Rouse v. State
Citation | 548 So.2d 643 |
Decision Date | 17 March 1989 |
Docket Number | 3 Div. 800 |
Parties | Peggy Ann ROUSE v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Charles M. Law, Montgomery, for appellant.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Robert E. Lusk, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant, Peggy Ann Rouse, was convicted, after a jury trial, for the offense of murder, in violation of § 13A-6-2, Code of Alabama 1975, and was sentenced to 30 years' imprisonment. She appeals, raising two issues.
Appellant was the wife of the victim. She testified that, on the day of the killing, she discovered that her husband had engaged in sexual intercourse with her 15-year-old daughter by a previous marriage. She stated that an argument ensued and that, when she tried to call the police, the victim pointed a pistol at her and threatened to kill her and her children. She said she obtained her .38 caliber pistol from under a chair cushion and fired five shots at the victim, emptying the weapon. The victim was struck by at least three .38 caliber bullets and, as a result, died almost instantly. Three of the entry wounds were in the victim's back and were "contact" wounds, i.e., the muzzle of the gun was apparently pressed against the body of the victim or was very near it when the shots were fired. The police found another pistol near the victim's body. It was a .32 caliber weapon, and contained no bullets. When the police arrived at the scene, they found the deceased's body in a sleeping bag and lying on the living room floor. A pillow case had been pulled over the victim's head. About two weeks after the shooting, appellant volunteered a statement to a police officer as follows: Appellant claimed self defense. She testified that the victim was pointing a pistol at her and threatening to kill her and her children at the time she shot him, and that she did it in defense of herself and her children.
Appellant first contends that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting into evidence the testimony of a state witness taken at an earlier trial. At that earlier trial of the instant case, which resulted in a mistrial due to a death in a juror's immediate family, the state medical examiner, Dr. James Lauridson, who performed an autopsy on the victim's body, testified in detail as to his findings. At the second trial, which resulted in appellant's conviction from which she now appeals, the trial court admitted the testimony of Dr. Lauridson taken at the first trial, over appellant's objection, on a showing by the state that Dr. Lauridson was temporarily out of the state and his whereabouts were unknown. The record shows that a subpoena was issued for Dr. Lauridson at the state's request and that it was left at his office on July 17, 1987; however, he had departed the previous day, July 16, for Colorado on his annual vacation with his family, and without knowledge of the subpoena. No one knew his whereabouts or how to get in touch with him. He was due to return on July 29, 1987. The trial commenced on July 20, and the first that appellant knew of the absence of Dr. Lauridson was when the prosecutor on the day of trial asked appellant to agree to a stipulation of Dr. Lauridson's testimony. Appellant refused. Appellant objected to the introduction of the transcript of the testimony from the previous trial on the grounds that a sufficient predicate had not been laid for its introduction and that its admission, under such circumstances, would deny her her constitutional right of confrontation under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Appellant argued to the trial court that a temporary absence from the state was not recognized as a proper predicate for introduction of a witness's prior testimony, relying on Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Dickinson, 244 Ala. 381, 13 So.2d 570 (1943). After a hearing, appellant's objections were overruled. We note, at this point, that the case action summary in the file reflects that a motion for continuance was made and denied; however, the transcript is silent in this regard. The lengthy and detailed testimony given by Dr. Lauridson at the previous trial was read into evidence by the state. The record of the first trial shows that appellant was represented by different counsel at the time, and reflects extensive cross-examination of Dr. Lauridson.
The general rule regarding the use of former testimony is stated in C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence (3d ed. 1977), as follows:
"The testimony of a witness, in a former trial or action, given (1) under oath, (2) before a tribunal or officer having by law the authority to take testimony and legally requiring an opportunity for cross-examination, (3) under circumstances affording the party against whom the witness was offered an opportunity to test his credibility by cross-examination and (4) given in a litigation in which the issues and parties were substantially the same as in the present cause, is receivable as evidence in the present trial (5) when the personal attendance of the witness to testify in the present trial is not feasible."
Id. at § 245.07(1) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 245.07(2) (footnote omitted).
Id. at § 245.07(8) (footnote omitted). See also Nolen v. State, 469 So.2d 1326 (Ala.Cr.App.1985); Anderson v. State, 362 So.2d 1296 (Ala.Cr.App.1978).
"The accused has a constitutional right of confrontation and cross examination which is an essential and fundamental requirement of a fair trial." Anderson v. State, 362 So.2d at 1301. See also Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). The right of confrontation envisions that the defendant must not be denied the opportunity to challenge his accusers in a face-to-face direct encounter before the trier of fact. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). There is an exception to the confrontation requirement where a witness is unavailable and has given testimony at previous judicial proceedings against the same defendant which was subject to cross-examination by that defendant. Barber v. Page; Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 15 S.Ct. 337, 39 L.Ed. 409 (1895). However, this exception arises from necessity and is justified on the ground that the right of cross-examination initially afforded substantially complies with the confrontation requirements. Ohio v. Roberts; Barber v. Page; McElroy's § 245.07(2), supra.
(Footnote omitted.)
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