Rowe v. State

• Decision Date: 04 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 73,73
• Citation: 769 A.2d 879,363 Md. 424
• Parties: Astley Leroy ROWE v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

769 A.2d 879

363 Md. 424

Astley Leroy ROWE v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 73, Sept. Term, 1999.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

April 4, 2001.

Julia Doyle Bernhardt, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for petitioner.

Steven L. Holcomb, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen. of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY,¹ RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, JJ.

BELL, Chief Judge.

The issue this case presents is the legality of a traffic stop of the petitioner, Astley Leroy Rowe, in the early morning hours, based on a State Trooper observing the van the petitioner was driving cross, by about eight inches, the white edge-line separating the shoulder from the traveled portion of the highway, return to the travel portion and, a short time later, touch the white edge line. In view of the trooper's knowledge that, at the time of the occurrence, people are coming home from bars and are getting tired, he effected a stop, allegedly for the benefit of the petitioner. The trial court found that the stop was legal and, therefore, denied the petitioner's motion to suppress evidence uncovered as a result of the stop. Affirming the petitioner's convictions, the Court of Special Appeals agreed. We shall reverse.²

I.

Having pulled into a median cross-over on Interstate 95 in Cecil County, in order to go south, Trooper Stephen Jones of the Maryland State Police observed the petitioner's van, "the only one in the area," proceeding southbound in the far right lane, the slow lane, traveling at a speed slower than the 65 mph speed limit. He indicated that the petitioner could not have missed seeing him in the crossover as he passed. Trooper Jones followed the van and observed it for approximately 1.2 miles. During that time, Trooper Jones paced the van, determining it to be traveling at between 50 and 54 miles per hour. He also observed it cross the white edge-line onto the shoulder:

"The vehicle crossed the white edge line on the right side of the shoulder, about eight inches over that white edge line on to the shoulder or rumble strips. It hit those rumble strips and at the time when he hit those rumble strips he swerved back into the slow lane."

Trooper Jones later saw the van touch the white edge-line again. Describing what he saw as "the tires directly on the white edge line and came back into the slow lane once again," he characterized the van as having "swerved or weaved back onto the white shoulder edge line once again." Trooper Jones then made the traffic stop, giving the following reason for doing so:

"[f]or failing to drive in a single lane. And at that time it was one o'clock in the morning. For me, it's when people are coming home from the bars the person could have possibly been intoxicated. It's also a time, it's late in the evening when people start to get tired and a lot of our accidents are people falling asleep at the wheel. I checked on the benefit of the driver after he failed to drive in a single lane."

Trooper Jones approached the van on the passenger side, identified the petitioner, the only occupant, as the operator and inquired whether the petitioner was getting tired and whether he had anything to drink. When the petitioner answered "no" to both questions, the trooper asked why the petitioner was "swerving [and] weaving in and out of his lane," to which the petitioner replied he had dropped something on the floor and was reaching to pick it up. Trooper Jones did not detect an odor of alcohol, and he testified that he was "fairly certain that [the petitioner] wasn't under the influence of alcohol."

While waiting for the petitioner's drivers licence and registration, Trooper Jones made a "quick scan" of the interior of the vehicle, observing two pieces of hard-sided luggage in the rear most part of the van. The petitioner produced a Florida driver's license and a car rental contract. Seeing that the petitioner's name was not on the rental contract, and that the contract did not provide for any additional drivers, the trooper ordered the petitioner out of the vehicle, noting, "[b]ecause [the petitioner] was driving a vehicle where the renter of the vehicle is not present and he is not authorized to drive the vehicle so I'm going to get the story straight before he proceeds on down the road."

Waiting for the license and warrant check he requested, Trooper Jones discovered, upon an examination of the rental car contract, that it had expired five days earlier. The petitioner offered the explanation that he borrowed the van from a friend, that he needed it to go to Florida to check on his tractor-trailer that was in a repair shop there, and he did not know that the rental contract had expired. Having learned that the petitioner's Florida driver's license was valid, although his driving privileges in New York had been suspended, Trooper Jones requested the dispatcher to run a registration check on the license tag, and attempt to contact the rental company. The officer explained that he did this to clear up "the discrepancies on [the] contract." Trooper Jones also requested a criminal history check of the petitioner.

