Rowe v. Jewell

Decision Date13 February 2015
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 13–5545.
Citation88 F.Supp.3d 647
PartiesCasey ROWE v. Sally JEWELL, Secretary, U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

John–Michael Lawrence, John–Michael Lawrence, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for Casey Rowe.

Sandra Ema Gutierrez, U.S. Attorney's Office, New Orleans, LA, for Sally Jewell, Secretary, U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management.

ORDER AND REASONS ON MOTIONS

JOSEPH C. WILKINSON, JR., United States Magistrate Judge.

In this employment discrimination action, plaintiff, Casey Rowe, alleges that his employer, Sally Jewell, Secretary, U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (the Bureau), discriminated against him based on his gender when the Bureau failed to select him for one of two job vacancies in March 2012; retaliated against him for engaging in protected activity by giving him a “fully successful,” rather than a “superior” or “exceptional,” performance rating for 2012; and created a retaliatory hostile work environment, all in violation of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Complaint, Record Doc. No. 1. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings and entry of judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) upon written consent of all parties. Record Doc. No. 15.

The Bureau filed a motion for summary judgment supported by several declarations under penalty of perjury, a deposition transcript and verified documentary exhibits. Record Doc. No. 37. Pretermitting any discussion of whether plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination, the Bureau argues that Rowe cannot rebut its proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for not selecting him for the vacancy because the evidence does not support his assertion that he was clearly better qualified than the successful applicants. As to his claim of a retaliatory hostile environment, defendant contends that Rowe's evidence fails to create any disputed fact issues on two of the four prongs of a prima facie case. Regarding plaintiff's contention that his supervisors retaliated against him by giving him a “fully successful” performance evaluation, the Bureau argues that he cannot establish the “causal link” element of a prima facie case or, alternatively, if he can establish a prima facie case, the evidence does not establish a material fact issue as to “but for” causation.

Rowe also filed his own motion for summary judgment, arguing that he is entitled to summary judgment on all of his claims. Record Doc. No. 31. His motion is supported by a memorandum that far exceeds the court's page limitations, without having sought leave to file excessive pages, and by an oppressive collection of extremely voluminous exhibits, many of which are duplicative and irrelevant. Plaintiff's exhibits include numerous entire deposition transcripts and transcripts of sworn statements taken by an investigator during the investigation of plaintiff's Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaints, when only portions are relevant or helpful; one declaration under penalty of perjury; and a paper mountain of largely unverified, miscellaneous and extraneous documents. However, the Bureau does not dispute the authenticity of any of Rowe's exhibits. Despite the excessiveness of plaintiff's submissions, the court has laboriously reviewed all the materials and has considered them authentic and as evidence to the extent they are relevant and otherwise admissible.

After the motions for summary judgment were filed, the parties timely filed a joint statement of undisputed facts. Record Doc. Nos. 45, 46. Rowe and the Bureau each filed a timely memorandum in opposition to the other's summary judgment motion. Record Doc. Nos. 47, 48. Plaintiff received leave to file additional exhibits, an amended statement of undisputed facts and an amended memorandum in support of his motion. Record Doc. Nos. 38, 44, 49, 50, 51, 52. The court granted the Bureau's motion for relief from its obligation under Local Rule 56.2 to respond to Rowe's extremely lengthy statement of undisputed facts. The court therefore assumes that defendant disputes any facts in plaintiff's amended statement of uncontested facts that were not incorporated into the parties' joint statement of undisputed facts. Record Doc. Nos. 39, 51.

Having considered the complaint, the record, the submissions of the parties and the applicable law, and for the following reasons, IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and plaintiff's motion is DENIED.

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Rule 56, as revised effective December 1, 2010, establishes new procedures for supporting factual positions:

(1) A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.
(2) Objection That a Fact Is Not Supported by Admissible Evidence. A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.
(3) Materials Not Cited. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.
(4) Affidavits or Declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).

Thus, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those materials in the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuinely disputed material fact, but it is not required to negate elements of the nonmoving party's case. Capitol Indem. Corp. v. United States, 452 F.3d 428, 430 (5th Cir.2006) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ). [A] party who does not have the trial burden of production may rely on a showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot produce admissible evidence to carry its burden as to [a particular material] fact.” Advisory Committee Notes, at 261.

A fact is “material” if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the action under governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). No genuine dispute of material fact exists if a rational trier of fact could not find for the nonmoving party based on the evidence presented. Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 40 F.3d 698, 712 (5th Cir.1994).

To withstand a properly supported motion, the nonmoving party who bears the burden of proof at trial must cite to particular evidence in the record to support the essential elements of its claim. Id. (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ); accord U.S. ex rel. Patton v. Shaw Servs., L.L.C., 418 Fed.Appx. 366, 371 (5th Cir.2011). [A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; accord U.S. ex rel. Patton, 418 Fed.Appx. at 371.

“Factual controversies are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, but only if both parties have introduced evidence showing that an actual controversy exists.” Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 432 (5th Cir.1998) ; accord Murray v. Earle, 405 F.3d 278, 284 (5th Cir.2005). We do not, however, in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.” Badon v. RJR Nabisco Inc., 224 F.3d 382, 394 (5th Cir.2000) (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). “Conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts ... will not prevent the award of summary judgment; ‘the plaintiff [can]not rest on his allegations ... to get to a jury without any “significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.” Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 40 F.3d at 713 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).

“Moreover, the nonmoving party's burden is not affected by the type of case; summary judgment is appropriate in any case where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment in favor of the nonmovant.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original); accord Duron v. Albertson's LLC, 560 F.3d 288, 291 (5th Cir.2009).

II. THE UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

The following material facts are accepted as undisputed, solely for purposes of the pending motions. The facts are drawn from the parties' joint statement of undisputed facts and the deposition testimony, sworn declarations and sworn oral statements in the record. The oral statements were taken by the EEO investigator and are called “affidavits” in the record of the investigation.

The relevant events in the instant case began with the announcement in December 2011 of two vacancies for a Supervisory Environmental Specialist at the GS–13 level in the Bureau's Environmental Assessment Section, Office of Environment. The Environmental Assessment Section of the Office of Environment was going to be divided into two units...

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  • Discrimination based on national origin, religion, and other grounds
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Texas Employment Law. Volume 1 Part V. Discrimination in employment
    • May 5, 2018
    ...TCHRA. Williams, 376 F.3d at 476-77. No Texas court has yet recognized a retaliatory hostile work environment claim. In Rowe v. Jewell , 88 F.Supp.3d 647, 674 (E.D. La. 2015), the court stated in the absence of controlling Fifth Circuit authority on the issue, it would assume without decidi......

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