Roush v. Mahaska State Bank

Citation605 N.W.2d 6
Decision Date20 January 2000
Docket NumberNo. 98-474.,98-474.
PartiesShawn Ryan ROUSH, Appellant, v. MAHASKA STATE BANK and David L. Shelquist, Appellees, v. Howard Roush, Third-Party Defendant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Rehearing Denied February 11, 2000.1

Jerry Wieslander of Frank G. Wieslander, P.C., Altoona, for appellant.

Randall C. Stravers of Pothoven & Stravers, Oskaloosa, for appellee Mahaska State Bank. H. Raymond Terpstra, II of Terpstra, Terpstra & Epping, Cedar Rapids, and Stanley R. Parker of Parker & Hay, LLP, Topeka, Kansas, for appellee David L. Shelquist.

Considered by LARSON, P.J., and LAVORATO, SNELL, CADY, and HARRIS,2 JJ.

CADY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered on the pleadings. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Shawn Roush owned a 1979 General Motors half-ton truck. On May 31, 1995, the Mahaska State Bank took possession of the truck pursuant to a writ of replevin issued by the district court in an action against Howard Roush. The Bank maintained a security interest in the business inventory of Howard, who apparently represented to the Bank that the truck was part of the business inventory. Shawn was not a party to the action, and subsequently made repeated requests to the Bank for the truck. The Bank eventually released the truck to Shawn on August 11, 1996.

On May 29, 1997, Shawn commenced this action against the Bank and its agent or employee, David Shelquist, based upon their alleged wrongful conduct in taking possession of the truck. The petition was captioned "Petition in Replevin," but Shawn acknowledged the Bank had released possession of the truck. It requested judgment for damages to the truck including depreciation and loss of use. Shawn also requested punitive damages and damages for emotional pain and suffering.

The Bank and Shelquist filed a cross-claim against Howard for indemnity, and subsequently moved for judgment on the pleadings against Shawn. They claimed an action in replevin could not be instituted as a matter of law since Shawn had possession of the property at the time the action was commenced. Shawn claimed possession did not affect his right to institute a replevin action for damages resulting from past detention. He also asserted his claim for damages was alternatively supported by other theories recognizable under notice pleading, which he was entitled to pursue independent of replevin.

The district court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the petition. It concluded damages for wrongful detention were not available in a replevin action when the petitioner held possession of the property at the time the action was commenced.

II. Scope of Review.

We review a grant of judgment on the pleadings for corrections of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4.

III. Judgment on the Pleadings.

A judgment on the pleadings is authorized by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 222. This rule provides:

Any party may, at any time, on motion, have any judgment to which he is entitled under the uncontroverted facts stated in all the pleadings, or on any portion of his claim or defense which is not controverted, leaving the action to proceed as to any other matter of which such judgment does not dispose.

Iowa R. Civ. P. 222.

The proper function of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is to test the sufficiency of the pleadings to present appropriate issues for trial. See Hurd v. Odgaard, 297 N.W.2d 355, 356 (Iowa 1980)

. The motion is only appropriate when the pleadings, taken alone, entitle a party to judgment. Stanton v. City of Des Moines, 420 N.W.2d 480, 482 (Iowa 1988).

Replevin is a specialized statutory remedy with a narrow purpose designed to restore possession of property to the party entitled to possession. See Ankeny Community Sch. Dist. v. Van Gorp, 501 N.W.2d 506, 507 (Iowa 1993)

. Although damages are available to the successful party in a replevin action, replevin is not an action for damages. See Iowa Code § 643.17 (1997) (judgment for possession includes award for damages); Campbell v. Williams, 39 Iowa 646, 648 (1874) (the question in replevin is who is entitled to possession of the property at the time the action was commenced). An award of damages in a replevin action is incidental to the purpose of regaining possession. See Lyons v. Shearman, 245 Iowa 378, 381, 62 N.W.2d 196, 197 (1954). Thus, we agree with the district court that replevin is not available when the plaintiff is in actual possession of the property subject to the replevin. Accord, Aber v. Bratton, 60 Mich. 357, 27 N.W. 564, 566 (1886) (no replevin action can be maintained where plaintiff already has possession); Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Teetzlaff, 53 Wis. 211, 10 N.W. 155, 158-59 (1881) (as appellant had possession of the machine at commencement of the action, no right of action to replevy the same existed).

Although Shawn acknowledged physical possession of the truck, he claims replevin is still available because the Bank maintained constructive possession of the truck. He asserts the Bank had constructive possession based on its claim of a security interest which affected his ability to use the truck.

