Rourk v. Cameron Appraisal Dist.

• Decision Date: 04 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 13-02-047-CV.,13-02-047-CV.
• Citation: 131 S.W.3d 285
• Parties: Thora O. ROURK, et al., Appellants, v. CAMERON APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

131 S.W.3d 285

Thora O. ROURK, et al., Appellants, v. CAMERON APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellee.

No. 13-02-047-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi-Edinburg.

March 4, 2004.

Ruben R. Pena, Law Offices of Ruben R. Pena, P.C., Harlingen, for Appellant.

Ernest C. Garcia, Linebarger Goggan Blair, Austin, for Appellee.

Before Chief Justice VALDEZ and Justices RODRIGUEZ and AMIDEI.¹

OPINION

Opinion by Justice AMIDEI (Assigned).

Appellants, Thora O. Rourk, et al.,² and all others similarly situated, brought a class action requesting a declaratory judgment that travel trailers and park model recreational vehicles are personal property and exempt from taxation under article VIII, section 1(d)(2) of the Texas Constitution, and section 11.14(a) of the Texas Tax Code. Tex. Const. art. VII, § 1(d)(2); Tex. Tax.Code Ann. § 11.14(a) (Vernon 2001). The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of appellee, Cameron Appraisal District, and this appeal ensued.

In five issues, appellants claim the trial court erred: (1) in holding that it had no jurisdiction over their challenge to the constitutionality of appellee's actions because appellants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies; (2) in granting summary judgment for appellee when fact questions exist regarding whether the travel trailers and park model recreational vehicles were personal property and exempt from taxation under article VIII, section 1(d)(2) of the constitution; (3) in providing more relief than was requested by appellee; (4) in denying class certification; and (5) in finding that all members of the class must exhaust their administrative remedies.

We reverse and remand.

Standard of Review

The court in Garcia v. John Hancock Variable Life Ins. Co., 859 S.W.2d 427 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1993, writ denied), summarizes the applicable standards for reviewing a summary judgment as follows:

(1) The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law;

(2) In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true; and

(3) Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubt resolved in its favor.

See id. at 429-30 (citing Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985); Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Tex.1984)).

A defendant pleading an affirmative defense may obtain summary judgment by (1) disproving at least one of the elements of each of the plaintiff's causes of action, or (2) conclusively proving all the elements of the affirmative defense. See Am. Med. Elecs., Inc. v. Korn, 819 S.W.2d 573, 576 (Tex.App.Dallas 1991, writ denied); Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied); Lesbrookton, Inc. v. Jackson, 796 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1990, writ denied).

When a defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense, he must expressly present and conclusively prove each essential element of that defense. Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex.1972); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979); Deer Creek Ltd. v. North Am. Mortgage Co., 792 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1990, no writ). A defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense when he denies the plaintiff's right to judgment, even if the plaintiff establishes every allegation in its pleadings. Highway Contractors, Inc. v. W. Tex. Equip. Co., 617 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1981, no writ). Unless the defendant conclusively establishes its affirmative defense, the plaintiff has no burden in response to a motion for summary judgment filed on the basis of an affirmative defense. Torres v. W. Cas. & Sur. Co., 457 S.W.2d 50, 52 (Tex.1970).

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellants are individuals with travel trailers and park model recreational vehicles situated on rented spaces in trailer parks or trailer courts in Cameron County, Texas.³ Appellee assessed and taxed appellants' vehicles for ad valorem taxes. Appellants challenged the assessment as an unconstitutional violation of article VIII, section 1(d)(2) of the Texas Constitution,⁴ and as a violation of section 11.14(a) of the Texas Tax Code⁵ on grounds that appellee incorrectly classified their vehicles as "manufactured homes."⁶ Appellants sued for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and requested that the case be certified as a class action.

