Rounds Bros. v. McDaniel

• Decision Date: 04 May 1909
• Citation: Rounds Bros. v. McDaniel, 133 Ky. 669, 118 S.W. 956 (Ky. Ct. App. 1909)
• Parties: ROUNDS BROS. v. McDANIEL.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

118 S.W. 956

133 Ky. 669

ROUNDS BROS. v. McDANIEL.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

May 4, 1909

Appeal from Circuit Court, Daviess County.

"To be officially reported."

Action by A. J. McDaniel against Rounds Bros. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed, with directions.

Sweeney Ellis & Sweeney, for appellant.

W. E. Aud and J. R. Hays, for appellee.

CARROLL J.

This case presents the interesting question: What acts and conduct of a father will constitute an emancipation of his minor child so as to deny the father the right to recover the child's wages during his minority?

The mother of Byrne McDaniel died in 1900, when he was about 12 years old, leaving his father, the appellee, A. J. McDaniel with six children to care for. The father, who was a poor but kindly disposed man, a carpenter by trade, did not own any property, and found it necessary to place the other children--all of whom were younger than Byrne--in orphan homes; but after doing so he aided in their support. After this the father and Byrne boarded with a sister of the father, and for two or three years thereafter Byrne worked at different places, earning a few dollars a week, which he contributed towards his support. In 1902 Byrne, who was then about 14 years old, commenced to work for appellant, Rounds Bros. They paid him small wages in the beginning, but finding him to be an industrious, sober, well-behaved, and capable boy, gradually increased his compensation, until at the time this suit was brought in 1907 he was receiving some $8 or $10 a week. During the first two years that he worked for them he lived with his father at his aunt's, and contributed all or the greatest part of his wages towards paying for his board and clothing. In 1904, Byrne becoming dissatisfied with the accommodations received at his aunt's, left her house and procured board and lodging elsewhere. The evidence does not disclose any substantial reason why Byrne left the home of his aunt, but he assigned as a cause for so doing that the accommodations there were not as comfortable as he desired, and that he could not get his meals when he wanted them. After he left his father did not contribute anything toward his support or maintenance or expend anything in his behalf. In fact, he did not, after leaving his aunt, need the assistance of his father, as he was earning sufficient money to take care of himself. His father did not object to his leaving home, nor did he make any provision or arrangement for another home for him, although it cannot be said that his acts or conduct or treatment of Byrne furnished any sufficient reason why Byrne should have abandoned the home provided for him by his father. His father was at all times aware of the fact that Byrne was working for the Rounds Bros., and knew that from 1904 to 1906 they paid him his wages, and that he was expending them for his own use and benefit; but he did not object or make any demand that the wages be paid to him until April, 1906, when he notified Rounds Bros. that they must pay him what the boy earned. This they declined to do, and in 1908, he brought this action to recover the amount Byrne earned after he notified the Rounds Bros. to pay the wages to him. The lower court rendered a judgment in favor of the father against the Rounds Bros. for the amount of the boy's wages after the notification, less the sum expended during this time by Byrne for board and clothes. It may be here stated that, if the father had not emancipated his son and was entitled to his wages, no just complaint could be made of the judgment. Having the view the lower court did of the law of the case, it was correctly held that there should be deducted from the wages received by the son the amount necessary to defray his expenses. Culberson v. Alabama Construction Co., 127 Ga. 599, 56 S.E. 765, 9 L.R.A. (N. S.) 411, 9 A. & E. Ann.Cas. 507. From the judgment the Rounds Bros. prosecute this appeal, and ask a reversal upon the ground that the father had emancipated his son, and therefore was not entitled to recover his wages, and in this insistence they are joined by Byrne. The father's contention is that the facts before stated are not sufficient to amount to an emancipation of his son, and consequently he was entitled to recover from the Rounds Bros. the boy's wages after he notified them that he claimed them. He also makes the further point that even if it should be held that, by permitting his son to leave home and earn his own living, he impliedly emancipated him, yet he had the right at any time during the child's minority to revoke this constructive emancipation and resume parental control and authority, and that, after he had so revoked it by notifying the Rounds Bros. that he claimed his son's wages, the status of parent and child was re-established the same as if there had never been any emancipation.