We recognize some states permit an action for replevin based upon constructive possession. See 77 C.J.S. Replevin § 30, at 335 (1994); 66 Am.Jur.2d Replevin § 26, at 851-52 (1973). In such actions, however, neither the plaintiff or defendant have possession of the property. Instead, the property is possessed by a third party and the defendant has the ability to direct the third party to deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff. See Bush v. Belenke, 381 So.2d 315, 316 (Fla.Ct.App.1980)

(property in agent's possession); see also Black v. City of Cleveland, 58 Ohio App.2d 29, 387 N.E.2d 1388, 1390 (1978) (defendant deemed in constructive possession, despite inability to produce item, as had wrongfully sold plaintiff's property to third party to avoid replevin action); Barnes v. Keller, 94 Ohio App. 107, 114 N.E.2d 604, 606 (1952) (warden deemed in constructive possession where transferred plaintiff's bear cubs to third party for care; and though cubs not recoverable directly from warden, money damages available); Main v. Miami Money Store, Inc., 655 So.2d 148, 149-50 (Fla.Ct.App.1995) (as defendant did not have control over plaintiff's diamond which had been seized by the police, defendant was not in constructive possession); Petty v. Borg, 106 Utah 524, 150 P.2d 776, 781-82 (1944) (defendant, not in actual possession, who claimed to be owner of car regarded as having sufficient control to maintain replevin action against where person who did have possession recognized defendant's claim in car). The facts of this case do not support an action based on constructive possession, and it is unnecessary for us to determine whether such a cause of action is recognized in Iowa.

Nevertheless, there are other legal principles which must be considered in resolving this appeal. The facts set forth in a petition are accepted as true in deciding a case on the pleadings. Crawford v. City of Des Moines, 255 Iowa 861, 867, 124 N.W.2d 868, 871 (1963). Moreover, a petition is not limited by its caption, but is required to be read in light of the allegations and legal ramifications contained within the four corners. See Schulte v. Mauer, 219 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Iowa 1974)

; In re Robinson's Estate, 231 Iowa 1099, 1102, 3 N.W.2d 158, 160 (1942). Furthermore, a pleader is not required to identify specific theories of recovery in a petition. Wendland v. Sparks, 574 N.W.2d 327, 329 (Iowa 1998). Instead, a petition must only give notice of the incident giving rise to the claim and the general nature of the action, although a party may be limited to a specific theory of recovery when the party limits a pleading or presentation to the court to exclusive theories. Id.

Applying these principles to the petition in this case, we think it was apparent Shawn did not file his action to regain possession of the truck, but sought damages for the wrongful detention of his property. Although replevin was not available because Shawn had possession of the truck, the resistance to the motion for judgment on the pleadings showed he alternatively asserted "the theories of conversion, negligence, breach of contract ... and tortious interference" to support the claim for damages. See Tigges v. City of Ames, 356 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Iowa 1984)

. Thus, under our notice pleading, the petition combined a claim for damages and a claim...

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • Huff Energy Fund, L.P. v. Longview Energy Co.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • November 25, 2015
    ...do not have rules modeled on Rule 8(a)also do not require a party to plead legal theories of recovery. See, e.g., Roush v. Mahaska State Bank, 605 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Iowa 2000); Parish of Jefferson v. Bankers Ins. Co., 88 So.3d 1082, 1085 (La.Ct.App. 5 Cir.2012, writ denied); Goodley v. Folino, N......
  • Andersen v. Khanna
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa
    • September 6, 2011
    ...read in light of the allegations and legal ramifications contained within the four corners” of the document. Roush v. Mahaska State Bank, 605 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Iowa 2000). Moreover, simply because a party's “name is included in the caption,” that does not make it “clear from the record that [it]......
  • Andersen v. Khanna
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa
    • September 6, 2011
    ...read in light of the allegations and legal ramifications contained within the four corners" of the document. Roush v. Mahaska State Bank, 605 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Iowa 2000). Moreover, simply because a party's "namePage 5is included in the caption," that does not make it "clear from the record that......
  • Hussemann v. Hussemann
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • May 23, 2014
    ...appeal.II. Standard of Review. “We review a grant of judgment on the pleadings for corrections of errors at law.” Roush v. Mahaska State Bank, 605 N.W.2d 6, 8 (Iowa 2000). The court should grant a party's motion for judgment on the pleadings only if the uncontroverted facts stated in the pl......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT