Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., Montgomery County, Ohio
| Decision Date | 22 March 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 82-3218,82-3218 |
| Parties | 37 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 175, 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 34,478, 16 Ed. Law Rep. 1068 Marjorie H. ROWLAND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MAD RIVER LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO, a public body corporate, Defendant-Appellant, Robert L. Bell, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Michael J. Burdge, argued, Dayton, Ohio, for defendant-appellant.
Alexander M. Spater, Spater, Gittes & Terzian, Columbus, Ohio, Michael D. Simpson, argued, Nat. Educ. Ass'n, Michael H. Gottesman, Bredhoff & Kaiser, Michael D. Simpson, Peter O. Shinevar, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellee.
Leonard Graff, Legal Director, Nat. Gay Rights Advocates, San Francisco, Cal., for amicus curiae Nat. Gay Rights Advocates.
Before LIVELY, Chief Judge, and EDWARDS and KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judges.
The school district appeals from a judgment in favor of a non-tenured guidance counselor who was suspended, then transferred and finally not rehired at the end of her one-year appointment. The question presented is whether these actions deprived the plaintiff of her right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment or to equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. We conclude that under the facts of this case neither constitutional deprivation occurred, and reverse the judgment of the district court.
The plaintiff began working as a vocational guidance counselor at Stebbins High School in Montgomery County, Ohio in August 1974 under a limited one-year contract. A short time later she told a secretary in an office she shared with other vocational education personnel that two of the students she was counseling were homosexual. During the same period in the fall of 1974 the plaintiff told the same secretary that she, the plaintiff, was bisexual and that she had a female lover. She also informed the assistant principal of the school and several teachers who were personal friends that she was bisexual. In December the plaintiff had a meeting with the principal of Stebbins, the defendant DiNino, and he suggested that she resign. The plaintiff refused to resign and then told several other Stebbins teachers that she had been asked to resign because she was bisexual, and sought their support. Following another meeting with DiNino, the defendant Hopper who was superintendent of the district, and the district's attorney, the plaintiff again refused to resign. Plaintiff's attorney also attended this meeting.
Following the second refusal to resign the plaintiff was suspended with full pay for the remainder of the contract year. She then filed the first of two actions in the district court. When the district court entered a preliminary injunction against her suspension, plaintiff was reassigned to a position involving development of a career education curriculum. This was a position with no student contact. In March 1975 DiNino recommended that the contract of the plaintiff, along with those of several other Stebbins teachers, not be renewed. Superintendent Hopper concurred, and the plaintiff was informed of the recommendation. At a regular meeting of the school board the recommendation to not renew Rowland's contract was unanimously adopted without independent investigation. The plaintiff filed a second action in the district court charging that the reassignment and failure to renew her contract violated a number of her constitutional rights. The defendants in both actions were the school district, the president and members of the board of the district, the superintendent of the district and the principal of Stebbins High.
In her first district court complaint the plaintiff set forth five causes of action. In the first of these she sought damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, claiming that the act of the defendants in suspending her without a hearing violated her right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on this claim, on two claims attacking the constitutionality of several Ohio statutes and on a state claim brought under pendent jurisdiction. The plaintiff appealed to this court and we affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on all four claims in an unpublished order. The district court severed the fifth claim in the first action and consolidated it with the second action. In this severed and consolidated claim the plaintiff charged violation of her right of privacy under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution in that she was suspended Thereafter the district court dismissed all claims, sua sponte, upon finding that sexual preference is not a constitutionally protected interest. On appeal this court noted that none of the circumstances surrounding the decision of the defendants to not renew Ms. Rowland's contract had been developed and concluded that dismissal on the pleadings was improper. In an unpublished order, 615 F.2d 1362 (6th Cir.1980) the judgment dismissing the complaint was vacated and the cause was remanded for further proceedings. Upon return to the district court the case was assigned to a United States Magistrate and the parties agreed to a jury trial before, and the entry of final judgment by, the magistrate.
solely because she was bisexual. Thus, the suspension, transfer and nonrenewal claims were all before the district court in the remaining action.
The magistrate determined to submit the issues, as he perceived them, to the jury in the form of a series of "special verdicts." Though all parties submitted extensive proposed instructions, the magistrate gave none of them, concluding that the alternative to special verdicts would be "a short course on the Constitution." In special verdicts 1 through 3 the jury found that neither plaintiff's disclosure to the secretary of her love for another woman, nor her statements to the assistant principal and to other teachers concerning her bisexuality interfered with the proper performance of anyone's duties or with the operation of the school generally. In the same verdicts the jury found that the decision to suspend the plaintiff was motivated at least in part by these statements regarding her bisexuality. In special verdict 4 the jury found that the decisions to transfer and to not renew her contract were not motivated even in part by the fact that plaintiff had filed a law suit regarding her suspension.
