Rowe v. N.Y. & N. J. Tel. Co.

• Decision Date: 25 February 1901
• Citation: 66 N.J.L. 19,48 A. 523
• Parties: ROWE v. NEW YORK & N. J. TEL. CO. et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

48 A. 523

66 N.J.L. 19

ROWE

v. NEW YORK & N. J. TEL. CO. et al.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Feb. 25, 1901.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Action by Sarah A. Rowe against the New York & New Jersey Telephone Company and the Hudson County Electric Company. Verdict for plaintiff. Rule to show cause why new trial could not be granted. Verdict set aside conditionally.

Argued November term, 1900, before the CHIEF JUSTICE and DIXON, J Van Buskirk & Parker, for plaintiff. Henry S. White, for defendant.

Telephone Co. Charles W. Fuller, for defendant Electric Co.

DIXON, J. Between 7 and 8 o'clock in the evening of August 5, 1800, Clarence D. W. Rowe, a boy about 12 years old, while walking along the sidewalk of Thirty-Fourth street, in Bayonne, struck his foot against a wire charged with electricity, and was instantly killed. This suit was brought by his administratrix to recover for the pecuniary loss resulting from his death to his mother, sister, and two brothers. The jury in the Hudson circuit awarded the plaintiff $5,126, and the defendants now apply for a new trial. The wire touched by the boy belonged to the New York & New Jersey Telephone Company, but the current of electricity that killed him came from the wires of the Hudson County Electric Company. The evidence shows that a little while before the accident a squall had passed over the neighborhood, during which the telephone wire had been broken, and had fallen upon the wires of the electric company, beneath it, which were strung at right angles to the telephone wires, and tints it carried the current from them to the ground.

The first question for consideration is whether any circumstances were shown on which it was permissible for the jury to find that the defendant companies, or either of them, had been guilty of negligence in the premises. We think the omission of the companies to construct guards between their lines at the place where they crossed, so that, if an upper wire broke, it would not come in contact with the heavily charged wires below, was a fact on which a finding of negligence in each can be supported. In view of the dangerous nature of a wire charged with a strong current of electricity. It is entirely reasonable to hold that corporations using the public highway for wires that may be so charged should exercise a high degree of care to keep the wires where travelers will not be likely to come in contact with them. Anderson v. Light Co., 63 N. J. Law, 387, 43 Atl. 654. Where, as in the present case, a line of telephone wires, carrying normally a harmless current, is crossed beneath by a line of wires carrying normally a deadly current, a guard running parallel with the lower line, and between it and the upper, would certainly afford additional protection to travelers on the street below, should a break happen in an upper wire. We perceive no reason for deciding that juries may not hold, in proper cases, that such a safeguard is due to the public. But, assuming that such a guard may be required, we must consider whether the duty of providing it may be imposed on both companies. The obligation of the electric company may readily...