Rowe v. Finch, Civ. A. No. 2518.
| Decision Date | 02 June 1969 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 2518. |
| Citation | 304 F. Supp. 221 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | Cecil ROWE, on behalf of Dewanna S. Rowe, Infant, Plaintiff, v. Robert H. FINCH, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant. |
Charles T. Bailey, Logan, W. Va., for plaintiff.
Milton J. Ferguson, U. S. Atty., George D. Beter, Asst. U. S. Atty., Huntington, W. Va., for defendant.
This is an action under Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. A decision rendered by a hearing examiner on October 30, 1967, became the final decision of the Secretary on October 4, 1968, when the Appeals Council affirmed, with modifications, the decision of the hearing examiner. The final decision holds that plaintiff is not entitled to child insurance benefits under Section 202(d) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(d), on the ground that Dewanna S. Rowe was not, as claimed, the "child" of Cecil Rowe, the wage earner, within the meaning of Section 216(e) and (h) of the Act, 42 U.S. C.A. § 416(e) and (h).
The standard of review in actions of this nature is found in Section 205(g) of the Act, as amended, and is as follows:
"The findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive * * *."
In short, the Courts are not to try the case de novo, and if the findings of the Secretary are supported by substantial evidence, the Courts are bound to accept them. Underwood v. Ribicoff, 298 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1962). Nevertheless, it is said that this provision of the law does not contemplate that the Courts should surrender their "traditional function," but rather that they will view the record as a whole, not for the purpose of making an independent finding, but to determine whether or not the administrative finding is supported by substantial evidence and to see to it that the administrative agency does not act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying just claims or allowing unworthy ones. Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964); Underwood v. Ribicoff, supra; Snyder v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1964). In determining the meaning of "substantial evidence," the Courts have held it to be more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Thomas v. Celebrezze, supra. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and it must be based on the record as a whole. Celebrezze v. Bolas, 316 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1963). The Fourth Circuit Court has pointed out that if there is only a slight preponderance of the evidence on one side or the other, the Secretary's findings must be affirmed. Underwood v. Ribicoff, supra. Therefore, the immediate task of this Court is to determine whether the defendant's denial of plaintiff's claim is supported by substantial evidence.
The facts of the present case, as they emerge from the record, may be summarized as follows:
Janet Sue Bailey, a granddaughter of the wage earner, gave birth to Dewanna, the claimant in this proceeding, on January 4, 1965. At the time of the child's birth, Janet Sue and her husband were having marital difficulties and they were on the verge of a separation. Under these circumstances, the parents of the child had made plans to give custody of the child to wage earner and his wife shortly after her birth, however, a last minute reconciliation was apparently made, for when Mrs. Rowe went to their home in Chicago, Illinois, to get the child, Mr. and Mrs. Bailey informed Mrs. Rowe that they planned to stay together and raise Dewanna themselves. In March of 1965, the Baileys again determined that they could not live together and thereafter, on March 6, 1965, they took Dewanna to the home of the wage earner and his wife. Dewanna has remained in the Rowe home (with the exception of a short period in June and July of 1966) since March of 1965, and the Rowes have raised her as their own child, they being the sole contributors to her support. In June of 1965, the Baileys were divorced and Janet Sue was awarded custody of Dewanna. In October of 1965, Janet Sue signed a statement in which she expressed her desire to give "full custody of the baby" to the Rowes, and in October 1966, the natural parents of Dewanna gave the Rowes permission to adopt the child. On January 13, 1967, an order was entered in the Circuit Court of Logan County, West Virginia, consummating the adoption process therein instituted.
On the basis of an application filed February 9, 1965, the wage earner, Cecil Rowe, became entitled to Social Security disability benefits in August of 1965 for a period of disability commencing January 22, 1965.
At issue in this case is the determination by the Secretary that Dewanna S. Rowe is neither the "legally adopted" nor "equitably adopted" child of the wage earner within the meaning of the provisions of the Social Security Act. Entitlement to benefits as an equitably adopted child is grounded upon Section 216(e) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 416(e), which provides as follows:
"(e) The term `child' means (1) the child or legally adopted child of an individual * * *,"
and Section 216(h) (2) (A) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 416(h) (2) (A), which provides:
"In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully or currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled at the time such applicant files application * * *."
Thus, under certain circumstances, where there is clear and convincing evidence of a written or oral agreement to adopt resulting in an "equitable adoption" within the period prescribed by the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(d), the courts have found the child entitled to benefits under the Act. See Davis v. Celebrezze, 239 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.W.Va.1965). Having reviewed the record in this proceeding we find little support for the contention of plaintiff that an equitable adoption occurred as the result of an agreement between the Rowes and the Baileys. Thus, though there is ample evidence of a giving up of custody of the child, at no time was there ever a clear agreement between the parties that the Baileys would give Dewanna to the Rowes and the Rowes would in turn adopt the child. Insofar as the Secretary's decision is based upon a finding that no contract to adopt existed between the parties, we find ample support for it in the record and, accordingly, affirm that part of the decision.
The remaining issue for decision in this case relates to the question of whether or not the actual adoption of Dewanna consummated on January 13, 1967, qualifies her for child's insurance benefits as provided by the Act. The applicable statute, 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(d), provides as follows:
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