Roven v. Miller

• Decision Date: 05 March 1959
• Citation: Roven v. Miller, 168 Cal.App.2d 391, 335 P.2d 1035 (Cal. App. 1959)
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Maximillan ROVEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Willis L. MILLER and Dorothy M. Miller, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 5936.

Page 1035

335 P.2d 1035

168 Cal.App.2d 391

Maximillan ROVEN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.Willis L. MILLER and Dorothy M. Miller, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 5936.

District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, California.

March 5, 1959.

Rehearing Denied March 30, 1959.

Hearing Denied April 29, 1959.

John W. Preston, John W. Preston, Jr., Los Angeles, Adelman & Schwartz, Beverly Hills, for appellant.

Powell & Banyard, Santa Ana, for respondents.

MUSSELL, Justice.

This is an action for specific performance of a contract for the sale by defendants to plaintiff of approximately 99.66 acres of land in Orange county.In the first count of the complaint plaintiff sought specific performance of an alleged written contract and in the third count sought specific performance of an alleged oral contract, claiming that the defendants were estopped to deny said oral agreement.Counts two and four of the complaint, in which plaintiff sought damages for breach of contract, were dismissed and the issue of plaintiff's right to specific performance was tried by the court without a jury.Judgment was rendered denying specific performance of the contract and plaintiff appeals from the judgment and also seeks to appeal from an order denying motion for a new trial.Since an order denying motion for a new trial in a civil case is not appealable, plaintiff's purported appeal from that order must be dismissed and only the appeal from the judgment need be considered.Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 368, 125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515.

On August 14, 1954, plaintiff and defendants entered into a contract in writing, entitled 'Purchase Option Contract', which is quoted in footnote 1.¹

During the sixty day period in which plaintiff was to 'determine the contingencies'defendants requested in writing that he report on his progress.Roven reported that the preliminary title report was acceptable; that some preliminary field work had been done; that a preliminary 'V.A.' approval had been received; and that he had requested the Boyle Engineering Company to furnish defendants certain progress reports.From the time the agreement was signed by defendants and until November 4, 1954, they had not been supplied with information regarding their supplying domestic water to plaintiff's proposed subdivision and at no time were they offered first preference in the right to supply water.At Roven's request the sixty day option period was extended to November 5, 1954.On November 4, 1954, Roven informed defendants in writing that he had determined that the subject property was suitable for subdivision and gave defendants notice that he would purchase the property in accordance with the purchase option agreement.

On December 16, 1954, defendants filed an application with the Orange County Planning Commission to have their Garden Grove Boulevard frontage rezoned for commercial use and the area applied for was the same as shown on the sketch attached to the agreement involved.

On December 10, 1954, the Boyle Engineering Company reserved tract numbers, including the Millers' property, at the county surveyor's office and in the latter part of 1954plaintiff instructed engineer Fickes to contact various water companies to furnish water to the entire development.In January, 1955, the planning commission advised the defendants that the tentative map filed by Boyle Engineering Company was for the entire area and that the area excluded for commercial use was not the same as defendants had described in their application for commercial zoning and, that in order to forestall any action on the Boyle map, they should hire an engineer to prepare another map for filing on their behalf.This conflict with respect to maps resulted in numerous meetings and discussions between the parties.

Mr. Fickes testified that one of his problems from the beginning of the project was to determine what property was being reserved for commercial area and at no time did Fickes or Roven have any discussion regarding the site for the church which was referred to in the purchase agreement.

On April 13, 1955, plaintiff filed a tentative map with the planning commission and this map contained no church site, no overall scheme of development, reduced the commercial area of the Miller property and was filed without the consent of the defendants.

