Rotwein v. Bogart

Decision Date25 January 1962
Docket NumberNo. 128,128
Citation177 A.2d 258,227 Md. 434
PartiesJoseph ROTWEIN v. James J. BOGART et ux.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Joseph Rotwein, in pro. per., Washington, D. C. (Robert B. Myers, Rockville, on the brief), for appellant.

M. J. Cuff, Hyattsville, for appellees.

Before HAMMOND, HORNEY, MARBURY, and SYBERT, JJ., and O. BOWIE DUCKETT, Special Judge.

DUCKETT, Judge.

This case involves the purchase by the appellant of a house and lot from the appellees in Bethesda, Maryland. The house was constructed by the appellees (defendants below) and purchased by the appellant, a Washington, D. C. lawyer, in January, 1958, for forty-three thousand, five hundred dollars ($43,500). A contract of sale executed by the parties contained, among others, the following warranties:

'Seller [warrants] that the workmanship and materials of the house and equipment are free of defects and in good working order. * * *'

'It is agreed that prior to settlement seller will correct any condition of the land resulting in faulty drainage, particularly the condition which results in the accumulation of water in the rear of the property and the depositing of silt on adjoining property.'

The appellant, claiming that the appellees had breached the above provisions, filed suit against them for damages in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. After a lengthy trial, the jury decided against the purchaser and in favor of the builder.

The appellant presents two points in requesting a new trial or a reversal of the judgment of the court below, viz.:

(1) Did the trial court commit reversible error in refusing to permit appellant's rebuttal witness to express an opinion as to what caused the floors to be squeaky and noisy?

(2) Did the trial court commit reversible error in withdrawing from the consideration of the jury the issue of whether the provision relating to the drainage condition had been breached by the appellees?

We shall first consider Point No. 1. The witness in question, Jack Pustilnik, called in rebuttal, was permitted to testify that he had been in the lumber business for twenty-two years; that he was vice-president, general manager and a stockholder in the Baltimore Lumber Company where he was on duty daily from eight a. m. to five p. m. However, he testified that in addition to his above duties, he had for two years (about five or six years ago) been a partner in a floor laying business and that while working at the lumber company, he had, at the same time, supervised the laying of floors in approximately two hundred homes. He did not lay any of the floors himself. Acting upon this testimony, the court ruled that Mr. Pustilnik could qualify as an expert in the lumber business but nor in the flooring trade. In his ruling, the court said: 'I do not see how he can possibly testify as an expert on flooring if he had never laid a floor himself, and, of course, this is obviously a part-time operation because he has another full-time job.'

We find no prejudicial error in the court's ruling on this point.

The determination of whether a witness is competent to testify as an expert is primarily for the trial court and largely within its discretion. See cases collected in 10 M.L.E., Evidence, § 281, p. 298. However, the lower court's ruling may be reversed if clearly erroneous or an abuse of judicial discretion. Turner v. State Roads Commission, 213 Md. 428 433-4, 132 A.2d 455; 2 Jones on Evidence (5th ed.), § 414; McCormick on Evidence, § 13, p. 28. Cf. 2 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), § 561, and Hunt v. Bradshaw, 251 F.2d 103 (C.A. 4th).

We do not agree entirely with the court's first reason, that the witness could not qualify as an expert in the flooring trade as he had never previously laid a floor. A witness may qualify if he possesses special and sufficient knowledge regardless of whether such knowledge was obtained from study, observation or experience. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v. Messenger, 181 Md. 295, 29 A.2d 653. A law professor may be an expert on trial procedure even though he has never tried a case. There are many expert astronauts who have yet to make a space flight.

An expert witness must be thoroughly qualified, Park Land Corp. of Baltimore City v. City of Baltimore, 128 Md. 611, 624, 98 A. 153, and the trial court may well have concluded that Mr. Pustilnik's part-time supervision was not sufficient. Moreover, his was rebuttal and cumulative testimony, and this court will not reverse for an error below unless the error 'was both manifestly wrong and substantially...

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37 cases
  • State of Md. Deposit Ins. Fund Corp. v. Billman
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • October 17, 1990
    ...or exclusion of evidence unless they cause substantial injustice,' so 'substantial prejudice' must be shown. In Rotwein v. Bogart, 227 Md. 434, 437, 177 A.2d 258[, 260] (1962) we declared that 'this Court will not reverse for an error below unless the error "was both manifestly wrong and su......
  • McQuay v. Schertle
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • June 2, 1999
    ...the error on the part of the trial court "was both manifestly wrong and substantially injurious," id. (quoting Rotwein v. Bogart, 227 Md. 434, 437, 177 A.2d 258 (1962)), or the error is established to have had "a prejudicial effect on the outcome of the case." Id. (quoting Kuenne, supra, 24......
  • I. W. Berman Properties v. Porter Bros., Inc.
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • September 8, 1975
    ...reverse for an error by the lower court unless that error is 'both manifestly wrong and substantially injurious.' Rotwein v. Bogart, 227 Md. 434, 437, 177 A.2d 258, 260 (1962). An error which does not affect the outcome of the case is 'harmless error.' Master Royalties Corp. v. Mayor & City......
  • Roy v. Dackman
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • October 6, 2014
    ...such knowledge was obtained from study, observation or experience.” Radman, 279 Md. at 171, 367 A.2d 472 (quoting Rotwein v. Bogart, 227 Md. 434, 437, 177 A.2d 258 (1962) ). The classic example of this concept was articulated by the Court of Appeals: “[a] law professor may be an expert on t......
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