Rovin v. State

• Docket Number: 198-2022
• Decision Date: 31 July 2023
• Parties: VALERIE ROVIN v. STATE OF MARYLAND
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

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VALERIE ROVIN v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 198-2022

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

July 31, 2023

UNREPORTED^[*]

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF MARYLAND ^[**]

Circuit Court for Wicomico County Case No. C-22-CV-17-000326

Nazarian, Tang, Albright, JJ.

OPINION

Albright, J.

After she was acquitted on criminal charges of juror intimidation and second- degree assault, Valerie Rovin, Appellant, sued the State of Maryland, Appellee, and certain state officials in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County. Her suit alleged among other things, violations of her constitutional rights and various torts stemming from her arrest and charges, and from statements made about her by law enforcement officials after her arrest.^[1]

The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the State. This Court reversed in an unreported decision,^[2] but the Supreme Court of Maryland (at the time the Court of Appeals of Maryland)^[3] reversed our decision in part.^[4] In so doing, our Supreme Court concluded that Ms. Rovin's claims against individual state officials were barred either by common law prosecutorial immunity or by statutory state personnel immunity. As such, the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State was left largely intact, with only Ms. Rovin's claims against the State itself remaining. Our Supreme Court then remanded the case with instructions to the circuit court to assess an argument that the State had presented for the first time on appeal: whether, in light of case law from the U.S. Supreme Court,^[5] an officer's objectively reasonable interpretation of a criminal statute can support probable cause, even if mistaken.

On remand, Ms. Rovin amended her complaint,^[6] and the State moved for summary judgment on several of her counts.^[7] The circuit court granted summary judgment in the State's favor and, because its order did not dispose of every claim in the case, certified the order for immediate appeal under Maryland Rule 2-602(b). Ms. Rovin now presents one question for our review that we have rephrased:^[8]

Whether the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in the State's favor.

We shall answer Ms. Rovin's question in the negative and affirm the circuit court's grant of summary judgment. As we will explain, officers here had probable cause to arrest Ms. Rovin based upon an objectively reasonable interpretation of the law, and they had a facially valid warrant for Ms. Rovin's arrest. There is no allegation that officers acted with malice or in bad faith, and the statute that they enforced was not unconstitutional, either facially or as it was applied here.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Criminal Conviction of Ms. Rovin's Daughter

The proceedings here arose after Ms. Rovin's daughter was convicted of several offenses in 2015, including driving under the influence of alcohol, and received a sentence that included jail time.^[9] Ms. Rovin attended a portion of her daughter's trial.^[10]After her daughter was convicted, and on the same day, Ms. Rovin located the jury's foreperson at his workplace to confront him about the verdict. The record indicates that the jury foreperson had previously met Ms. Rovin and a different child of Ms. Rovin's, but the record does not suggest that the foreperson knew Ms. Rovin's daughter who was convicted.^[11] After Ms. Rovin left his workplace, the foreperson reported the incident to the police.

Ms. Rovin disputes what she said during her conversation with the foreperson. She does not, however, appear to dispute what the foreperson told police. The foreperson met with a detective and stated that Ms. Rovin entered his workplace and was escorted to his office so that patrons would not be disturbed. As noted by the detective, the foreperson reported that Ms. Rovin behaved erratically and aggressively, caused a commotion, and appeared to be incensed at the foreperson's decision to convict Ms. Rovin's daughter. The foreperson said that Ms. Rovin entered his personal space such that he felt "uncomfortable and threatened." He also stated that Ms. Rovin told him that she would have "Bill Rovin" "take care of him[.]" The foreperson did not know Bill Rovin. Ms. Rovin told him that Bill Rovin worked in Nicaragua and had people who could "take care of" the foreperson. The foreperson interpreted this as a threat and alerted the police.

B. The Criminal Case Against Ms. Rovin

Officers of the Wicomico County Sheriff's Office consulted with two attorneys at the State's Attorney's Office, who advised that Ms. Rovin's conduct constituted juror intimidation under Section 9-305(a) of the Criminal Law Article and should be charged accordingly.

