Rowan County v. Sloas, No. 2003-SC-000938-DG.

• Decision Date: 21 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. 2003-SC-000938-DG.
• Citation: 201 S.W.3d 469
• Parties: ROWAN COUNTY, Kentucky; Don Hall, Individually and in His Capacity as Rowan County Jailer; and Paul Henderson, Individually and in his Capacity as Rowan County Deputy Jailer, Appellants, v. William SLOAS, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

201 S.W.3d 469

ROWAN COUNTY, Kentucky; Don Hall, Individually and in His Capacity as Rowan County Jailer; and Paul Henderson, Individually and in his Capacity as Rowan County Deputy Jailer, Appellants, v. William SLOAS, Appellee.

No. 2003-SC-000938-DG.

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

September 21, 2006.

As Corrected September 26, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Frank H. McCartney, Suit, McCartney & Price, Flemingsburg, William Warner Roberts, Roberts & Watkins, Morehead, Counsel for Appellants.

Robert W. Miller, Robecca K. Phillips, Grayson, Counsel for Appellee.

SCOTT, Justice.

The Appellee, William Sloas (Sloas), was incarcerated in the Rowan County Jail in December 1997 after being convicted of a fourth offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, KRS 189A.010, and possession of a controlled substance in the first degree, KRS 218A.1415, both Class D felonies. He was released four months later on April 28, 1998.

At the time, Rowan County operated a jail work program, commonly referred to as the "Class D Work Program," under which state prisoners could volunteer to work on certain county projects under the supervision of the county jail. Pursuant to KRS 532.100(4), Class D (and now Class C) felons may serve out their sentences in a county jail.

According to the Appellant, Don Hall, the Rowan County Jailer (Jailer), the work program was already in place when he was elected in 1994. It later evolved into being called the "Class D Work Program." The program generally consists of six state prisoners under the supervision of a deputy jailer. They work on various county projects, generally at the request of a county department head, such as solid waste, or the road department. At times, however, they are assigned other jobs at the request of the County Judge/Executive and/or various Magistrates. Ninety-percent of the time, however, they work cleaning up trash beside the roadways for the solid waste department. In return for their work, each state prisoner is paid $1.25 per day by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. And other than minor incidents, no one had ever been hurt on the program, that is, until January 21, 1998.

Sloas volunteered for the program around January 1, 1998. On January 21, he and five (5) other state prisoners were working clearing brush and trees on a roadside clearing project for the county road department at the request of Magistrate Nick Caudill. They were supervised by deputy jailer, Paul Henderson (Henderson), who normally supervises the program. Henderson had been a deputy jailer since 1990 and had been in charge of the work program since 1995. "Hoss" Johnson, with the county road department, was also helping. He brought a truck and a chipper with which to "chip up" the brush and trees they cut.

Sloas was hit that afternoon by a falling tree, cut down by another inmate. At the time, he was standing on the road next to the chipper, figuring, as he said, "it was the safest place" to be. However, Carl Lewis, who cut the tree, said he visually cleared the area before he started cutting, then when he looked up just as he finished the last cut, he saw Sloas standing there, trying to light a cigarette. Henderson said, "it looked like he reached in his pocket to get a cigarette out and then he didn't have it lit and he just walked over like he was asking that boy [John Paul] for a light. Then they all hollered and I hollered too. About that time the tree came down." Sloas' leg was broken below the knee. Appropriate treatment was rendered and all his medical bills were paid by Rowan County. He was last seen by the doctor on April 21, 1998, and was released from jail on April 28, 1998.

Sloas then sued Rowan County, along with the Jailer and Henderson, alleging negligent supervision and training of staff and prisoners without implementation of adequate safety procedures. The Jailer and Henderson were sued in both their official and individual capacities. The claims also included vicarious liability for the negligence of Henderson and state inmate, Carl Lewis.