At various meetings and in correspondence with Roven the Millers and their attorney advised Roven that he was in default and that the option agreement had terminated.On September 7, 1955, defendants, with their attorney and plaintiff's attorney, met at an escrow office and attempted to come to some agreement and to open an escrow 'if all the conflicts had been resolved'.The parties were unable to agree on the terms of the sale and Miller then stated that he would prefer that plaintiff be personally present.On the following day, September 8, 1955, the parties and their attorneys met at the same escrow office and a further attempt was made to agree upon the terms and conditions of the sale.No agreement was reached and thereafter plaintiff and his attorney prepared escrow instructions and submitted them to defendants, who refused to sign them.On September 19, at another meeting, Miller stated to Roven that it was apparent that they could not get together.On November 4, 1954, Roven notified defendants by letter that he had determined that the property involved was suitable for subdivision and he would purchase said property in accordance with the terms of the option agreement.On November 14, 1955, Roven advised defendants by letter that he would appear at a bank in Garden Grove on November 28, 1955'with the full cash portion of the purchase price and a note for the balance of the purchase price to be secured by first trust deed on the property, without subordination provisions or other contingencies, ready, able and willing to deposit same in escrow and fully carry out all the terms and provisions of the purchase option agreement to be performed on my part.Demand is hereby made on you that you be present at said time and place ready to deposit in escrow your deed to said property and otherwise fully carry out and perform the terms and provisions of the purchase option contract on your part.'The defendants did not appear at said bank on November 28, 1955, and on December 12, 1955, Roven filed the instant action for specific performance.

The trial court found, inter alia, that

'It is true: That defendants granted an extension of the option period set forth in said agreement to November 5, 1954; that on November 4, 1954, plaintiff notified defendants, in writing, that he was exercising the option; that at the time of said notice plaintiff and defendants had not reached an agreement concerning defendants' supplying domestic water for the proposed subdivision development; that at the time of said notice, plaintiff had not given defendants first or any preference in the right to supply domestic water for the proposed subdivision development; that at the time of said notice, plaintiff had not resolved all the contingencies contained in the agreement and had not used diligence to resolve said contingencies; that at the time of said notice plaintiff had been requested in writing by defendants to report as to his progress in determining said contingencies and that plaintiff, at the time of said notice, had not reported his progress to defendants as requested by defendants.

'It is true: That the said agreement entered into between plaintiff and defendants on August 16, 1954 is incomplete, indefinite and uncertain.

'That said provision for subordination does not state the amount of the construction loan which will be placed on said property, nor any of its terms, nor when said construction loan will become due, nor the rate of interest that it will bear nor the terms of the first Deed of Trust nor the conditions of the first Deed of Trust; that the provisions of said subordination clause hereinabove referred to are incomplete, vague, indefinite and uncertain; that in order for the parties to complete the transaction, it was necessary for them to agree in the future upon the terms and conditions of said construction loan and of the first Deed of Trust to secure it; that no agreement was ever had between the parties concerning the terms and conditions of said subordination agreement nor the terms and conditions of said Deed of Trust which was to secure said construction loan.'

In Gould v. Callan, 127 Cal.App.2d 1, 273 P.2d 93, it was held that the failure of a subordination clause to state the amount of interest and the terms and conditions of payment of an obligation to be secured by a first deed of trust made the contract uncertain and indefinite and justified the court in denying specific performance; that a contract will not be enforced unless it is complete and certain; that a contract for the sale of realty will not be specifically enforced unless it not only contains all the material terms, but also expresses each in a reasonably definite manner; that this general principle has been applied in denying specific performance of contracts which were incomplete, indefinite and uncertain with respect to the terms of payment of deferred balances or the terms of the encumbrances representing such deferred balances and that uncertainty as to the terms and conditions of deferred payments is fatal to a claim for specific performance.

In Bruggeman v. Sokol, 122 Cal.App.2d 876, 265 P.2d 575, the escrow instructions were indefinite and uncertain as to the time, place and conditions of the payment of the purchase price and the terms and conditions of the interim finance were not set forth and were to be determined at some future time.It was there held that the trial court property refused to decree specific performance of a contract for the sale of the real property involved.

In the instant case the subordination clause contained in the...