Roth v. House of Refuge

• Decision Date: 02 July 1869
• Parties: MARTIN ROTH v. THE HOUSE OF REFUGE. John Boyle, By His Next Friend, Charles Boyle v. The Same.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

31 Md. 329

MARTIN ROTH v. THE HOUSE OF REFUGE.

John Boyle, By His Next Friend, Charles Boyle v. The Same.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

July 2, 1869

The causes were argued before STEWART, GRASON, MILLER, ALVEY and ROBINSON, JJ.

W Parkin Scott and William M. Merrick, for the appellants.

Frederick W. Brune and S. Teackle Wallis for the appellee.

Alvey J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The first question to be determined in this case is, whether there exists in the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City the right to review the determination of the judge assigned to the Baltimore City Court, in matters of habeas corpus? for if so, then, it is clear, there is no right of appeal to this court from the judgment of the Supreme Bench, and this appeal must be dismissed. For that there is no right of appeal to this court, in matters of habeas corpus, is no longer an open question, and the only ground upon which the present appeal can be maintained is, that the Supreme Bench has assumed and exercised unauthorized jurisdiction and that its judgment, in so far as it has exercised unwarranted jurisdiction in the premises, may be reviewed and reversed.

The solution of the question of jurisdiction here involved depends upon the construction of part 4 of Art. 4 of the Constitution, in reference to the courts of Baltimore City, and particularly of sec. 33 of that Article.

Without stating the provisions of the preceding sections in relation to the organization and style of the courts, the apportionment of powers and jurisdiction to each, and the manner in which they are to be conducted in the administration of justice, it is necessary to notice particularly the language employed in Art. 4, sec. 33, in reference to the powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Bench, as distinguished from the powers and jurisdiction of the other courts of the city.

By that section it is declared to be the duty of the Supreme Bench "to provide for the holding of as many general terms as the performance of its duties may require, such general terms to be held by not less than three judges; to make all needful rules and regulations for the conduct of business in each of the said courts, during the session thereof, and in vacation, or in chambers, before any of said judges; and shall also have jurisdiction to hear and determine all motions for a new trial in cases tried in any of said courts, where such motions arise, either on questions of fact, or for misdirection upon any matters of law, and all motions, in arrest of judgment, or upon any matters of law determined by the said judge or judges, while holding said several courts; and the said Supreme Bench of Baltimore City shall make all needful rules and regulations for the hearing before it of all of said matters."

It will be observed that the power given to this court is large and comprehensive. If there be any matter of law determined by the judges in the several courts, except it be in cases of appeal from justices of the peace, it is liable to be reheard and determined by the Supreme Bench; the great object being to to secure uniformity of decision, and greater deliberation of judgment than was practicable in the separate courts, presided over by a single judge. And such being the scope and design of its jurisdiction, the relation of the Supreme Bench to the other courts of the city is that of a court in banc, where parties can have questions of law deliberately considered by at least three judges, without the delay and expense of an appeal to the Court of Appeals and where they can have the benefit of such review in many important cases where an appeal will not lie. Why, then, is matter of law, determined on application for habeas corpus, not within the meaning and design of the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Bench? It must be admitted that the language employed is comprehensive enough to embrace it; and if it be excluded at all, it must be so only because of the want of adaptation of the jurisdiction to the particular remedy. But we see nothing of the want of fitness in the application of such jurisdiction to the...