In special verdict 5 the jury found that in suspending and transferring her the defendants treated the plaintiff differently from similarly situated employees "because she was homosexual/bisexual." The jury also found that DiNino and Hopper treated her differently from similarly situated employees in recommending that plaintiff's contract not be renewed, but that the board of education did not treat her differently in voting not to renew Ms. Rowland's contract. In the same special verdict the jury found that at the time of her suspension the plaintiff was not performing as a vocational guidance counselor in a satisfactory manner "because she revealed to Mrs. Monell [the secretary] the sexual orientation of two students when it was not necessary to do so."
In special verdict 6 the jury found that defendants DiNino and Hopper acted in good faith in all their actions regarding plaintiff and in special verdict 7 that the board of education acted for no other reason than the recommendation of the defendant Hopper in voting not to renew Ms. Rowland's contract. In special verdict 8 the jury found that if plaintiff "had not been bisexual and if she had not told Mrs. Monell, the secretary, of her sexual preference," she would not have been suspended or transferred and the board of education would not have failed to renew her contract "anyway for other reasons."
On the basis of the special verdicts the magistrate entered an order finding in favor of the school board members in their individual capacities, and in favor of the defendants DiNino and Hopper "on all issues in the complaint" because they acted in good faith. However, he found in favor of the plaintiff and against the school district for the suspension and transfer of plaintiff "in violation of her rights to equal protection of the law and free speech" and for nonrenewal of her contract "in violation of her right to free speech." The jury then awarded damages of $13,500 for personal humiliation, mental anguish and suffering proximately caused by plaintiff's suspension, no damages for her transfer, and damages of $26,947 for loss of earnings The magistrate found that the school district was liable for damages resulting from the plaintiff's suspension because the defendant Hopper was acting on behalf of the school district when he suspended her. Though Hopper was entitled to good faith immunity, the school district did not share this immunity, the magistrate held, because Hopper was acting "within the sphere of his authority as a policy-maker or decisionmaker." The magistrate held that special verdict 5, which found that the school board did not treat plaintiff differently from similarly situated employees because of her sexual preference in failing to renew her contract, determined that the school district did not violate Rowland's right to equal protection of the law by not renewing her contract. Nevertheless, he held the school district liable on the equal protection claim because of Hopper's action in suspending and transferring the plaintiff. He also construed special verdict 7, that the school board voted to not renew the contract solely on the basis of Hopper's recommendation, as a determination that plaintiff's right to freedom of speech was infringed by the nonrenewal action of the board.
proximately caused by nonrenewal of her contract. The jury found that plaintiff had suffered no loss of reputation or...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Doe v. McFaul
... ... United States District Court, D.Ohio, E.D ... December 26, 1984. 599 F. Supp. 1422 ... Prosecutors, Cuyahoga County, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendants ... were promulgated in the name of all the local common pleas judges and the journal entry was ... School v. Affleck, 346 F.Supp. 1354, 1368 ("If after a ... 1778, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983); see Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, Montgomery ... ...
-
Wagner v. GENESEE COUNTY BD. OF COM'RS
... ... as the position of Friend of the Court as a local government unit. Based upon that ... 1984), Rowland v. Mad River School District, 730 F.2d 444, 451 ... ...
-
American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. U.S. Postal Service, AFL-CIO
... ... Area Local, et al ... UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE ... In that case the Constable of Harris County, Texas dismissed a deputy named Ardith McPherson ... Healthy City School District Board of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, ... Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 413, 99 S.Ct. 693, 695, 58 ... grief was not matter of public concern); Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, 730 F.2d 444 ... ...
-
Under 21 v. City of New York
...84 L.Ed.2d 392, posed similar questions. There, the Sixth Circuit held that neither First nor Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated (730 F.2d 444). The Supreme Court, by a vote of 6 to 2 denied certiorari. Indeed, Mr. Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Rowland was of the opinion that ce......
-
The myth of superiority.
...clearances); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Federal Bureau of Investigation); Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984) (high school counselor), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985); McConnell v. Anderson, 451 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1971) (library (40......
-
Schoolhouse Rock: Lessons of Homosexual Tolerance in Keeton v. Anderson-wiley from the Classroom to the Constitution - Billie Pritchard
...controversial themes, including lesbianism, to be performed by her advanced acting class; Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 450 (6th Cir. 1984) ("[W]e have held it was not impermissible to discipline the plaintiff for making statements about her sexual preference."); Coll......