We have in this state no statute upon the subject under consideration, nor has the question ever been directly decided by this court; but the subject of parent and child, and the reciprocal rights, duties, and obligations of each, has furnished so much interesting matter for text-book writers, and has so frequently been considered by courts of other jurisdictions, that there is ample precedent and authority, both ancient and modern, from which to gather and formulate the general rules of law applicable to this relation. But this case presents some features of the law that are not so well settled, and concerning which there is conflict of authority. The duties and obligations of parent and child are, in a sense, at least reciprocal. Upon the parent is imposed by nature, as well as law, the obligation of supporting and caring for his offspring. As said by Blackstone (volume 1, p. 447): "The duty of parents to provide for the maintenance of their children is a principle of natural law; an obligation, says Puffendorf, laid on them not only by nature herself, but by their own proper act, in bringing them into the world, for they would be in the highest manner injurious to their issue, if they only gave their children life that they might afterwards see them perish. By begetting them therefore they have entered into a voluntary obligation to endeavor, so far as in them lies, that the life which they have bestowed shall be supported and preserved." In Schouler on Domestic Relations, p. 415, it is said: "Three leading duties of parents as to their legitimate children are recognized at the common law: First, to protect; second, to educate; third, to maintain them. These duties are all enjoined by positive law, yet the law of the natural affection is stronger in upholding such fundamental obligations of the parental state." From this duty resting upon the parent comes the right to the services of the child during his minority, intended to be at least in some measure compensation for the care and attention bestowed upon the child in infancy; and this right of the parent to the services of the child during his minority is everywhere recognized. Jones v. Tevis, 14 Ky. 25, 14 Am.Dec. 98; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Willis, 83 Ky. 57, 4 Am.St.Rep. 124; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Henon (Ky.) 68 S.W. 456; Blackstone, Commentaries, vol. 1, p. 454; Schouler on Domestic Relations, p. 334; Tyler on Infancy & Coverture, p. 200; 29 Cyc. 1623; 21 Am. & Eng. Ency. of L. p. 1039.

It is equally well settled that the parent, although entitled to the services and earnings of his minor child, may relinquish or surrender this right: First, by failing to provide for his child a home if he is able to do so; second, by such ill treatment, neglect, or cruel conduct as forces the child to abandon his home; third, by becoming so degraded or dissolute a character that his child cannot in morals or decency live with him; and, fourth, by emancipating his child. And if, in this case, the father had failed to provide a reasonably comfortable home for Byrne, or if he had treated him in a cruel or inhuman manner, or if he had so grossly neglected his parental duties as to cause him to leave his home, or if his life was so unworthy or discreditable that his son could not in decency or self-respect longer continue to recognize his authority, we would have little difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the father could not, after driving him away, or by his acts or conduct forcing him to shift for himself and make his own living, thereafter lay claim to his earnings. All the books are agreed upon this point, and indeed, in the absence of authority, we could have no doubt that under a state of case like this the father could not have the assistance of the courts to aid him in securing the services or wages of his child whom he had compelled by neglect, cruel treatment, or dissolute habits to secure another home. 29 Cyc. p. 1627; Godfrey v. Hays, 6 Ala. 501, 41 Am.Dec. 58; Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass. 272, 8 Am.Dec. 101; Swift & Co. v. Johnson, 138 F. 867, 71 C.C.A. 619, 1 L.R.A. (N. S.) 1161; Tyler on Infancy & Coverture, p. 200. But the facts of this case do not warrant us in putting our decision upon any of these grounds, and so, if the judgment below is to be reversed, it must be because the father had emancipated his son. The doctrine of "emancipation," looking at it from a legal standpoint, is a recognition of the right of the parent to relinquish control and authority over his child to whose custody and service he is entitled; or to surrender, if he so elects and desires, to his minor son, who is capable of making his own living, the right to do so, and the privilege of receiving the wages that he earns. When this right of emancipation has been granted, it follows as a matter of course that the person for whom the child labors may pay him his wages, and that the child...