381, 1383 (La.1987). The trial court's determinations as to whether the worker's testimony is credible and whether the worker has discharged his or her burden of proof are factual determinations not to be disturbed on review unless clearly wrong or absent a showing of manifest error. Gonzales v. Babco Farms, Inc., 535 So.2d 822, 824 (La.App.2d Cir.), writ denied, 536 So.2d 1200 (La.1988) (collecting cases). Indeed, the manifest error/clearly wrong standard of appellate review applies in compensation actions even when the trial court's decision is based solely upon written reports, records or depositions. Virgil v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Co., 507 So.2d 825 (La.1987).
Attempting to give meaning to the nebulous terms 'clearly wrong' and 'manifest error,' we recently enunciated the following general principles that govern an appellate court's power to reverse a trial court's factual findings:
Rosell v. Esco, 549 So.2d 840, 844-45 (La.1989) (citations omitted and emphasis supplied).
As reflected by the underscored language above, in Rosell, supra, we identified two factors that limit the deference due the trier of fact. In West, supra, we identified a third factor especially apt in compensation actions: 'the appellate court is not required by [the manifest error/clearly wrong] principle to affirm the trier of fact's refusal to accept as credible uncontradicted testimony ... where the record indicates no sound reason for its rejection and where the factual finding itself has been reached by overlooking applicable legal principles.' West, 371 So.2d at 1150; See Thomas v. RPM Corp., 449 So.2d 18, 21 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ...
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