Rowe v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 11 December 2019
• Docket Number: 4:19-cv-00256-JAJ-SBJ
• Parties: Susan ROWE, Christine M. Kleiber, Tammy D. Burden, Julie A. Schropp, and Stacey L. Good, Plaintiffs, v. Kimberly Kay REYNOLDS, in her official capacity as Governor State of Iowa, James M. Kurtenbach, in his official capacity with Iowa Department of Administrative Services; and the State of Iowa, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

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Susan ROWE, Christine M. Kleiber, Tammy D. Burden, Julie A. Schropp, and Stacey L. Good, Plaintiffs,
v.
Kimberly Kay REYNOLDS, in her official capacity as Governor State of Iowa, James M. Kurtenbach, in his official capacity with Iowa Department of Administrative Services; and the State of Iowa, Defendants.

No. 4:19-cv-00256-JAJ-SBJ

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division.

Signed December 11, 2019

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Bruce H. Stoltze, Bruce H. Stoltze, Jr., John Quentin Stoltze, Stoltze & Stoltze, PLC, Christopher A. Kragnes, Kragnes & Associates PC, Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiffs.

Molly McConville Weber, Iowa Attorney General, Des Moines, IA, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

JOHN A. JARVEY, Chief Judge

This action to recover overtime wages pursuant to state and federal law is before the court on the plaintiff's September 13, 2019, Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 5] seeking judgment on the defendants' affirmative defense of sovereign immunity. The defendants filed their Resistance [Dkt. No. 9] on October 4, 2019, and the plaintiffs filed their Reply [Dkt. No. 10] on October 11, 2019. For the reasons stated below, the plaintiffs' September 13, 2019, Motion For Partial Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 5] is GRANTED .

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Factual Background

The defendants have admitted all of the allegations in the plaintiffs' Statement Of Undisputed Material Facts In Support Of Partial Summary Judgment. See Defs.' Resp. To Pls.' Stmt. of Mat. Facts [Dkt. No. 9-1]. The defendants also have not asserted that any additional facts are material to the disposition of the pending motion. Thus, the following factual summary relies on the plaintiffs' statement of facts.

The parties agree that the plaintiffs are employed by the State of Iowa as registered nurses at the Woodward Resource Center, the Iowa Medical and Classification

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Center, and the Iowa State Penitentiary. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Iowa District Court for Polk County on June 29, 2019, alleging claims under IOWA CODE CH. 91A and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 207. The plaintiffs seek class action status.

The defendants filed their Answer and Affirmative Defenses to Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand on August 5, 2019, in the Iowa District Court for Polk County. The defendants admit that one of their affirmative defenses states, "Plaintiffs' individual and purported class and collective claims are barred to the extent Defendants are entitled to immunity, including sovereign immunity." On August 14, 2019, the defendants removed this action to this federal court. The court adds that the defendants refiled their Answer in this court on August 15, 2019.

B. Additional Procedural Background

The plaintiffs, all registered nurses employed by the State of Iowa, brought this action on their own behalf and on behalf of other similarly-situated current or former registered nurse employees of the defendants. The defendants are the governor of the State of Iowa and the director of the Iowa Department of Administrative Services, sued in their official capacities, and the State of Iowa. "A suit for damages against a state official in his official capacity is a suit against the State." Calzone v. Hawley , 866 F.3d 866, 872 (8th Cir. 2017). Thus, all references to "the defendants," here, are references to the State of Iowa, and vice versa.

In Count I of their Complaint, the plaintiffs assert a federal-law claim pursuant to the FLSA, alleging that the defendants have failed to pay the named plaintiffs and the putative class overtime for their work that is properly to be paid under 29 U.S.C. § 207. In Count II, the plaintiffs assert a state-law claim pursuant to IOWA CODE CH. 91A, which is known as the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law (IWPCL), see IOWA CODE § 91A.1, alleging that the defendants have failed to pay the named plaintiffs and the putative class for overtime hours in violation of IOWA CODE § 91A.3.

The defendants removed this action to this federal court asserting federal question jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(a), based on the FLSA claim. The defendants also asserted on removal that this court has supplemental jurisdiction over the IWPCL claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

C. The Motion For Partial Summary Judgment

The plaintiffs seek partial summary judgment on the defendants' affirmative defense of sovereign immunity. They argue that the Iowa Supreme Court has held that the State of Iowa has waived its sovereign immunity to claims in state court under the IWPCL and the FLSA. They argue, further, that, in this case, the defendants waived sovereign immunity to the IWPCL claim in federal court, pursuant to Lapides v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia , 535 U.S. 613, 122 S.Ct. 1640, 152 L.Ed.2d 806 (2002), by removing this action to this federal court. They argue that the general principles set out in Lapides also apply to the FLSA claim, resulting in a waiver of sovereign immunity to that claim in federal court.

The defendants respond that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to federal FLSA claims against the state in federal court and that Lapides expressly applies only to state-law claims with respect to which the state has waived immunity from state-court proceedings. The defendants contend that, at least arguably, the Iowa Supreme Court found only that federal FLSA overtime claims can be brought in state court through the mechanism of an

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IWPCL claim. They argue that, if the Iowa Supreme Court went so far as to find a waiver to sue the state in state court on a federal FLSA claim, the Iowa Supreme Court should now "change course" and rule that there is no such waiver. The defendants also argue that, while the Iowa Supreme Court found an express consent to suit on IWPCL claims in Iowa courts, there is no such consent to suit—and no resulting waiver of sovereign immunity to suit—in federal courts.

In reply, the plaintiffs argue that it is well-established that IOWA CODE CH. 91A allows the State of Iowa to be sued in state court and that Lapides allows the state to be sued in federal court on such a claim upon removal, that is, by a waiver resulting from litigation conduct. The plaintiffs point out that, when the defendants removed this action to federal court, they passed up the opportunity to have the Iowa Supreme Court "change course" on its ruling that the state can be sued in state court on a federal FLSA claim. The plaintiffs reiterate that the State of Iowa's waiver of sovereign immunity to FLSA claims in state court also waives immunity to such claims in federal court when the state removes the action.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Standards For Summary Judgment

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). It provides, further, that a "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. Summary judgment decisions usually focus on whether the non-moving party has generated a genuine issue of material fact precluding entry of judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g. , Torgerson v. City of Rochester , 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). However, " ‘[w]here [as here] the unresolved issues are primarily legal rather than factual, summary judgment is particularly appropriate." Ritchie Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Stoebner , 779 F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Cochrane , 124 F.3d 978, 981-82 (8th Cir. 1997) ).

B. Sovereign Immunity vs. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

This case involves questions of sovereign immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity, but the two are not coterminous. "The Eleventh Amendment provides that the ‘Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit ... commenced or prosecuted against one of the ... States’ by citizens of another State, U.S. Const., Amdt. 11, and (as interpreted) by its own citizens." Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia , 535 U.S. 613, 618, 122 S.Ct. 1640, 152 L.Ed.2d 806 (2002) (citing Hans v. Louisiana , 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890) ); Fryberger v. Univ. of Arkansas , 889 F.3d 471, 473 (8th Cir. 2018). Thus, Eleventh Amendment immunity is immunity of a State from suit in a federal court. Id.

Eleventh Amendment immunity is only " ‘one particular exemplification’ " of sovereign immunity,...