O'Rourke v. Jason Inc., Civil Action No. 94-30167-MAP.

• Decision Date: 10 September 1997
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 94-30167-MAP.
• Citation: 978 F.Supp. 41
• Parties: Kevin O'ROURKE, Plaintiff, v. JASON INCORPORATED, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

978 F.Supp. 41

Kevin O'ROURKE, Plaintiff, v. JASON INCORPORATED, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 94-30167-MAP.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

September 10, 1997.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Charles J. Sclafani, Law Offices of Irwin I. Weitz, Springfield, MA, for Plaintiff.

Timothy P. Wickstrom, Tashjian, Simsarian & Wickstrom, Worcester, MA, for Defendant.

PONSOR, District Judge.

Upon de novo review this Report and Recommendation is hereby adopted. Plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement is DENIED; defendant's motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED. The clerk is ordered to enter judgment for defendant. So ordered.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION WITH REGARD TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT (Docket No. 48) and DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docket No. 50)

August 15, 1997

NEIMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter concerns Kevin O'Rourke ("Plaintiff")'s motion to enforce a professed settlement agreement against Jason Incorporated ("Defendant"). Plaintiff asserts, among other things, that Defendant had agreed to settle his complaint and that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should apply. Denying that a settlement agreement had ever been finalized, Defendant in turn has moved for summary judgment, contending that the statute of limitations precludes any relief.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment has been referred to this Court for a report and recommendation pursuant to Rule 3 of the Rules of United Sates Magistrates of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Because Plaintiff's motion also entails a potentially dispositive issue, the Court has addressed that motion pursuant to Rule 3 as well. For the reasons indicated below, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement be denied and that Defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted.

II. BACKGROUND

There is no genuine dispute as to the following facts, many of which were explored in the Court's August 23, 1996 report and recommendation regarding Defendant's previous motion for summary judgment. (See Docket No. 35.)

At the time of the accident underlying this lawsuit, Plaintiff was employed by the Springfield Resource Recovery Plant in Agawam, Massachusetts. As a shift supervisor and engineer, he monitored and maintained the plant's boilers. On July 14, 1991, Plaintiff investigated a malfunction in a boiler. The hopper doors on the boiler in question were hinged at the bottom and opened from top to bottom by way of two sets of nuts and washers. Plaintiff unscrewed the nuts securing the doors in an attempt to cool down the system to facilitate further investigation. When Plaintiff began to unscrew the nuts on one particular door, he observed leaking water and turned away. Pressure within forced the hopper door to swing open, causing Plaintiff to sustain first and second degree burns on his legs and back from scalding water. The injuries required immediate hospitalization and ongoing treatment.

Plaintiff's product liability complaint against Defendant — who assertedly designed and manufactured the hopper doors — was filed on July 15, 1994. Although the injury had in fact occurred on July 14, 1991, the complaint averred that Plaintiff was injured on July 16, 1991. The complaint, as plead, therefore fell within one day of the applicable three year statutes of limitations. See M.G.L. ch. 260, § 2A; M.G.L. ch. 106, § 2318. In turn, Defendant's answer indicated that it was "without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of [this] allegation." Plaintiff's pre-trial memorandum, filed on December 6, 1995, also asserted that his injury occurred on July 16, 1991. Defendant's pre-trial memorandum, filed December 7, 1995, did not contest this date.

Plaintiff's later court documents also assumed that the accident occurred on July 16, not July 14, 1991. For example, in his February 23, 1996, opposition to Defendant's original motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff included his responses to Defendant's interrogatories in which he stated that his injury occurred on July 16, 1991. Likewise in his February 1, 1996, motion to amend his complaint, which sought to add a claim of market share liability, Plaintiff referred to July 16, 1991, as the date of injury. Following the parties' lead, the Court's August 23, 1996, report and recommendation accepted as an undisputed fact that Plaintiff's injury occurred on July 16, 1991. District Judge Michael A. Ponsor adopted the recommendation to deny Defendant's motion for summary judgment and set a jury trial for February 24, 1997.

