Rowles v. State, 54276
| Decision Date | 29 September 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 54276,No. 3,54276,3 |
| Citation | 143 Ga.App. 553,239 S.E.2d 164 |
| Parties | Richard D. ROWLES v. The STATE |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Wallace C. Clayton, Austell, for appellant.
Herbert A. Rivers, Sol., J. Stephen Schuster, Asst. Sol., Marietta, for appellee.
The appellant Rowles was convicted based upon an affidavit that alleged he committed an offense designated as a "misdemeanor" accompanied by an accusation in three counts alleging that he committed a criminal trespass by remaining upon the grounds of Six Flags Over Georgia after having received notice to depart (because of his alleged intoxicated condition); simple assault and battery by unlawfully shoving a security guard at Six Flags; and a third charge of public drunkenness. The trial court directed a verdict of acquittal of the public drunkenness, apparently upon the theory that the evidence did not establish the public nature of the area in which the appellant was observed. The jury returned a verdict of guilty as to the other two offenses. Appellant was sentenced to a $250 fine and 12 months in the public work camp, suspended. Rowles brings this appeal enumerating five errors. Held:
1. In his first enumeration of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his special and general demurrers to the affidavit and accusation. This error is based upon the allegation that the affidavit charging Rowles with a "misdemeanor" is invalid since it fails to state plainly the offense charged and is contrary to the law establishing the State Court of Cobb County which requires an affidavit to set forth plainly the offense charged. A second basis for the enumeration is that Count One alleging criminal trespass does not allege that the offense was committed "knowingly and without authority," as the offense is described in the pertinent statute. Ga.L.1968, pp. 1249, 1285; 1969, pp. 857, 859 (Code Ann. § 26-1503(b)(3)).
( a) There was no error in the denial of the general and special demurrers. An affidavit which charges the accused simply with the offense of committing a misdemeanor, at a certain time and in a certain county, is sufficient to support an accusation in the state court of such county, charging the accused with clearly defined and particularized criminal offenses. Glass v. State, 119 Ga. 299, 46 S.E. 435 (1904); Murray v. State, 30 Ga.App. 641(1), 118 S.E. 760. See Durrett v. State, 135 Ga.App. 749, 750(1), 219 S.E.2d 9 (1975). While the accusation cannot be broader than the affidavit, if the affidavit alleges the commission of a crime cognizable by the laws of Georgia, then the accusation may particularize and specify the definite criminal transaction that the large and general phraseology of the affidavit intends to impute to him. Murphy v. State, 119 Ga. 300, 46 S.E. 450 (1904); Dickson v. State, 62 Ga. 583, 588.
( b) The second facet of appellant's argument proceeds upon the theme that Count One, alleging criminal trespass, does not use the words "knowingly and without authority." However, the count does allege that Rowles acted " contrary to the laws of this state, the good order, peace and dignity thereof," by remaining upon the premises of Six Flags after being ordered to depart.
The language of the statute setting forth the offense with which the appellant was charged requires that he "knowingly and without authority" remained upon the property of another after receiving notice from the owner's agent to depart. Where the accusation informs the accused that he had been given notice to depart and thereafter that the accused refused to depart, contrary to the laws of this state and its good order, peace and dignity, and finally that such conduct amounted to an offense cognizable under the laws of Georgia (a misdemeanor), it strains credulity to assert that the accused does not know the specific offense with which he is charged or that such language does not allege criminal misconduct, including necessarily the element of knowledge and lack of authority. Overly technical niceties of pleading are no longer required so long as the accusation is sufficient to be easily understood by the jury or is substantially in the language of the statute. Cragg v. State, 117 Ga.App. 133, 159 S.E.2d 717 (1968); Mealor v. State, 135 Ga.App. 682, 218 S.E.2d 683 (1975). See Parsons v. United States, (C.C.A.Ga.) 189 F.2d 252 (1951). Thus an accusation is sufficient if it charges the commission of an offense in plain terms and the nature of the offense is sufficiently described to permit both the accused and the jury to understand the crime charged in the accusation. It is our conclusion that the present affidavit and accusation meet these standards. Lanthrip v. State, 235 Ga. 10, 218 S.E.2d 771 (1975). This enumeration of error is without merit.
2. In his second enumeration, appellant urges error by the trial court in its failure to grant the appellant's motion for a directed verdict as to Counts One and Two (the criminal trespass and assault charges). The bases of this enumeration are that appellant was in a state of arrest and therefore was unable to leave the premises as ordered by the owner's agent, and secondly, that he (Rowles) was on the grounds pursuant to a season pass for that in the absence of a tender of the fee paid for such permit, Rowles had a contractual right to be where he was. Appellant further urges that because he was acquitted of the charge of public drunkenness, he had a right to be where he was; the arrest was therefore illegal, and one that he had a right to resist, thus obviating any criminality in his striking the illegally arresting officer.
This enumeration patently is without merit. How or why appellant entered...
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...a part of the charge may be inapplicable under the facts in evidence. Highland, supra, at p. 519, 194 S.E.2d 332. Rowles v. State, 143 Ga.App. 553, 557, 239 S.E.2d 164 (1977) cert. den. Accord, Pippin v. State, 205 Ga. 316(9), 323, 53 S.E.2d 482 (1949)." Keller v. State, 245 Ga. 522(1), 265......
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...... This is so even though a part of the charge may be inapplicable under the facts in evidence. Highland, supra, at p. 519 [194 S.E.2d 332]. Rowles v. State, 143 Ga.App. 553, 557 (239 . Page 722. SE2d 164) (1977) cert. den. Accord, Pippin v. State, 205 Ga. 316(9), 323 (53 SE2d 482) (1949).' ......
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