Appellee contested jurisdiction and class certification. Specifically, appellee sought to have section 11.14(a) of the Texas Tax Code declared unconstitutional and null and void.⁷ Appellee argued that appellants' vehicles were not exempt from taxation under the constitution because the vehicles were taxable as "manufactured homes." In addition, appellee claimed that some of appellants' vehicles were so affixed to the real estate they were "improvements" and taxable under section 1.04(3) of the Texas Tax Code. See Tex. Tax.Code Ann. § 1.04(3) (Vernon 2001).⁸

Without explanation, comment or specification the trial court held generally the proposed class was not clearly ascertainable, and class action procedure would alter the substantive prerequisites of a showing of a de novo appeal pursuant to the Texas Tax Code as a basis for jurisdiction, and denied class certification. The order denying certification found that appellants had been misjoined and ordered that any cause of action which any of the thirty-four named and identified plaintiffs may wish to pursue against appellee should be separately docketed and tried as separate lawsuits.⁹ The summary judgment, entered on the same day as the order denying certification, ordered dismissal with prejudice any cause of action the thirty-four plaintiffs may have had against appellee for the tax year 2000, together with any cause of action Ryle Andrews, George and Fran Wrasse, Vassie Miller, Jerry and Carol Wingett, Elva Broker, Jewell and Martha Groover, Larry and Mary Gustin and Richard Parker may have had for the tax year 2001. Further, the summary judgment ordered that appellants take nothing on their cause of action alleging their "dwelling structures" were exempt from taxation or that appellee violated the Texas Constitution in the valuation or assessment of appellants' "dwelling structures" for purposes of taxation. The trial court did not rule that tax code section 11.14(a) was unconstitutional.

Issues Presented

Appellants' first issue contends that the trial court erred in holding that appellants had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, therefore, finding that it had no jurisdiction over appellants' claims. Appellants claim they have the right to directly challenge appellee's actions in adding their vehicles to the tax rolls for ad valorem tax purposes as an unconstitutional usurpation of the authority of the Legislature to legislate.¹⁰ Also, appellants point out that in appellee's "Amended Answer and Original Counterclaim for Declaratory Relief," appellee sought to have section 11.14(a) of the Texas Tax Code declared unconstitutional, and they (appellants) were seeking a ruling on the constitutionality of the Legislature's action as well as that of appellee's. Specifically, appellants argue that (1) section 42.09 of the Texas Tax Code is not applicable to dismiss their suit because twenty-three of the thirty-four appellants for the tax year 2000, and seven of the thirty-four appellants for the tax year 2001 were not invoking the procedure for adjudication of the grounds of protest under that section, but were instead urging the Texas Constitution as their authority; and (2) appellee's denial of tax exemptions on appellants' vehicles is an unconstitutional application and construction of section 11.14(a) of the Texas Tax Code.

In contrast, appellee claims that the Texas Tax Code procedures for adjudicating a tax protest are the exclusive remedies available to a property owner. Tex. Tax.Code Ann. § 42.09(a) (Vernon 2001). In its brief, appellee outlined the procedure for making a protest and appealing an appraisal review board final order, but appellee did not contend that all of appellants failed to follow the procedure as a prerequisite to the filing of this suit. To the contrary, appellee admitted that a number of appellants (eleven for the tax year 2000 and twenty-seven for the tax year 2001) had perfected their appeals. Both parties admitted that a certain number of unidentified appellants did not seek any administrative remedies.

The trial court found that it did not have jurisdiction¹¹ and ordered dismissed with prejudice: (1) any cause of action for the tax year 2000 which any of the thirty-four sets of named and identified plaintiffs may have had against appellee; and (2) any cause of action for the tax year 2001 which appellants Ryle Andrews, George and Fran Wrasse, Vassie Miller, Jerry and Carol Wingett, Elva Broker, Jewell and Martha Groover, Larry and Mary Gustin and Richard Parker may have had.

As an initial matter, we note that a violation of a taxpayer's constitutional right to an assessment conforming to article VIII, section 1 of the constitution of Texas and the statutes of this state may be judicially enforced. Parker County v. Spindletop Oil and Gas Co., 628 S.W.2d 765, 768 (Tex.1982); Whelan v. State, 155 Tex. 14, 282 S.W.2d 378, 380 (1955); City of Saginaw v. Garvey Elevators, Inc., 431 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Corrigan Prop., Inc. v. City of W. Univ. Pl., 430 S.W.2d 917, 919-20 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, no writ). Acts that are prohibited or unauthorized by law are subject to taxpayers' suits for injunctive or other appropriate relief. Deacon v. City of Euless, 405 S.W.2d 59, 64 (Tex.1966); 70 Tex. Jur.3d, Taxpayers'...