Rowland v. Chappell
Citation | 876 F.3d 1174 |
Decision Date | 06 December 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 12-99004,12-99004 |
Parties | Guy Kevin ROWLAND, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Kevin CHAPPELL, Warden, Respondent–Appellee. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Joel Levine (argued), Costa Mesa, California; Michael Robert Levine (argued), Levine & McHenry LLC, Portland, Oregon; for Petitioner–Appellant.
Alice B. Lustre (argued), Deputy Attorney General; Glenn R. Pruden, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Gerald A. Engler, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Xavier Becerra, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, San Francisco, California; for Respondent–Appellee.
Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Richard R. Clifton, and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Guy Kevin Rowland appeals from the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction for first degree murder and rape and his capital sentence. We affirm.
On February 11, 1987, the State of California filed an amended information charging Rowland with one count of first degree murder (with the special circumstance that the murder took place during the commission of rape) and one count of rape. It alleged that Rowland had twelve prior felony convictions, and that he was on parole when he committed the offense.
On May 13, 1988, after the guilt phase of the trial, the jury convicted Rowland of both first degree murder and rape, and also found true the special circumstance allegation. On June 6, 1988, after the penalty phase, the jury returned a death sentence.
Evidence at trial established that on March 16, 1986, Marion Geraldine ("Geri") Richardson went to the "Wild Idle" bar in Byron, Contra Costa County, California. Richardson lived in Byron with her mother and worked as a cook. She regularly snorted methamphetamine and evidently had some with her that night.
Rowland, who was twenty-four years old at the time, was also at the bar. Rowland socialized with Richardson for a while. According to an off-duty bartender, Rowland was "coming on" to Richardson, but she did not respond positively and seemed to be "trying to ignore" him.
Before 10 p.m., Rowland left the bar alone, driving away in his truck. Sometime later, Richardson told her friend that she was not feeling well, had a terrible headache, and needed to go home to get some sleep as she had to go to work early the next morning. Richardson left the bar alone in her car. Her car was later seen parked, empty and unlocked, at an odd angle about half a block from the bar.
In the hours that followed, Rowland brutally beat Richardson about the head, face, and elsewhere. He also raped her. According to expert testimony, Richardson had a bruise on her inner thigh which could have been caused by someone using a knee to force her legs part. Rowland also choked Richardson twice, killing her the second time. Before her death, Richardson ingested a potentially lethal dose of methamphetamine, which it appeared Rowland put in her mouth. Rowland then hauled Richardson's body in his truck to Half Moon Bay in San Mateo County, dragged her on the ground, and dumped her in the ocean.
The next morning, at about 7 a.m., Rowland went to the house of his lover, Susan Lanet, in Livermore. He looked disturbed and said he wanted to leave California.
They shared some methamphetamine he had evidently taken from Richardson. Rowland soon admitted to Lanet that he had killed Richardson. He asked Lanet whether she wanted Richardson's belongings, including a ring and make-up. Lanet declined. Rowland then offered Lanet $20 to clean his truck and remove "[b]lood and every strand of hair." Lanet pretended to accept, but instead called the police. Shortly thereafter, Rowland was arrested as he attempted to flee. At around 9:45 a.m., Richardson's body was found at the base of a cliff by Moss Beach near Half Moon Bay. Blood and other evidence in Rowland's truck tied him to Richardson's killing.
At the guilt phase of the trial, Rowland did not present any evidence, call any witnesses, or take the stand. His primary defense was that the evidence did not establish first degree murder or rape. The jury returned a guilty verdict.
During the penalty phase of the trial, the State offered in aggravation: (1) the circumstances of Rowland's crimes committed against Richardson (for which it relied on the evidence already provided during the guilt phase); (2) Rowland's extensive prior violent criminal activity; and (3) Rowland's prior felony convictions.
As the State demonstrated to the jury, Rowland had an egregious history of violence towards women:
As to Rowland's prior felony convictions, the State established that Rowland was convicted of multiple counts of kidnapping, rape, sodomy, and other felonies for the vicious attack on the thirteen-year-old girls.
In mitigation, Rowland himself did not testify, but he presented evidence of his family background, including physical abuse and alcoholism. He was born into a middle class family in 1961, and had one brother and two sisters. His parents had a violent, alcoholic marriage. His mother neglected and abused him, and twice attempted to drown him in the bathtub as a baby. As a toddler, he experienced night terrors and convulsions. At a young age, he commenced psychotherapy and drug therapy. In school, he had learning disabilities and behavioral problems. He started to abuse alcohol and drugs, and proceeded to spend substantial time in correctional facilities.
Rowland was diagnosed with different mental conditions at various points in his life. For example, when he was six or seven years old, he was diagnosed with hyperactivity. At the time of trial, when he was twenty-six, Rowland was diagnosed with borderline personality disorder
. As discussed further below, psychiatrist Dr. Hugh Ridlehuber testified for Rowland at the penalty phase.
Rowland also offered the background of his family members as mitigation evidence. His parents each came from violent, sexually abusive, alcoholic backgrounds. Rowland's parents physically and/or sexually abused his sister, and Rowland's father abused his mother.
The jury returned a death sentence.
On December 17, 1992, the California Supreme Court affirmed Rowland's conviction and death sentence. See People v. Rowland , 4 Cal.4th 238, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 841 P.2d 897 (1992).
On March 7, 1994, Rowland filed his first habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. His state habeas petition was accompanied by supporting declarations, including from Dr. Ridlehuber, who had testified for Rowland in the penalty phase and now declared that he had been hired by trial counsel "too late" to do an adequate examination. The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition on the merits on June 1, 1994.
On August 26, 1994, Rowland filed a motion in federal district court requesting appointment of counsel and a stay of execution pending preparation of his finalized habeas petition. On June 19, 1995, after counsel was appointed, Rowland filed a motion for a further stay of execution, which was accompanied by a partial list of non-frivolous issues to be raised in the finalized petition. On June 28, 1996, after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), Rowland filed his finalized habeas petition.
Rowland ultimately filed his operative third amended habeas petition on November 19, 2007. On October 2, 2012, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State. The district court rejected Rowland's argument that AEDPA does not apply to his case. The district court also denied a certificate of appealability ("COA") on all of Rowland's claims.
Rowland then filed a timely appeal, and our court granted a COA on a number of issues.
We review de novo a district court's denial of a habeas petition and for clear error any factual findings made by the district court. Hurles v. Ryan , 752 F.3d 768, 777 (9th Cir. 2014).
Under AEDPA, when a state court has decided a...
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