Roullard v. McSoley, 7481.
| Decision Date | 18 April 1934 |
| Docket Number | No. 7481.,7481. |
| Citation | 172 A. 326 |
| Parties | ROULLARD v. McSOLEY. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Appeal and Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Herbert L. Carpenter, Judge.
Woodrow W. Welch petitioned the probate court to appoint William H. McSoley, Esq., as guardian of his person and estate. The petition was granted, and Phebe Roullard, the maternal grandmother of the ward, appealed to the superior court. In the superior court, a motion to dismiss her appeal was denied and exception was taken by William H. McSoley. From an adverse decree, Phebe Roullard appeals. On motion by William H. McSoley that appellant's claim of appeal be dismissed and appellant's exceptions from superior court.
Motion to dismiss denied, exceptions overruled, and case remitted.
See, also, Slepkow v. McSoley, 172 A. 328.
Archambault & Archambault, of Providence, for appellant.
William H. McSoley and Louis V. Jackvony, both of Providence, for appellee.
This case was heard (1) on motion of the appellee that the appellant's claim of appeal be dismissed and (2) on the exceptions of the appellant to certain rulings on evidence at the trial in the superior court and to the direction of a verdict affirming the decree of the probate court.
May 29, 1933, Woodrow W. Welch, being then 16 years of age, petitioned the probate court of Cranston to appoint William H. McSoley, Esq., as guardian of his person and estate. Gen. Laws 1923, c. 372, § 3. After a hearing at which no objection was made the petition was granted and the guardian filed a bond for $10,000. The appellant, Phebe Roullard, the maternal grandmother of the ward, appealed to the superior court from the decree of the probate court. In the superior court a motion to dismiss her appeal was denied, and exception to such denial was duly taken by the appellee.
The question raised in the superior court and in this court by the motions to dismiss is whether the appellant is entitled to an appeal under the provisions of Gen. Laws 1923, c. 362, § 1, which provide that: "Any person aggrieved by an order or decree of a court of probate may, unless provisions be made to the contrary, appeal therefrom to the superior court for the county in which such probate court is established, by taking the following procedure. * * *" Is the appellant "aggrieved" by the decree of the probate court within the meaning of the statute? A guardian of minor children appointed by will may be removed in the same manner and for the same cause as may other guardians appointed by the court. McPhillips v. McPhillips, 9 R. I. 536. The guardian in this case, although nominated by the ward, was appointed by the court, and is subject to the same control as any other guardian.
The state by its legislation exercises supervision and control over the person and property of infants, and it is the duty of the courts to protect their interests.
In the instant case the ward is an infant and an orphan; he has no brothers or sisters. His grandmother, his nearest relative, took much of the care of him during his mother's lifetime and until her death which occurred May 25, 1933. The grandmother's relation to him, although not exactly in loco parentis, is, in some respects, of that character. See McGarr v. National & Providence Worsted Mills, 24 R. I. 447, 53 A. 320, 60 L. R. A. 122, 96 Am. St. Rep. 749.
Section 5 of chapter 105", Gen. Laws 1923, provides: "The kindred of any such poor person, if any he shall have, in the line or degree of father or grandfather, mother or grandmother, children or grandchildren, by consanguinity, or children by adoption, living within this state and of sufficient ability, shall be holden to support such pauper in proportion to such ability." If the estate of the ward is wasted by the guardian, the obligation to support the ward is imposed upon the grandmother by the statute. Her interest in the guardianship is not general or remote; it is particular and immediate. In addition to the potential financial liability, she has a natural interest in the selection of a proper person to supervise the training and education of her grandson. The continuance of this personal interest is beneficial, both to the ward and to the state. To decide...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Matunuck Beach Hotel, Inc. v. Sheldon
...(1926); McKenna v. McKenna, 29 R.I. 224, 69 A. 844 (1908); Cf. Vermette v. Cirillo, 114 R.I. 66, 328 A.2d 419 (1974); Roullard v. McSoley, 54 R.I. 232, 172 A. 326 (1934); Hall v. Burgess, 40 R.I. 314, 100 A. 1013 (1917) (cases holding that the administrator or executor of an estate comes wi......
-
Landmark Medical Center v. Gauthier
...pauper in proportion to that family member's ability. We have recognized the obligations imposed by this statute in Roullard v. McSoley, 54 R.I. 232, 172 A. 326 (1934), and later in Whitmarsh v. McGair, 84 R.I. 226, 122 A.2d 748 Both statutes provide a means for a creditor to seek payment f......
-
Duffy v. Sarault, Civ. A. No. 88-0394.
...of their positions. An aggrieved person is an individual who has been denied some personal or property right. Roullard v. McSoley, 54 R.I. 232, 235, 172 A. 326, 327 (1934). As discussed above, the Plaintiffs did in fact have a property interest in continued employment, albeit not in perpetu......
-
Slepkow v. MeSoley
...decree, respondent Phebe Roullard appeals. Appeal sustained to extent of reversing decree, and decree rendered. See, also, Roullard v. McSoley, 172 A. 326. Judah C. Semonoff and Edmund J. Kelly, both of Providence, for William H. McSoley and Louis V. Jackvony, both of Proyidence, for guardi......