On February 14, 1997, Plaintiff moved to enter and view the Springfield Resource Recovery Plant. In his motion, Plaintiff, for the first time in court documents, referred to his injury as having occurred on July 14, 1991. As it happened, that same day, February 14, 1997, Plaintiff's counsel, with the approval of Defendant's counsel, contacted the clerk's office and reported that the parties had reached an oral settlement agreement. The proposed agreement involved a compromise of the statutory lien held by the worker's compensation insurer as required by M.G.L. ch. 152, § 15. Plaintiff's counsel requested a hearing before Judge Ponsor in order to obtain approval of the settlement. The clerk scheduled the hearing for the afternoon of February 24, 1997, the originally scheduled trial date.

On the morning of the scheduled hearing date, Plaintiff's counsel, after reviewing the draft release prepared by Defendant's counsel, advised Defendant's counsel that the injury occurred on July 14, 1991, not July 16, 1991. Defendant's counsel thereupon refused to sign the petition for approval of settlement, which already had been endorsed by the worker's compensation insurer. The parties appeared in court that afternoon and reported that the matter was not settled. Judge Ponsor scheduled a status conference for March 3, 1997, at which time he ordered that Plaintiff's proposed motion to enforce the settlement agreement and Defendant's proposed motion to dismiss be filed by March 21, 1997. The Court addresses these two motions in turn.

III. MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT

Plaintiff essentially makes four arguments why the parties' purported settlement should be enforced: (1) he has an enforceable oral contract with Defendant to settle the case for a specific amount; (2) he did not actively deceive Defendant as to the date of the accident; (3) the doctrine of judicial estoppel should be employed to enforce the parties' agreement; and (4) Defendant is being contradictory regarding its knowledge of the date of injury. These arguments are addressed below after a discussion of two preliminary matters.

First, the Court notes that both parties rely on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and draw no distinction between contracts entered into by parties themselves and those entered into by the parties' counsel. Nevertheless, from the facts presented, it is apparent that each party's attorney had actual authority to enter a binding settlement. Compare Michaud v. Michaud, 932 F.2d 77, 81 (1st Cir.1991), and Milewski v. Roflan Co., 195 F.Supp. 68, 69 (D.Mass.1961) (denying motion to enforce settlement agreement finding attorney lacked authority to bind client). See also Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Glover, 975 F.2d 1298 (7th Cir.1992) (oral settlement agreement not enforced because plaintiff had notice that trustee lacked authority to settle). The Court proceeds accordingly.

Second, the Court queries whether the parties, through counsel, contemplated that their oral agreement would be reduced to writing. At least two documents in this vein have been called to the Court's attention: (1) the release drafted by Defendant's counsel, which was never signed by Plaintiff because of the incorrect date; and (2) the petition for approval of settlement which, as described, was not signed by Defendant's counsel when he realized that the date of the accident, which he assumed was July 16, was in fact July 14, 1991.

In the Court's opinion, the failure of the respective parties to execute either one of these documents does not void any underlying agreement. Neither party claims an intent not to have been bound absent fully executed documents. Compare Winston v. Mediafare Entertainment Corp., 777 F.2d 78, 80-81 (2d Cir.1985) (parties did not enter into a binding settlement agreement). Moreover, the nature of Defendant's liability was not uncertain. Compare Estate of Davis v. Johnson, 745 F.2d 1066, 1075 (7th Cir.1984) (purported settlement not enforced since "defendants' liabilities remained uncertain pending the signing of the releases.") Thus, neither the release nor the petition for approval of the settlement was a condition precedent to enforcement of any oral agreement. In fact, the petition assumed that a settlement had been reached. Court approval was only required, pursuant to M.G.L. ch. 152, § 15, in order to address a third party's worker's compensation lien on Plaintiff's recovery. Although judicial disapproval of the settlement would have affected Defendant, Defendant had no significant role in the approval process.¹

1.

Conceding that there was no written agreement, Plaintiff first claims that he has an enforceable oral contract with Defendant to settle the case for a specific amount. Defendant asserts, in response, that there was never a meeting of the minds.

As the parties are aware, the formation of an agreement requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent, i.e., a meeting of the minds to the exchange and consideration. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17(1) cmt c. See also Trifiro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 845 F.2d 30, 31 (1st Cir.1988). These elements are required whether the contractual agreement is written or oral. An oral agreement to settle a claim therefore may be enforced as any other contract. S...