Roth v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y

Decision Date21 October 2016
Docket NumberNo. 15–2095.,15–2095.
Citation886 N.W.2d 601
Parties Mary E. ROTH and Michael A. Roth, Individually and as Coexecutors of the Estate of Cletus Roth, Anna M. Roth, Individually, and Bradley E. Roth, Individually, Plaintiffs, v. The EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN GOOD SAMARITAN SOCIETY d/b/a Good Samaritan Society–George, Defendant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Pressley Henningsen and Benjamin P. Long of RSH Legal, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for plaintiffs.

Christopher P. Jannes and Kendall R. Watkins of Davis, Brown, Koehn, Shors & Roberts, Des Moines, for defendant.

MANSFIELD

, Justice.

We have been asked to answer two certified questions of Iowa law in a tort case brought by the adult children of a former nursing home resident against the nursing home. The questions are as follows:

1. Does Iowa Code section 613.15

require that adult children's loss-of-parental-consortium claims be arbitrated when the deceased parent's estate's claims are otherwise subject to arbitration?

2. Does the fact that a deceased parent's estate's claims are subject to arbitration establish that it is impossible, impracticable, or not in the best interest of the decedent's adult children for the decedent's estate to maintain their claims for loss of parental consortium, such that the loss-of-consortium claims can be maintained separately in court, notwithstanding that the estate's claims must be arbitrated?

For the reasons discussed herein, we answer these questions as follows:

1. No.
2. It is not necessary to answer this question.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On November 27, 2013, seventy-nine-year-old Cletus Roth was admitted to a forty-five-bed nursing facility operated by The Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society (Good Samaritan) in Lyon County. Approximately two weeks later, on December 12, Cletus's son Michael signed a detailed admission agreement with Good Samaritan relating to Cletus's stay. At that time, Michael had general healthcare powers of attorney for Cletus. Cletus's daughter Mary also had the same powers of attorney.

Part of the admission documentation was a separate two-page document entitled “RESOLUTION OF LEGAL DISPUTES.” This item stated at the top in boldface type, Please note that the Resident's agreement to arbitrate disputes is not a condition of admission or of continued stay. Beneath this sentence were a series of clauses:

A. Resident's Rights. Any legal controversy, dispute, disagreement or claim arising between the Parties hereto after the execution of this Admission Agreement in which Resident, or a person acting on his or her behalf, alleges a violation of any right granted Resident under law or contract shall be settled exclusively by binding arbitration as set forth in Section C. below. This provision shall not limit in any way the Resident's right to file formal or informal grievances with the Facility or the state or federal government.
B. All Other Disputes. Any legal controversy, dispute, disagreement or claim of any kind arising out of or related to this Admission Agreement, or the breach thereof, or, related to the care of stay at the Facility, shall be settled exclusively by binding arbitration as set forth in Section C. below. This arbitration clause is meant to apply to all controversies, disputes, disagreements or claims including, but not limited to, all breach of contract claims, all negligence and malpractice claims, all tort claims and all allegations of fraud concerning entering into or canceling this Admission Agreement. This arbitration provision binds all parties whose claims may arise out of or relate to treatment or service provided by the center including any spouse or heirs of the Resident.
C. Conduct of Arbitration. The Resident understands that agreeing to arbitrate legal disputes means that he/she is waiving his/her right to sue in a court of law and to a trial by jury and that arbitration is not a limitation of liability but merely shifts the Parties' dispute(s) to an alternate forum. The Resident shall indicate his/her willingness to arbitrate by informing the Facility by marking the YES or NO box below and signing and dating where indicated....
D. Governing Law. The Parties acknowledge that the Facility regularly conducts transactions involving interstate commerce and that services provided by the Facility to the Resident involve interstate commerce. The Parties therefore agree that this Admission Agreement is a transaction involving interstate commerce. The Parties agree that this Resolution of Legal Disputes provision and all proceedings relating to the arbitration of any claim shall be governed by and interpreted under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. Sections 1

–16 (or as amended or superseded).

In the middle of the second page were two boxes:

YES I DO wish to arbitrate disputes and I received a copy of this Resolution of Legal Disputes.
NO I DO NOT wish to arbitrate disputes.

Michael indicated that he wished to arbitrate disputes by approving the checking of the first box and then signing and dating the arbitration agreement.1

Following Cletus's death, on August 14, 2015, Mary and Michael as coexecutors of his estate—as well as Mary, Michael, and their siblings Anna and Bradley individually—filed an action against Good Samaritan. The petition alleged that the defendant had “negligently cared for Cletus ... and violated numerous regulations, laws, rights, and industry standards, causing Cletus ... personal injury, illness, harm, and eventual death....” Five counts were set forth in the petition: “wrongful death, negligence, gross negligence, and/or recklessness,” “breach of contract,” “dependent adult abuse,” “loss of consortium for [Mary, Michael, Anna, and Bradley],” and “punitive damages.” Good Samaritan removed the case to federal court based on diversity of citizenship then moved to compel arbitration.

