Rouse v. Iowa
| Decision Date | 28 July 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. C 99-4027-MWB.,C 99-4027-MWB. |
| Parties | Howard Dean ROUSE, Petitioner, v. State of IOWA, sub nomine John Ault, Warden, Anamosa State Penitentiary, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Petitioner Howard Dean Rouse was represented by Martha M. McMinn of Sioux City, Iowa.
Respondent John Ault was represented by Thomas William Andrews, Iowa Assistant Attorney General, in Des Moines, Iowa.
WITHDRAWAL OF REFERRAL TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
When is a state prisoner's state post-conviction relief application "properly filed" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), such that it tolls the time for the prisoner to file a federal petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254? That question is squarely presented here, where the respondent contends that the petitioner's state post-conviction relief application was not "properly filed," and therefore cannot make the present action timely, because the state post-conviction relief action was ultimately dismissed pursuant to IOWA CODE § 822.8. That state code provision bars claims for post-conviction relief that were already fully litigated or not preserved on direct appeal. The petitioner contends, however, that his post-conviction relief application was "properly filed," and thus tolled the time for his federal habeas corpus action, because it complied with state procedural requirements governing time and place of filing. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has not determined the meaning of "a properly filed application" in § 2244(d)(2) and the Circuit Courts of Appeals to address the question are split on the appropriate interpretation. This court must therefore make its own best determination of the question.
However, before addressing the difficult question of the meaning of "a properly filed application" for state post-conviction relief in § 2244(d)(2), the court must first address its prior referral of this action to a magistrate judge. By order dated November 9, 1999, the undersigned referred this petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in its entirety, to United States Magistrate Judge Paul A. Zoss pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). However, the court finds that it is now appropriate to withdraw that referral. Therefore, the November 9, 1999, referral of this matter to the magistrate judge will be withdrawn and the undersigned will rule upon the respondent's pending motion for summary judgment.
Petitioner Howard Dean Rouse filed his petition for habeas corpus relief in this action on April 6, 1999.1 In that petition Rouse seeks relief, on various grounds, from his conviction of second-degree murder on November 13, 1986, following a bench trial. Rouse was sentenced to imprisonment for not more than fifty years. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed Rouse's conviction in an unpublished decision on December 22, 1988. See State v. Rouse, 442 N.W.2d 279 (Iowa Ct.App.1988) (table op.). The Iowa Supreme Court declined further review and procedendo issued on March 10, 1989. The United States Supreme Court denied Rouse's petition for a writ of certiorari on October 2, 1989. See Rouse v. Iowa, 493 U.S. 827, 110 S.Ct. 93, 107 L.Ed.2d 58 (1989).
Thereafter, Rouse filed an application for state post-conviction relief on or about April 6, 1990,2 and a supplemental application on April 2, 1993. On May 11, 1996, the respondent moved for summary judgment on Rouse's post-conviction relief application on the ground that the application was precluded by IOWA CODE § 822.8. Specifically, the respondent argued that two of the issues asserted in the post-conviction relief action had been fully litigated on direct appeal, while the rest of the issues had never been raised on direct appeal. The Iowa District Court for Woodbury County granted the respondent's motion for summary judgment on March 11, 1997. The Iowa District Court concluded that two of the issues raised in the post-conviction relief application were indeed fully litigated on direct appeal, and three others were not raised on direct appeal, so that Rouse was precluded from raising any of these issues in a post-conviction relief proceeding. However, the court concluded that, even if it could consider the merits of these contentions, it would conclude that Rouse's claims were without merit. Rouse's counsel in the post-conviction relief action filed a notice of appeal on April 3, 1997, and Rouse filed his own pro se notice of appeal on April 10, 1997. In an unreported decision filed on October 29, 1998, the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the respondent in Rouse's post-conviction relief action, specifically finding that the claims were barred pursuant to IOWA CODE § 822.8 and that Rouse had failed to show "cause" and "prejudice," in the form of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, for the failure to raise the unlitigated claims on direct appeal. See Rouse v. State, No. 8-451/97-0626, slip op. at 3-4 (Iowa Ct.App. Oct. 29, 1998). The Iowa Supreme Court denied Rouse's request for further review on January 4, 1999.
Rouse's present federal action for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 followed on April 6, 1999. After an extension of time to do so, the respondent answered Rouse's petition for habeas corpus relief on June 25, 1999. On November 5, 1999, prior to the date on which Rouse's opening brief was due, the respondent moved for summary judgment or partial summary judgment in this action. The respondent asserts that Rouse's habeas corpus action is time-barred, because his post-conviction relief application was "improperly filed" under IOWA CODE § 822.8, and thus did not toll the statute of limitations for this action. The respondent also asserts that, even if this action is not time-barred, it involves a "mixed petition" including improperly exhausted and defaulted claims, so that it should be dismissed. Finally, the respondent contends that Rouse's claims fail on the merits.
Rouse resisted the respondent's motion for summary judgment in this action on February 22, 2000. Rouse contends that this habeas corpus action is timely, because the ultimate disposition of his state post-conviction relief application is not relevant to whether that action was "properly filed" so as to toll the limitations period for the present action. Rather, he contends that the state post-conviction relief action tolled the limitations period for the present action, because it was "properly filed" in terms of procedural requirements such as time and place of filing. He also contends that, if his federal habeas petition is "mixed," he should be allowed to proceed on his properly exhausted claim or claims or to attempt to exhaust all of his claims. In his resistance to the motion for summary judgment, Rouse argues the merits of only one claim — the one he believes is "most likely to succeed on the merits," his contention that certain statements made to law enforcement officials that were used to impeach him were involuntary — although he contends he is not thereby waiving any other claims.
In a reply brief filed March 3, 2000, the respondent attempts to distinguish the authority upon which Rouse relies for the proposition that his post-conviction relief action was "properly filed." The respondent contends that those decisions actually did not address the precise question at issue here, but turned on issues of whether the post-conviction relief applications were "pending" through various stages of their appeals, issues the respondent contends have been resolved in the same way by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Moreover, the respondent presses his argument that Rouse's non-compliance with IOWA CODE § 822.8 is an adequate and independent state law ground for denial of Rouse's claims, and hence renders Rouse's claims unreviewable in his federal habeas petition.
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