Rowe v. State
| Decision Date | 27 January 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 1281S382,1281S382 |
| Citation | 444 N.E.2d 303 |
| Parties | Monroe ROWE, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Andrea K. Knish, Munster, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., John D. Shuman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Appellant, Monroe Rowe, Jr., was convicted of one count of robbery under Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-5-1 and determined to be a habitual offender. On appeal he raises issues under two headings:
(1) Error in the determination of the admissibility of a statement made by him to the police.
(2) Error in the denial of a defense motion for a continuance of the trial.
On February 13, 1981, at 3:00 a.m., a green Toyota drove into a gas station located in Gary, Indiana. It was occupied by two men and a woman. The driver pointed a gun at the attendant and took his money. Appellant and a woman, Kim Brown, were arrested the next day while driving a car of like description. Appellant was identified at the trial by the attendant as the driver of the Toyota and the man who had wielded the gun. Appellant's confession retailing a part in the robbery was introduced into evidence at trial.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress his confession on the ground that it and the "Miranda " waiver preceding it were not knowingly and voluntarily given. Following a hearing the motion was denied and the confession admitted at trial over objection.
The burden rested with the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession and waiver were free and voluntary. Burton v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 94, 292 N.E.2d 790. The question presented is whether, looking to all of the circumstances, they were free and voluntary and not induced by any violence, threats, promises or other improper influence. Nacoff v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 97, 267 N.E.2d 165. On appeal from a determination that the accused's statement was admissible, we do not weigh the evidence nor resolve questions of credibility, but consider the evidence which supports the decision of the trier of fact in the case of contested evidence and any uncontested evidence presented by the appellant. Magley v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 618, 335 N.E.2d 811. The trial court's finding will be upheld if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support it. Hill v. State, (1979) Ind., 390 N.E.2d 167.
Some of the events culminating in appellant's confession are shown by uncontradicted evidence. He was arrested at 1:30 a.m. on February 14, 1981 on a warrant unrelated to this appeal. He was with Kim Brown at the time. While in custody he was first questioned at 8:30 a.m. the same day after signing a Miranda waiver form. He denied participating in the gas station robbery. At 2:00 p.m. the same day, he again signed a Miranda waiver form, and was then confronted with the confession of Kim Brown and the weapon used in the robbery which had been recovered as a result of that confession. Appellant then decided to give a statement confessing his role in the robbery. During the process of producing a typewritten statement, appellant became ill, and paramedics were summoned. They arrived and the process was stopped while appellant was examined. They declared that he was alright, and appellant refused an offer to go at that point to the hospital. The typewritten statement was then completed and signed.
Appellant first contends that the police interrogators withheld treatment for his immediate symptoms of withdrawal to coerce him into giving an incriminating statement. The evidence on the point is conflicting. One police officer testified that the illness was not manifested until three-fourths of the written statement had been set down, long after appellant's flat oral admission to being a participant in the gas station robbery. Believing this testimony, as he was entitled to do, the judge could have concluded that appellant's decisions to waive his Miranda rights and to confess were made before he became ill, at a point when any need for immediate treatment was not known.
Appellant next contends that the police officers induced him to confess by offering him hospitalization to cure his drug addiction in lieu of imprisonment in return for his incriminating statement. The evidence on the point is in conflict. One police officer testified that appellant changed his exculpatory story within minutes after being confronted with the incriminating statement of Kim Brown and the weapon. Believing this testimony, the judge could...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Wisehart v. State
...sort of threats or violence nor obtained by any direct or implied promises nor by the exertion of any improper influence. Rowe v. State, (1983) Ind., 444 N.E.2d 303; Hendricks v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 496, 371 N.E.2d 1312, cert. denied 436 U.S. 961, 98 S.Ct. 3079, 57 L.Ed.2d 1127. The tria......
-
Newton v. State
...56 S.Ct. 461, 80 L.Ed. 682. The burden rested with the State to prove Newton's statement was freely and voluntarily made. Rowe v. State, (1983) Ind., 444 N.E.2d 303. The issue of voluntariness centers around a careful evaluation of all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the stateme......
-
Komyatti v. State
...evidence which could have been part of his case-in-chief. Lewis v. State (1980), Ind.App., 406 N.E.2d 1226, 1230. In Rowe v. State (1983), Ind., 444 N.E.2d 303, 305, the defendant sought a continuance when one of his witnesses failed to appear, but the trial court denied the motion. In revi......
-
Starks v. State
...He had ample opportunity to serve the various subpoenas and seek the court's assistance in enforcing them if necessary. See Rowe v. State (1983), Ind., 444 N.E.2d 303. Moreover, the motion for continuance was not precipitated by any surprise arising at trial. Defense counsel not only posses......