While awaiting the additional information, the trooper elicited from the petitioner that the luggage in the van was his. He then asked the petitioner if he had anything illegal in the vehicle, including guns or drugs, to which the petitioner responded in the negative. Trooper Jones then requested permission to search the vehicle, and the petitioner consented both verbally and by signing a written consent form. He testified that when he opened the rear hatch of the petitioner's van, he immediately smelled what he believed to be marijuana. The subsequent search of the luggage uncovered approximately 34,000 grams (about seventy-seven pounds) of marijuana.

The petitioner was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, possession of marijuana and a violation of Maryland Code (1977, 1999 Repl.Vol.), § 18-106(b) of the Transportation Article,³ driving a rental vehicle in violation of the rental agreement. He was also issued warnings for driving "50 in a 65"⁴ and failing to drive in a single lane. See § 21-309.

In the Circuit Court for Cecil County, the petitioner moved to suppress the marijuana, arguing that he did not knowingly and voluntarily consent to the search of the van and that, even if he consented, the trooper did not have probable cause to make the stop. Denying the motion to suppress, the motions court stated:

"Well, as to the stop, I grant you that the defendant was not flagrantly violating the law, but at the hour of the night and what he was doing was enough to cause suspicion of the Trooper as to whether or not he was going to sleep or he had a little bit too much to drink and I think he had a duty to and the right to stop him.

"Once he stopped him, we have all heard testimony about that but I accept the Trooper's testimony that he advised the defendant of his rights with respect to the search.

"I find further that the defendant consented to it. Even if he hadn't consented to it, he was within his rights to search the vehicle because he found out that the defendant was operating the rental vehicle, which he was not the authorized driver and, in fact, the rental the [sic] agreement had expired. So I deny the motion to suppress."

A jury found the petitioner guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and violation of § 18-106(b). The petitioner noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.

In an unreported opinion, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. That court held that the traffic stop was justified because the van the petitioner was driving was "weaving off the highway" and that the investigatory detention was reasonable,⁵ there being "absolutely nothing to indicate that the trooper used up an inordinate amount of time in attempting to resolve [the rental car contract] matter." Critical to that court's latter determination were the finding that the defendant had violated § 21-309 and the fact that he was not listed on the rental agreement.

We granted the petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Rowe v. State, 356 Md. 17, 736 A.2d 1064 (1999), to address the important issue this case presents.

II.

Our review of the trial court's denial of the petitioner's motion to suppress under the Fourth Amendment is based solely on the record of the suppression hearing. See Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282, 753 A.2d 519, 524 (2000); Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 368, 735 A.2d 491, 497 (1999); In Re Tariq A R-Y, 347 Md. 484, 488, 701 A.2d 691, 692 (1997). We review the facts found by the trial court in that record in the light most favorable to the State, or stated differently, to determine whether the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. See Cartnail, 359 Md. at 282, 753 A.2d at 525; Ferris, 355 Md. at 368, 735 A.2d at 497; In Re Tariq A R-Y, 347 Md. at 488, 701 A.2d at 693. Legal conclusions, however, are reviewed "de novo." Cartnail, 359 Md. at 282, 753 A.2d at 525; Ferris, 355 Md. at 368, 735 A.2d at 497.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.⁶ A person is considered "seized" for Fourth Amendment purposes if, under all of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of the suspect would believe that he or she was not free to leave or to terminate the encounter. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2387, 115 L.Ed.2d 389, 400 (1991). A traffic stop of a motorist is a seizure which implicates the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573, 84 L.Ed.2d 605, 613 (1985). Therefore, even temporary or limited restraints on the liberty of a person during a traffic stop may not be constitutionally permissible if, under all of the circumstances, the traffic...