At around the same time, the foreperson applied for a peace order against Ms. Rovin and gave sworn testimony in the District Court for Wicomico County. He testified that he was a member of a jury that convicted Ms. Rovin's daughter, and that Ms. Rovin then came to his workplace to threaten to harm him. Specifically, he stated that Ms. Rovin threatened that she would have "somebody come in from out of town" to harm him, and that "she told me she was going to contact somebody who was going to send people . . . to take care of me.... People from Nicaragua where Bill Rovin lives." The foreperson was unable to obtain a peace order against Ms. Rovin because the statutory requirements were not met.^[12] But, the peace order court informed the foreperson that "there's a statute, it's a criminal offense to intimidate a juror" and "if she has done what you say she has done, that may very well be a criminal offense."

After that hearing, officers applied for a statement of charges against Ms. Rovin. Among other things, that application recited the information provided by the foreperson and noted the opinion of the State's attorneys that this was a case of juror intimidation. The District Court Commissioner agreed that there was probable cause that Ms. Rovin violated Section 9-305, and a warrant issued for her arrest. Ms. Rovin was then arrested pursuant to the warrant and held for approximately one day, after which she was placed under house arrest for approximately four months until her criminal trial.^[13]

Ms. Rovin was tried on two charges: second-degree assault and a violation of Section 9-305 of the Criminal Law Article by juror intimidation. After the close of the State's case, Ms. Rovin moved for an acquittal, arguing that, on both the evidence at trial and the law, she did not commit either offense. Specifically, Ms. Rovin argued that the evidence showed that any threat she made against the foreperson was not for imminent harm, and that at most she only had the intent to retaliate against the foreperson for a prior verdict, not to influence an ongoing proceeding or affect the verdict. In support, she asserted that it would not have been possible to cause the foreperson to affect the verdict:

[Ms. Rovin's Counsel]: [T]he thrust of my argument [on the second-degree assault charge] is that there was, number one, no act by [Ms.] Rovin that threatened an imminent battery.... She was merely in his office at his invitation, yes, yelling, yes, being rude, yes, it was distasteful, but . . . the so-called threat was that a Bill Rovin from Nicaragua will send someone to take care of [the foreperson].

* * *

What the [juror intimidation] statute says is a person may not by threat, force or corrupt means try to influence, intimidate or impede a juror in the performance of the person's official duties.... they had already found [Ms. Rovin's daughter] guilty. There was not a pending judicial proceeding, no pending trial. [The foreperson] had already completed his official duty .... and there is no way that she could have influenced that verdict, which was over.

She had to attempt to influence a juror in the performance of his official duties. She did not have that intent because she couldn't have any influence on his official duties.... She went there to criticize him for finding her daughter guilty, and according to [the foreperson] to threaten that somebody else would come and do harm. But she wasn't trying to [affect] the outcome of the trial[.]

* * *

[A]t best you could consider her conduct was a threat of retaliation against [the foreperson] for a prior verdict.... She was just voicing her opinion, granted in a way she shouldn't have, everybody knows that. But it did not amount to a crime. I think she understands better than anybody she shouldn't have done this, but the bottom line is she didn't commit a crime[.]

Later, during the State's argument, the trial court asked the State to explain its theory based upon the admissible evidence. Specifically, the trial court focused its inquiry on the element of influencing, intimidating, or impeding a juror in the juror's official duties, asking the State to articulate how Ms. Rovin was "trying to get this particular juror to take any action?" In response, the State did not articulate a theory, instead appearing to concede its belief, after the close of the evidence, that Ms. Rovin was not attempting to prompt the foreperson to act.

After this exchange, the trial court agreed with Ms. Rovin that the evidence indicated that she merely sought to retaliate against the foreperson for the prior verdict, rather than convince him to take some action to affect the verdict: "the evidence here is of a retaliation for something that was already done, which is improper, but not in violation of [Section 9-305]."^[14] The circuit court then granted Ms. Rovin's motion:

Well, I think this is a very difficult case. I think [Ms Rovin's] actions were very improper.

* * *

As far as the violation of [Section] 9-305, I think this should be a violation of the law to intimidate or threaten a juror for something they

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