Following limited discovery, the Rowan Circuit Court granted summary judgment on all claims: for Rowan County on grounds of sovereign immunity; for the Jailer and Henderson in their official capacities on grounds of absolute official immunity; and, for the Jailer and Henderson in their individual capacities, on grounds of qualified official immunity. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgments in favor of Rowan County and in favor of the Jailer and Henderson in their official capacities, see Schwindel v. Meade County, 113 S.W.3d 159, 163, 169 (Ky.2003), but reversed the summary judgments as to the Jailer and Henderson in their individual capacities, reasoning that "there are genuine issues of material fact with regard to whether Sloas' statutory rights were violated in a manner that would tend to show `bad faith' on the part of Hall and Henderson." Sloas v. Rowan County, Ky., et al., No.2000-CA-0000560-MR, slip op. at 10, 2003 WL 22149322 (Ky.App. Sept. 19, 2003).

We granted discretionary review and now affirm the Court of Appeals decision regarding Rowan County, as well as the Jailer and Henderson in their official capacities, but reverse their decision against the Jailer and Henderson in their individual capacity as there were no material issues of fact regarding "bad faith," and thus, they were entitled to qualified official immunity.¹

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56.03.

However, we have also said that summary judgment is only proper "where the movant shows that the adverse party could not prevail under any circumstances." Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky.1991). Yet, we have recognized that "a party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion cannot defeat that motion without presenting at least some affirmative evidence demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial." Hubble v. Johnson, 841 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Ky.1992). If so, the trial court must then view the record "in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment and all doubts are to be resolved in his favor." Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480 (citing Dossett v. New York Mining and Manufacturing Co., 451 S.W.2d 843 (Ky.1970)).

Summary judgments play an especially important role when dealing with immunities, as we also view qualified official Immunity as an immunity from suit, that is, from the burdens of defending the action, not merely just an immunity from liability. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-01, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); cf. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government v. Smolcic, 142 S.W.3d 128, 135 (Ky. 2004). In the attainment of this goal, however, we differ from the federal standards in one significant aspect.

In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816-18, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), the United States Supreme Court rejected the subjective, or "good faith" test for immunity, in favor of an "objective reasonableness standard" designed to avoid the many subjective factual issues so as to permit the early resolution of as many qualified immunity issues as possible prior to trial, typically by summary judgment. Id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727. "[S]ubjective intent [or good faith, is a factual question that] so rarely can be decided by summary judgment . . . [and] may entail broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an official's professional colleagues, [and normally requires a trial to resolve]," id. at 816-17, 102 S.Ct. 2727, not to mention the social costs attendant to protracted litigation.² We, however, still maintain the subjective element of good faith in our jurisprudence.³

"Yanero holds that an official sued in his or her individual capacity `enjoy[s] only qualified official immunity, which affords protection . . . for good faith judgment calls made in a legally uncertain environment.'" Jefferson County Fiscal Court v. Peerce, 132 S.W.3d 824, 833 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510 (Ky.2001)). Thus, "[o]fficials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas," Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1080, 113 S.Ct. 1048, 122 L.Ed.2d 356 (1993), and "[m]ost government officials are not expected to engage in `the kind of legal scholarship normally associated with law professors and academicians.'" 1A Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation: Claims and Defenses § 9A.09[B] (4th ed.2006) (citation omitted). Thus, "qualified immunity protects `all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987).

"Once the officer or employee has shown prima-facie that the act was performed within the scope of his/her discretionary authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish by direct or circumstantial evidence that the discretionary act was not performed in good faith." Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 523 (Ky.2001). "Good faith," however, is somewhat of a misnomer, as the proof is really of "bad faith." In fact, in most cases, "good faith" is just a presumption that exists absent evidence of "bad faith."

[B]ad faith can be predicated on a violation of a [causally related] constitutional, statutory, or other clearly established right which a person in a public employee's position presumptively would have known was afforded to a person in the plaintiff's position . . . or if the officer or employee...