On December 7, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa filed a memorandum opinion. It directed that the claims of Cletus's estate be submitted to arbitration. However, the district court asked this court to answer two certified questions of Iowa law relating to the adult children's loss-of-consortium claims.

II. Standard Applicable to Certified Questions.

We have said before,

It is within our discretion to answer certified questions from a United States district court. We may answer a question certified to us when (1) a proper court certified the question, (2) the question involves a matter of Iowa law, (3) the question “may be determinative of the cause ... pending in the certifying court,” and (4) it appears to the certifying court that there is no controlling Iowa precedent.

Life Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am. v. Estate of Corrado, 838 N.W.2d 640, 643 (Iowa 2013)

(citation omitted) (quoting Iowa Code § 684A.1 ).

Here we elect to answer the certified questions. They arrive to us from a proper court, they involve matters of Iowa law, they may be determinative of the cause, and there is no controlling Iowa precedent. See Oyens Feed & Supply, Inc. v. Primebank, 879 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Iowa 2016)

. Additionally, both parties urge us to answer the questions. See id.

III. Analysis.

A. First Certified Question: Does Iowa Code Section 613.15

Require Adult Children's Loss–of–Consortium Claims to Be Arbitrated When the Estate's Claims Are Otherwise Subject to Arbitration? When a person dies due to the wrongful or negligent act of another, Iowa law authorizes the personal representative to commence a wrongful-death action on behalf of the estate. As we have explained,

Iowa recognizes no common law action for wrongful death. Power to maintain such actions is entirely statutory. Our first statute was enacted in 1851 as Code § 2501. That section is today § 611.20, a survival statute, which keeps alive for the benefit of his estate the cause of action which the deceased prior to his death could have brought had he survived the injury, with recovery enlarged to include the wrongful death.

Egan v. Naylor, 208 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Iowa 1973)

. Iowa Code section 611.20, the present statutory foundation for wrongful-death actions, provides, “All causes of action shall survive and may be brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the same.” Iowa Code § 611.20 (2015). Furthermore, Code §§ 611.20, 611.22 and 633.336 and their predecessors have consistently been held to vest the right to recover wrongful death damages exclusively in the estate representative.” Egan, 208 N.W.2d at 918.

In addition, Iowa recognizes a cause of action for loss of consortium. When a minor child suffers injury or death, Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.206

provides, “A parent, or the parents, may sue for the expense and actual loss of services, companionship and society resulting from injury to or death of a minor child.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.206. Otherwise, such as here when a parent dies allegedly due to the wrongful act of another, Iowa Code section 613.15 provides,

In any action for damages because of the wrongful or negligent injury or death of a woman, there shall be no disabilities or restrictions, and recovery may be had on account thereof in the same manner as in cases of damage because of the wrongful or negligent injury or death of a man. In addition she, or her administrator for her estate, may recover for physician's services, nursing and hospital expense, and in the case of both women and men, such person, or the appropriate administrator, may recover the value of services and support as spouse or parent, or both, as the case may be, in such sum as the jury deems proper; provided, however, recovery for these elements of damage may not be had by the spouse and children, as such, of any person who, or whose administrator, is entitled to recover same.

Iowa Code § 613.15

.

So worded, Iowa Code section 613.15

empowers the administrator of a parent's estate, rather than the children, to bring an action for the children's loss of the parent's services. “In the case of a parent's death, the child's claim for...

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12 cases
  • Allison v. State
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • June 29, 2018
    ...even when the parties do not explicitly claim a right to relief based on constitutional provisions. Roth v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y , 886 N.W.2d 601, 611 (Iowa 2016) (interpreting statutory language guided by principle that statutes should be construed to avoid constitutio......
  • Ommen v. Ringlee
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    ...are a derivative of another party’s claims, in this case, CoOportunity.2 More squarely on point is Roth v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society , 886 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa 2016). There, we regarded a wrongful-death claim brought by a personal representative as a claim that stands in the s......
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    • June 29, 2018
    ...court," and (4) it appears to the certifying court that there is no controlling Iowa precedent. Roth v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y , 886 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa 2016) (omission in original) (quoting Estate of Corrado , 838 N.W.2d at 643 ).We conclude that these four criteria ha......
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    ...certifying court that there is no controlling Iowa precedent. Baldwin I , 915 N.W.2d at 265 (quoting Roth v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc'y , 886 N.W.2d 601, 605 (Iowa 2016) ).The parties dispute whether the third criterion has been met. The only claims currently pending in the f......
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