Rouse v. Michigan Dep't of State Police
| Decision Date | 07 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:08-cv-982 |
| Parties | TERRY ROUSE, Plaintiff, v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
HON. JANET T. NEFF
Pending before the Court are Defendant's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or for a New Trial and/or for Remittitur (Dkt 72)1 and Plaintiff's Motion for Award of Attorney Fees, Costs and Interest Pursuant to the American with Disabilities Act (Dkt 69).2 Plaintiff has also filed two Supplemental Motions for the award of attorney fees and costs (Dkts 88, 89).3 Having fully considered the parties' motion briefs and supporting documentation, the Court determines that oral argument is unnecessary. See W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.2(d). The Court denies Defendant's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or for a New Trial, grants remittitur to the statutory cap of $300,000, and grants Plaintiff's motions for attorney fees, costs and interest.
This case was tried before a jury in April 2010; at the close of Plaintiff's proofs, the Court granted Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law as to Plaintiff's Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act weight discrimination claim and as to economic damages. The jury returned a verdict finding Defendant liable for discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), on Plaintiff's claim that he was an otherwise qualified person who was intentionally discriminated against because Defendant perceived Plaintiff to be disabled in violation of Plaintiff's civil rights. The jury found compensatory damages of $426,000, consisting of $266,000 for past emotional distress and $166,000 for future emotional distress.
and/or for Remittitur
FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a). When reviewing a motion for a judgment as a matter of law based on insufficiency of the evidence, the court should not weigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury; rather, it must view the evidence in a lightmost favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Arban v. West Publ'g Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 400 (6th Cir. 2003); Hall v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 337 F.3d 669, 672 (6th Cir. 2003). The motion should be granted "only if a complete absence of proof exists on a material issue in the action, or if no disputed issue of fact exists on which reasonable minds could differ." Karam v. Sagemark Consulting, Inc., 383 F.3d 421, 427 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting LaPerriere v. Int'l Union UAW, 348 F.3d 127, 132 (6th Cir. 2003)).
If a party files a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law after a jury verdict, the party may also include a request for a new trial under Rule 59. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). The court may allow judgment on the verdict, order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law. Id. The trial court may "grant a new trial on all or some of the issues ... after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court." FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(A). Under this standard, "a new trial is warranted when a jury has reached a 'seriously erroneous result' as evidenced by: (1) the verdict being against the weight of the evidence; (2) the damages being excessive; or (3) the trial being unfair to the moving party in some fashion, i.e., the proceedings being influenced by prejudice or bias." Holmes v. City of Massillon, Ohio, 78 F.3d 1041, 1045-46 (6th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); accord Mike's Train House, Inc. v. Lionel, L.L.C., 472 F.3d 398, 405 (6th Cir. 2006).
Unlike motions for a judgment as a matter of law, in ruling on a motion for new trial, the trial court must weigh the evidence and compare the opposing proofs. McCombs v. Meijer, Inc., 395 F.3d 346, 352 (6th Cir. 2005); Woodbridge v. Dahlberg, 954 F.2d 1231, 1234 (6th Cir. 1992). Whether to grant a motion for new trial is within the broad discretion of the trial court. Bell v.Johnson, 404 F.3d 997, 1002-03 (6th Cir. 2005). "The Supreme Court has noted that 'the authority of trial judges to grant new trials' pursuant to Rule 59(a) 'is large.'" Id. at 1002 (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for the Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 433 (1996). Nonetheless, the motion should be denied if the verdict is one that reasonably could have been reached, regardless whether different inferences and conclusions could have been drawn or other results are more reasonable. Walker v. Bain, 257 F.3d 660, 670 (6th Cir. 2001); Woodbridge, 954 F.2d at 1234.
Plaintiff's claim of discrimination was premised on an allegation that Defendant "regarded" him as a person with a disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C) and § 12102(3).4 To succeed on a regarded-as-disabled claim of discrimination, a plaintiff must show that:
"(1) [an employer] mistakenly believes that [an employee] has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) [an employer] mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more [of an employee's] major life activities."
Gruener v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 510 F.3d 661, 664 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999)). Defendant argues that because Plaintiff introduced no evidence showing that Defendant based its decision to release him upon a mistaken perception of disability, under either "regarded as" test, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.
With respect to the first prong, Defendant argues that it is undisputed that Defendant's decision to relieve Plaintiff of duty was based on Dr. Syrjamaki's medical evaluation and conclusionthat Plaintiff was permanently disabled. Defendant points to Dr. Syrjamaki's testimony and medical evaluation finding that Plaintiff was permanently disabled from performing seven essential job duties. Defendant contends that because the medical report completed by Dr. Syrjamaki determined Plaintiff to be permanently disabled from performing the essential functions of his position, Defendant was not "mistaken" in its belief that Plaintiff was disabled, and therefore Plaintiff's claim must fail.
Defendant's argument ignores ample evidence to the contrary, which clearly created a jury-submissible question. Other evidence called into question Dr. Syrjamaki's determination that Plaintiff was permanently disabled. First, Dr. Syrjamaki's report itself suggested that Plaintiff may, in fact, be able to perform the essential functions of his job:
In general most of these impairments Mr. Rouse has functionally would be considered permanent. Obviously, if he lost a significant amount of weight he could have the potential ability to perform these essential functions of a lieutenant with the Michigan State Police.
(Jt. Trial Ex. 4, Dr. Syrjamaki's Independent Medical Evaluation (IME) at 4.) Additionally, Dr. Syrjamaki concluded that although Plaintiff certainly would not be able to fulfill the essential job functions of a lieutenant, "Lieutenant Rouse does not have any difficulties in his current position as an operations lieutenant, which is a sedentary job ... ."
More importantly, as Plaintiff points out, the report from Dr. Syrjamaki contradicted the evaluation of Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Morrison, who concluded that Plaintiff had no medical restrictions and was able to perform all the essential functions of his job (Jt. Trial Ex. 2). Dr. Morrison testified that Plaintiff returned to work after his second hip surgery, did not report any difficulties in performing his job and had an excellent history of recovery (see Dkt 63, Morrison Dep. at 18, 20, 33-35).
Second, there was evidence that could call into question Defendant's reliance on an allegedly objective determination in relieving Plaintiff from duty. Detective First Lieutenant Pekrul testified as to her belief that Plaintiff was disabled, which prompted Defendant's request for the IME by Dr. Syrjamaki (Tr. 4/14/10 at 247, 260). Pekrul's belief was based on her perceptions and observations, such as that Plaintiff was out of breath at times, appeared to have difficulty walking at times, did not kneel as required during a firearm qualification exercise, and was parking in a handicap spot (Tr. 4/14/10 at 316-18, 320-22, 328, 335-39; Pl's. Ex. 12) . Nonetheless, Defendant's assistant human resources director, Debra Gilmore, testified that at the time of Dr. Morrison's certification, human resources was satisfied that Plaintiff was able to perform his job duties (Tr. 4/14/10 at 286).
Plaintiff's testimony at trial contradicted much of Detective Pekrul's perceptions of him, further supporting a conclusion that Defendant may have been mistaken that Plaintiff was permanently disabled. Plaintiff testified concerning his ability to perform the essential functions of his job, and contradicted Detective Pekrul's alleged observations and perceptions that he was having difficulties performing his work. He testified that he was able to kneel in the firearm qualification exercise, and that his parking permit was temporary (see, e.g., Tr. 4/13/10 at 129, 132-33, 135, 169-173).
In the face of the evidence underlying Dr. Syrjamaki's evaluation and conclusion, the jury could have reasonably...
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