Rowe v. Matthews

• Decision Date: 15 October 1883
• Citation: 18 F. 132
• Parties: ROWE v. MATTHEWS and others.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

18 F. 132

ROWE v. MATTHEWS and others.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Michigan.

October 15, 1883

J. G Dickinson and Alfred Russell, for the motion.

John D Conely, contra.

BROWN J.

This motion is based upon some 59 alleged errors in the findings of the jury and the rulings of the court. These exceptions may be classified as follows: (1) That the verdict was against the law and the evidence; (2) that the court erred in certain of its rulings with respect to the admission of testimony; (3) that the court erred in several particulars in its instructions to the jury.

With regard to the first ground, I need only say that at the trial the verdict met with my entire approval, and that I have seen no reason for changing my opinion. I have also reviewed the alleged errors in the rulings and instructions of the court and am of opinion that none of the exceptions thereto are well taken. Had I found errors in them, I should have scrutinized their importance carefully before setting aside the verdict.

In their numerous exceptions counsel for the defendants seem to have shared in a misapprehension, which, judging from the number of motions of this character, is a common one, that nothing more is necessary to entitle a party to a new trial than to show such errors as would be deemed sufficient by an appellate court to justify setting aside the verdict. Nothing could be more misleading than this idea. Whatever may be the rule upon writs of error, the granting of new trials is largely a matter of discretion. Errors in the admission of testimony or in the instructions of the court, even though material, do not, as matter of law, necessitate a reversal of the proceedings. It is only where the case has been submitted to the jury upon wrong theory, or where the court is not satisfied that justice has been done, or is of opinion that a new trial will or ought to produce a different result, that the verdict should be disturbed. Nothing is better calculated to demoralize the administration of justice, and to justify the popular belief in the uncertainty of the law, than the practice of granting new trials upon trivial grounds, to give the defeated party another chance. It is for the interest of suitors and the public not only that cases should be fairly tried, but that the verdict of a jury should be the end of the controversy. Of course, this cannot always be the case. Courts will sometimes mistake the law upon a vital point. Juries are occasionally dominated by passion, sympathy, or prejudice. In either event, injustice is likely to occur, unless a new trial be granted. But if the court is satisfied...