Rothschild v. The Pac. Co.

• Docket Number: 23-cv-01721-LJC
• Decision Date: 21 June 2023
• Parties: THOMAS ETIENNE ROTHSCHILD, Plaintiff, v. THE PACIFIC COMPANIES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

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THOMAS ETIENNE ROTHSCHILD, Plaintiff, v. THE PACIFIC COMPANIES, Defendant.

No. 23-cv-01721-LJC

United States District Court, N.D. California

June 21, 2023

ORDER GRANTING IFP APPLICATION; SCREENING COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(E)(2)(B); GRANTING MOTION TO AMEND ECF NOS. 1, 12, 15

LISA J. CISNEROS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Thomas Etienne Rothschild filed his Complaint and an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). ECF Nos. 1, 12.^[1] Plaintiff also filed a Motion to Amend Complaint, Add Defendants, and Correct Venue (Motion to Amend). ECF No. 15. The Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend is appropriate for disposition without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Accordingly, the hearing on the Motion to Amend, set for July 10, 2023, at 9:00 A.M. is VACATED. Having considered Plaintiff's papers, the Court GRANTS the IFP application and finds that the Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court also GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Amend, and orders Plaintiff to file a first amended complaint that addresses the deficiencies identified in this screening order by July 12, 2023.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff purports to bring this lawsuit on behalf of himself and others similarly situated against Defendant The Pacific Companies. ECF No. 1 (Compl.) at 1.^[2] The crux of Plaintiff's Complaint centers around construction of a five-story parking garage in Burlingame, California that lasted approximately four years. Id. at 3. Plaintiff alleges that he lived next door to the construction site and was subjected to constant noise and dust that eventually lead to him developing breathing problems. Id. at 4. Plaintiff also alleges that the construction proceeded under dangerous conditions, and that he submitted verbal and written complaints to The Pacific Companies regarding these dangerous conditions to no avail. Id.

Plaintiff brings claims for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment breach of warranty, fraud, violations of the Clean Air Act^[3], negligence, negligence per se, and strict liability. Id. at 19. Plaintiff requests punitive and compensatory damages, interest, attorney fees, “and any other relief the court deems fitting.” Id. at 53. He requests $300,000,000. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court may allow a plaintiff to prosecute an action in federal court without prepayment of fees or security if the plaintiff submits an affidavit showing that he or she is unable to pay such fees or provide such security. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). But the Court is also under a continuing duty to dismiss a case filed without the payment of the filing fee whenever it determines that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If the Court dismisses a case pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2)(B), the plaintiff may still file the same complaint by paying the filing fee. This is because the Court's Section 1915(e)(2)(B) dismissal is not on the merits, but rather an exercise of the court's discretion under the IFP statute. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992).

To make the determination under Section 1915(e)(2)(B), courts assess whether the complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Courts have the authority to dismiss complaints founded on “wholly fanciful” factual allegations for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir. 1984). A court can also dismiss a complaint where it is based solely on conclusory statements, naked assertions without any factual basis, or allegations that are not plausible on their face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); see also Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). Ordinarily the Court must give an IFP plaintiff leave to “amend their complaint unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1235, n.9.

III. DISCUSSION

Having evaluated Plaintiff's financial affidavit, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the economic eligibility requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and GRANTS the application to proceed IFP. The Court will first screen Plaintiff's Complaint under Section 1915(e)(2)(B), before addressing Plaintiff's Motion to Amend

A. Screening of Plaintiff's Complaint Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)

Plaintiff's Complaint does not sufficiently allege a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff first alleges that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, “which provides district courts with jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the United States Constitution or laws of the United States.” Compl. at 1.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and a “federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted). A federal court may exercise either federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction. Federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 requires a civil action to arise under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. “[T]he presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).

Here, all of Plaintiff's claims arise under state law except his claim for violations of the Clean Air Act. “The Clean Air Act entitles any person to sue for a violation of ‘an emission standard or limitation under this chapter' or ‘an order issued by the [Environmental Protection Agency] Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation.'” In re Volkswagen ‘Clean Diesel' Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prod. Liab. Litig., 894 F.3d 1030, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1)); see also Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Davis, 932 F.2d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Section 7604 permits citizens to commence civil suits in the district court against persons who violate either emission standards or limitations promulgated under various sections of the [Clean Air] Act or orders issued by the EPA or a state concerning those standards or limitations.”) Relief under the Clean Air Act's citizen-suit provision is limited only to injunctive relief and/or civil penalties “deposited in a special fund in the United States Treasury for licensing and other services” or used in “beneficial mitigation projects.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(a), (g).

What the Clean Air Act does not provide for is “a free-standing cause of action for nuisance that allows for compensatory damages.” City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 895, 908 (9th Cir. 2020); see also Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463, n.7 (11th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the plaintiff's position that he should have been granted leave to amend his complaint as “lack[ing] merit” because “there is not any private right of action under the Clean Air Act”); Abuhouran v. Kaiserkane, Inc., No. 10-6609 NLH/KMW, 2011 WL 6372208, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 19, 2011) (“[T]he Clean Air Act does not authorize a private cause of action for compensatory damages for alleged violations of the Act, and thus federal question jurisdiction does not exist[] for such claims.”)

This leaves only Plaintiff's state law claims, over which this Court has jurisdiction if diversity jurisdiction exists. In addition to alleging this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he jurisdiction is further appropriate due to diversity.”

Compl. at 3. A court has diversity jurisdiction where the parties are diverse and “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Parties are diverse only when the parties are “citizens of different states.” Id. Here, Plaintiff alleges that he resides in Florida and “the Defendant resides in Tacoma, Washington.” Compl. at 3.^[4] But the Defendant, The Pacific Companies, is a corporation, so its state citizenship is not determined by where it “resides.” Instead, “a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Although Plaintiff alleges that the Court has personal jurisdiction over The Pacific Companies because its “principal place of business is not located in this state,” he does not allege where its principal place of business is actually located. Compl. at 1. Therefore, the Court has no basis to determine the citizenship of The Pacific Companies and whether it has diversity jurisdiction in this matter.

As to Plaintiff, a natural person's state citizenship is determined by his or her state of domicile. Kanter v Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). “A person's domicile is her permanent home, where she resides with the intention to remain or to which she intends to return.” Id. However, “[a] person residing in a given state is not necessarily domiciled there, and thus is not necessarily a citizen of that state.” Id. (internal citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges that he resides in Florida (Compl. at 3), but this is insufficient to allege...