Rowland v. S. Health Partners
| Decision Date | 27 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 3:18-cv-00033-GFVT-EBA |
| Parties | KIMISSA ROWLAND, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHERN HEALTH PARTNERS, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 53.] Plaintiff Kimissa Rowland was formerly incarcerated at Franklin County Regional Jail. She has filed suit under § 1983 against Southern Health Partners, Inc., Jane Bartram, Stacy Jensen, and Sabina Trivette for deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs, and also raises state law claims for negligence and gross negligence. [R. 1.] Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because they are protected by qualified immunity, and because there is no genuine issue for trial. For the following reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 53] is GRANTED.
Plaintiff Kimissa Rowland brings claims of deliberate indifference and medical negligence against Southern Health Partners, Inc., (SHP) Sabina Trivette, Stacy Jensen, and Jane Bartram. [R. 1.] Southern Health Partners, Inc. is "for-profit jail health care company" who contracts with local governments to provide medical care within their facilities. [R. 1 at ¶ 17.] Defendant Sabina Trivette is a licensed practical nurse (LPN) and employee of SHP. [R.53-1 at 1.] Defendant Stacy Jensen is an advanced practice registered nurse (APRN) and independent contractor of SHP. Id. Jensen subcontracted with Jane Bartram, also an APRN, for her work in the jail. Id. at 1-2. Ms. Rowland was a sentenced inmate at Franklin County Regional Jail where she alleges she suffered injuries and a violation of her constitutional rights due to Defendants' deliberate indifference to her serious medical need: ulcerative colitis. [R. 62 at 12.]
The timeline of events is of some importance in this case. Ms. Rowland was admitted to Franklin County Regional Jail on July 28, 2017 on a drug charge. [R. 1 at ¶ 9.] On August 8, Ms. Rowland saw Nurse Trivette to deliver her medical history and undergo a physical. [R. 62 at 4.] On August 15, Ms. Rowland submitted a medical request form and saw Nurse Trivette the following day, August 16, complaining of a sexually transmitted disease. [R. 53-1 at 3; R. 62 at 4.] Nurse Trivette gave medication for the STD based on SHP protocol. [R. 53-1 at 4.]. Ms. Rowland again submitted sick class slips on August 18 and 19 complaining of rash and cold symptoms, and was seen by Nurse Trivette once again on August 19 for these symptoms. [R. 53-1 at 4.]
On September 11, Ms. Rowland was released on medical furlough in order to see her regular doctor for issues with her ulcerative colitis. [R. 53-1 at 4; R. 62 at 5.] However, due to a lapse in insurance, Ms. Rowland was unable to see her doctor during the furlough. [R. 62 at 5.] Upon return to the jail on September 13, Ms. Rowland was x-rayed by jail staff who suspected that she had a foreign body concealed in her rectum. [R. 53-1 at 5.] Ms. Rowland was sent to a local hospital for a CT scan. Id. The scan did not reveal a foreign body, and the emergency room doctor released Ms. Rowland with a note advising she follow-up with a gastroenterologist "as soon as possible[.]" [R. 62-5.] The hospital doctor also prescribed a five-day course ofprednisone. [R. 62 at 7.] Ms. Rowland began treatment with prednisone on September 21 after Nurse Bartram reviewed the after-care instructions received from the hospital. [R. 53-1 at 6.]
On September 25, Ms. Rowland submitted a medical request slip complaining of a toothache. [R. 53-1 at 6.] She was seen by Nurse Trivette the following day, who provided Motrin and cipro for her tooth pain. [R. 62 at 8.] Defendants contend Ms. Rowland did not submit another medical call slip for ulcerative colitis symptoms until October 3. [R. 53-1 at 6.] Ms. Rowland believes she may have submitted additional call slips between September 25 and October 3, but she cannot recall what they said or how Defendants responded. [R. 63-5 at 101-03.] On October 3, Ms. Rowland submitted a call slip which said "my stomach again (ulcerative colitis) and my mouth is still sore and swolling [sic]." Id. She was seen the next day by Nurse Trivette, wherein she complained of nausea and vomiting. Id. Nurse Trivette referred her to an APRN, but it wasn't until October 16 that Ms. Rowland was seen by Nurse Jensen. [R. 53-1 at 6; R. 62 at 9.] Nurse Jensen noted Ms. Rowland was experience vomiting and blood in her stools, and diagnosed her symptoms as those of ulcerative colitis. [R. 53-1 at 6; R. 62 at 9.] Nurse Jensen started Ms. Rowland on a second round of prednisone and ordered an appointment be made for Ms. Rowland at UK's Gastroenterology Clinic. Ms. Rowland received the prednisone, but was never taken to the clinic. [R. 62 at 10.] According to Ms. Rowland, there is no evidence in the record that the clinic was ever called. Id.
On October 18, Ms. Rowland submitted a medical request slip stating she was not responding to the prednisone as quickly as usual, and also complaining of pain in her kidneys. [R. 53-1 at 7.] Again she was seen by Nurse Trivette the very next day and was assessed for a possible urinary tract infection. Id. Ms. Rowland submitted an additional medical call slip on October 25 which read: [R. 53-1 at 7.] Ms. Rowland was seen by Nurse Trivette, who elevated the matter to Nurse Jensen. Nurse Jensen ordered Ms. Rowland be taken to the emergency room. Id. Ms. Rowland was admitted to the hospital where she remained for two weeks until her ulcerative colitis was managed. [R. 62 at 11.]
Based on the foregoing, Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on all claims. Defendants argue Nurse Trivette, Nurse Bartram, and Nurse Jensen are entitled to qualified official immunity as to Ms. Rowlands § 1983 claim. [R. 53-1 at 9.] Additionally, Defendants contend Ms. Rowland has failed to demonstrate any of the defendants consciously disregarded a risk to her health. Id. at 15. Relatedly, if Defendants did consciously disregard a known health risk, resulting in harm to Ms. Rowland, Defendants argue Ms. Rowland must provide verifying medical evidence of that injury. Id. For the same reason, Defendants argue Ms. Rowland cannot prove injury as a result of medical negligence. Id.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A fact's materiality is determined by the substantive law, and a dispute is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. ZenithRadio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The burden is initially on the moving party to inform "the district court of the basis of its motion, and [to identify] those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of a material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once this burden is met, the nonmoving party, "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Further, "the trial court no longer has a duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact." Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989). Instead, "the non-moving party has an affirmative duty to direct the Court's attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact." In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001).
Federal qualified immunity "protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). When evaluating such claims, courts generally apply a two-step analysis. First, the court must consider whether "[t]aken in a light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, [ ] the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Second, the court asks whether the right at issue was "clearly established." Id. "The relevant dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004). "The burden of convincing a court that the law was clearly establishedrests squarely with the plaintiff." Key v. Grayson, 179 F.3d 996, 1000 (6th Cir.1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Court does not reach the two-part test, because the defendants are not "government officials" protected by qualified immunity. McCullum v. Tepe, 693 F.3d 696, 700 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted). In Harrison v. Ash, the Sixth Circuit considered whether nurses employed by a private medical provider which...
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