Rotella v. Joseph, 11975
Decision Date | 06 April 1981 |
Docket Number | No. 11975,11975 |
Citation | 615 S.W.2d 616 |
Parties | Peter W. ROTELLA, Administrator of the Estate of Deborah Evans, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Patricia JOSEPH and Willard W. Hutchison, Defendants-Respondents. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Stephen H. Ringkamp, Hullverson, Hullverson & Frank, Inc., St. Louis, for plaintiff-appellant.
Noble I. Leighton, Greene, Curtis & Leighton, Springfield, for defendant-respondent Joseph.
Mark E. Gardner, Lynn C. Rodgers, Woolsey, Fisher, Whiteaker, McDonald & Ansley, Springfield, for defendant-respondent Hutchison.
Does a two-month-old girl lose her cause of action for the wrongful death of her unmarried mother because a lawsuit, timely filed, was not commenced in her name by a next friend but was filed, expressly on her behalf, by a foreign administrator? The issue is easier to state than to resolve.
This is an action for the wrongful death of Deborah Evans who died on June 28, 1977, as a result of a two-vehicle collision which occurred on that date in Douglas County, Missouri. Decedent was a resident of Connecticut. Plaintiff is Peter W. Rotella, administrator of the estate of Deborah Evans, deceased, who was appointed by a Connecticut probate court. Defendant Joseph, a citizen of Connecticut, was the driver of the vehicle in which the decedent was riding, and defendant Hutchison, a Missouri resident, was the driver of the other vehicle.
The petition, filed June 17, 1978, in the circuit court of Douglas County, alleged that the collision and death resulted from the concurring negligence of both defendants. The petition also alleged that Marissa Joyleen Evans, who was born on April 23, 1977, "was the only child and survivor of the decedent" and that "as result of the death of Deborah Evans, this administrator brings action for wrongful death on behalf of her sole survivor, Marissa Joyleen Evans and prays for damages as provided by law for her wrongful death."
In November 1979 each defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, (Rule 74.04). 1 Both motions were sustained. Plaintiff appeals.
Various documents filed in the trial court, and the briefs of the parties filed in this court, make it clear that the basis of the trial court's ruling was that the Missouri wrongful death statute, § 537.080 RSMo 1969, controlled the issue of who was the correct plaintiff and that the Connecticut administrator lacked standing to institute this action on behalf of the surviving child.
Plaintiff asserts that the ruling of the trial court was erroneous on several grounds, including: (a) "Connecticut law provides that actions for wrongful death shall be brought by the administrator of the estate of the decedent, and Connecticut law has the most significant relationship to the determination of this particular issue where a two-car collision occurred in Missouri; one of the vehicles was operated by a Missouri resident; the other vehicle was operated by a Connecticut resident; the decedent, sister of the Connecticut operator and a passenger in her vehicle, was a Connecticut resident; the beneficiary, minor daughter of the deceased, and the plaintiff administrator of the deceased were Connecticut residents; and the Missouri operator had no interest in the nominal party plaintiff or the manner of distributions of the proceeds of a wrongful death action," and (b) Although the action was "nominally" filed by the foreign administrator, the petition alleged that the action was filed "on behalf of the sole beneficiary and minor daughter of the decedent" and, under Missouri procedure, "the proceeding should not have been invalidated by the trial court" because the interests of Marissa were adequately protected.
If ground (a) is valid, the issue of who was the correct party to bring the action is governed by the Connecticut statute, § 52-555 (Conn. Gen. Statutes). 2 In support of ground (a) plaintiff relies on Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. banc 1969) and cases decided in its wake. Kennedy dealt with "the basis on which the choice of law in tort cases should be made." In Kennedy, at p. 184, the court said, "We have concluded that we should abandon the inflexible lex loci delicti rule in favor of the rule set forth in § 145 of the Proposed Official Draft of Restatement (Second) on Conflict of Laws." (Adopted May 23, 1979.)
Ground (b), on the other hand, assumes that the issue of who is the correct party plaintiff is governed by § 537.080 RSMo 1969. Defendants take the position that the assumption is valid. Although the parties devote the major portions of their briefs to ground (a), ground (b) will be considered first.
Section 537.100 RSMo 1969, provided, in part: "Every action instituted under 537.080 shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action shall accrue...."
State ex rel. Kan. City Stock Yards v. Clark, 536 S.W.2d 142, 144(3) (Mo. banc 1976).
In Clark, at p. 144, the court approved the following language from Barker v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 91 Mo. 86, 14 S.W. 280, 281 (1886): "In conferring the right of action, and in providing such remedy, in designating when and by whom suits may be brought, it was, as a matter of course, competent for the legislature to provide and impose such conditions as it might deem proper, and the conditions thus imposed modify and qualify the right of recovery, or form rather, we think, a part of the right itself, and upon which its exercise depends."
Clark, supra, 536 S.W.2d at p. 145.
Deborah Evans, on the date of her death, was an unmarried adult survived by her infant daughter Marissa and by her parents. Under the principles stated in Clark, the claim for her wrongful death vested first in Marissa. It was incumbent upon Marissa to exercise her "preferred right by filing suit within one year from the date of...
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