Roundhouse Const. Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co., Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 April 1975
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: ROUNDHOUSE CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. TELESCO MASONS SUPPLIES COMPANY, INC., et al.

Page 778

362 A.2d 778

168 Conn. 371

ROUNDHOUSE CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION v. TELESCO MASONS SUPPLIES COMPANY, INC., et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

April 22, 1975.

Judgment Vacated Oct. 6, 1975. See 96 S.Ct. 20.

David S. Grossman, Brookfield, with whom, on the brief, was Sidney Burger, Ridgefield, for appellant (plaintiff).

Herbert V. Camp, Jr., Ridgefield, for appellees (defendants Fischer).

William W. Sprague, Hartford, filed a brief as amicus curiae.

Before HOUSE, C.J., and COTTER, LOISELLE, MacDONALD and BOGDANSKI, JJ.

HOUSE, Chief Justice.

This action was brought by the plaintiff to foreclose a mechanic's lien on the property of the defendants Richard P. and Bonnie R. Fischer. The Fischers contracted with the plaintiff, Roundhouse Construction Corporation, for the construction of a geodesic dome for a residence on real property owned by them in the town of Ridgefield. After construction had begun and after some payments had been made on the contract, the Fischers ceased making payments, and the structure is incomplete. On November 7, 1973, the plaintiff filed a mechanic's lien on the Fischer property and by complaint dated January 24, 1974, brought the present action to foreclose that lien. Also named as defendants in this action were four subcontractors who had filed mechanics' liens on the Fischer property.

The Fischers, hereinafter referred to as the defendants, denied the substantive portions of the plaintiff's complaint, asserted certain special defenses including a claim that the plaintiff's workmanship was unsatisfactory and that the structure had collapsed, counterclaimed against the plaintiff, and cross-complained against the four other lienors. One of the grounds set forth in the cross complaint and counterclaim was that the mechanics' liens were invalid in that they constituted a taking of the defendants' property without due process of law contrary to the provisions of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. The Fischers then moved the court, on the same constitutional basis, for an order to show cause why an injunction should not be issued against maintaining the liens. An order to show cause was issued to all the lienors. The parties stipulated to the facts which we have hereinbefore briefly summarized and agreed that the Superior Court should determine the sole issue of the constitutional validity of the mechanics' liens on the Fischer property. The court, filing a well-reasoned memorandum of decision, found the Connecticut mechanic's lien statutes unconstitutional as violative of the due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States and article first, § 10, of the constitution of Connecticut and rendered judgment enjoining the plaintiff and the other four lienor defendants from maintaining their mechanics' liens on the Fischer property and declaring the liens to be invalid. The present appeal was taken solely by the plaintiff. The other four lienor defendants against whom judgment was also rendered did not appeal.

The decisive issue on the appeal is whether the Connecticut statutory procedure governing mechanics' liens is unconstitutional because it does not comply with the due process of law requirements of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution and article first, § 10, of the Connecticut constitution. 'We have held that these provisions of the federal and state constitutions have the same meaning and impose similar constitutional limitations.' Cyphers v. Allyn, 142 Conn. 699, 703, 118 A.2d 318, 321; Katz v. Brandon, 156 Conn. 521, 537, 245 A.2d 579. The appeal raises for the first time in this court a question as to the constitutionality of Connecticut's mechanic's lien procedure. The United States Supreme Court, however, has recently had occasion to consider the constitutionality of the attachment, garnishment, sequestration and mechanic's lien procedures in several states and the decisions of that court guide and must control our decision.

The Connecticut mechanic's lien statutes are found in §§ 49-33 through 49-40a of the General Statutes. While the statutory provisions are too lengthy to be repeated here in their entirety, they provide, in brief, that '(i)f any person has a claim for more than ten dollars for materials furnished or services rendered in the construction, raising, removal or repairs of any building or any of its appurtenance . . . and such claim is by virtue of an agreement with or by consent of the owner of the land upon which such building is being erected or has been erected or has been moved, . . . such building, with the land on which it stands . . . shall be subject to the payment of such claim. Such claim shall be a lien on such land, building and appurtenances . . ..' General Statutes § 49-33.

Section 49-34 provides, in pertinent part, that '(n)o such lien shall be valid, unless the person performing such services or furnishing such materials, within sixty days after he has ceased to do so, lodges with the town clerk in the town in which such building is situated a certificate in writing, describing the premises, the amount claimed as a lien thereon and the date of the commencement of the performance of services or furnishing of materials, stating that the amount claimed is justly due, as nearly as the same can be ascertained, and subscribed and sworn to by the claimant; which certificate shall be recorded by the town clerk with deeds of land.' Section 49-35 requires that subcontractors and materialmen whose written contracts with the original contractor have not been assented to in writing by the other party to the original contract and who claim mechanics' liens must give notice to the owner of the property against which the liens are claimed. This requirement of notice, however, does not apply to a principal contractor such as the present plaintiff. Section 49-36 provides that the amount of the lien on any building or its appurtenances cannot exceed the amount agreed upon in the contract for such building and its appurtenances, and § 49-37 provides that the owner of the real estate subject to the lien may apply to the Superior Court for dissolution of the lien upon substitution of a bond with surety. In addition no mechanic's lien shall remain in force for a period longer than four years after it has been perfected unless the lienor commences an action to foreclose the lien within two years from the date the lien was filed, and provision is made for the discharge of the lien on the records if no action is brought to foreclose it within two years from the date it was perfected. General Statutes § 49-39. Section 49-51 permits any person having an interest in any real estate 'described in any certificate of lien, which lien is invalid but not discharged of record' to give notice to the lienor to discharge the lien and, if such request is not complied with in thirty days, to bring his complaint to the court which would have jurisdiction of the foreclosure of such lien, if valid, claiming such discharge. That court may adjudge the validity or invalidity of the lien, and a certified copy of a judgment of invalidity recorded on the land records shall fully discharge it.

The defendants argue that this mechanic's lien statutory scheme in Connecticut operates to deprive them of their property without the due process of law guaranteed them by the federal and state constitutions. More specifically, they assert that the Connecticut statutes fail to provide for prior notice to property owners such as themselves and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner and that, under procedural due process standards, the absence of such provisions renders the procedure unconstitutional.

It is fundamental that property cannot be taken without procedural due process as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States and article first, § 10, of the constitution of Connecticut. For more than a century, the central meaning of procedural due process has been clear. 'Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.' Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233, 17 L.Ed. 531; Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 23 L.Ed. 914; Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 17 S.Ct. 841, 42 L.Ed. 215; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 34 S.Ct. 779, 58 L.Ed. 1363. It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard 'must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62. The United States Supreme Court has reiterated that these fundamental requirements apply to the deprivation of 'any significant property interest.' Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113. In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1589, 29 L.Ed.2d 90, the Supreme Court held that the suspension of drivers' licenses 'adjudicates important interests of the licensees' and that '(i)n such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment.' The court noted that '(t)his is but an application of the general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a 'right' or a 'privilege" and held (p. 542, 91 S.Ct. at p. 1591) that 'it is fundamental that except in emergency situations . . . due process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest such as that here involved, it must afford 'notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case' before the termination becomes effective.'

This effective opportunity to be heard is the gravamen of the currently accepted standards of procedural due process in the area of property rights as now prescribed in the United States Supreme...