Rouser v. Crounse

• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Writing for the Court: Gary S. Austin UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
• Decision Date: 24 August 2020
• Docket Number: 1:19-cv-00550-NONE-GSA-PC
• Citation: Rouser v. Crounse, 1:19-cv-00550-NONE-GSA-PC (E.D. Cal. Aug 24, 2020)
• Parties: WILLIAM ROUSER, Plaintiff, v. D. CROUNSE, et al., Defendants.

WILLIAM ROUSER, Plaintiff, v. D. CROUNSE, et al., Defendants.

1:19-cv-00550-NONE-GSA-PC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

August 24, 2020

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, RECOMMENDING THAT THIS CASE BE DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

(ECF No. 17.)

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS

I. BACKGROUND

William Rouser ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action in the Sacramento Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. (ECF No. 1.) On April 29, 2019, the case was transferred to this court. (ECF No. 6.)

On July 30, 2020, the court screened the Complaint and dismissed it for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend. (ECF No. 15.). On August 19, 2020, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 17.)

The First Amended Complaint is now before the court for screening. 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint is required to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences." Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To state a viable claim, Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.

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III. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS IN THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the California Medical Facility in Vacaville, California. The events at issue in the First Amended Complaint allegedly occurred at the California Correctional Institution in Tehachapi, California, when Plaintiff was incarcerated there. Plaintiff names as defendants Lieutenant C. Crounse, Correctional Officer S. Vasquez, W.J. Sullivan (Warden), and Danielle R. Hemple (Deputy Attorney General) (collectively, "Defendants").

Plaintiff has omitted facts from the First Amended Complaint that were included in his original Complaint. Plaintiff is reminded that each amended complaint supercedes every prior complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir.1997), aff'd, 525 U.S. 299, 119 S.Ct. 710, 142 L.Ed.2d 753 (1999); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading," Local Rule 220. "All causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived." King, 814 F.2d at 567; accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474. The Court cannot look to prior complaints, which have been dismissed, for facts or allegations omitted from the current complaint. Each amended complaint must allege all claims and set forth all facts that Plaintiff wishes to include in the case.

The gravamen of the First Amended Complaint is that Plaintiff's cell was searched and a knife was found in his mattress. Plaintiff was charged with possession of a weapon, issued a form 115 disciplinary report, and found guilty by defendant Lieutenant D. Crounse at a hearing without Plaintiff present. Plaintiff alleges the hearing was based on false reports and he was denied witnesses and evidence. Plaintiff was transferred to Kern Valley State Prison administrative segregation the day after the hearing.

A summary of Plaintiff's allegations in the First Amended Complaint follows:

Defendant Lt. Crounse refused to allow Plaintiff to participate at his 115 hearing telling Plaintiff he would not allow Plaintiff to call his officers liars. Plaintiff then gave defendant Crounse two sworn declarations, and Crounse postponed the hearing. Plaintiff immediately

///wrote to defendant Hemple and told her he was sent to administrative segregation at Kern Valley State Prison the next day, without any hearing.

Plaintiff was denied evidence that the cell was searched after the last people moved out and before Plaintiff moved in, pursuant to Title 15 Rules. Plaintiff was not given any pictures of the 3-inch knife found in his brand new mattress. The mattress did not have holes in it or any thread missing. Plaintiff was also denied witnesses. Title 15 states that Plaintiff was required to be present at his disciplinary hearing unless he refused or was not mentally able. Under Title 15, if Plaintiff had searched the mattress, it would have been a felony. The investigative officer denied Plaintiff evidence and falsified the investigative report.

A week before the hearing Plaintiff wrote out a list of questions and evidence for the hearing, for the investigative employee, and sent a copy to defendant Deputy Attorney General (DAG) Danielle R. Hemple and her supervisor Gretchen Beuchesenshatz [not a defendant]. This was a criminal investigation picked up by the Kern County D.A. When Plaintiff gave defendant Vasquez a copy, Plaintiff told Vasquez he had sent the original to them. Plaintiff was denied evidence of the cell search slip, which never appeared, and the name of the officer who did the search. Plaintiff was denied pictures of the mattress where the alleged weapon was found and denied due process and equal protection.

Plaintiff kept Defendant aware of everything before and after the hearing. When Plaintiff gave his lawyer a motion to file for certain evidence, it was dismissed. Defendant Hemple is an officer of the court and was aware of the constitutional violations by those who denied Plaintiff and did nothing. Plaintiff sent Defendant Sullivan copies of all declarations making sure he knew about the violations by Defendants Crounse and Vasquez. Defendant denied Plaintiff's appeal (grievance) at the second level of review. Officials and employees who know of a constitutional violation may be held liable if they do nothing about it. Plaintiff had no questions for staff since this was an actual criminal investigation. Defendant committed the crimes of a false report as well as denying Plaintiff all rights of due process.

As relief, Plaintiff requests monetary damages and removal of the disciplinary report.

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IV. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. "[Section] 1983 'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 39*3-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing "under color of state law"). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, "within the meaning of § 1983, 'if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.'" Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). "The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a 'series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict' constitutional harms." Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of causation "closely resembles the standard 'foreseeability' formulation of proximate cause." Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (...