Roy L. Jones, Inc. v. HOME TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, 27248.

Decision Date17 February 1970
Docket NumberNo. 27248.,27248.
Citation422 F.2d 179
PartiesROY L. JONES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOME TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Inc., Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

James E. Ross, Blades, Crain, Slator, Winters & Ross, Houston, Tex., for appellant.

Tom Alexander, Jonathan Day, Houston Tex., Butler, Binion, Rice, Cook & Knapp, Houston, Tex., of counsel, for appellee.

Before GEWIN, THORNBERRY and AINSWORTH, Circuit Judges.

GEWIN, Circuit Judge:

This case arises from an accident involving a tractor-trailer unit composed of a tractor leased by appellant Roy L. Jones, Inc. (Jones), and a trailer owned by appellee Home Transportation, Inc. (Home). The accident occurred near Montgomery, Alabama when a portion of the trailer's gooseneck hitch collapsed dropping the trailer to the pavement. Jones compensated the shipper for damage sustained by the cargo and filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas seeking recovery from Home. Jones contended that Home was liable because of its negligence in inspecting the trailer and alternatively by virtue of an indemnity agreement between Jones and Home. The jury rejected both theories and judgment was entered for Home from which Jones appeals. We affirm.

Jones and Home are both common carriers holding motor vehicle certificates issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for adjoining interstate routes. The two companies have what is commonly called an interchange agreement whereby equipment of one of the companies, manned by its employees, may be operated over the routes of the other. Compliance with ICC regulations is accomplished by means of a spot lease from the company which owns the equipment to the company which holds ICC rights to the routes over which the equipment is operating. Under the lease the company holding ICC authority has control of the shipment and pays a percentage of the revenues to the other company for the use of its equipment and employees.

The shipment in question, an enclosed gear weighing approximately 62,000 pounds, was received by Home at King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. It was consigned by Philadelphia Gear Corporation to U.S. Naval Construction, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Gulfport, Mississippi. The shipment proceeded south, over Home's routes, to Marietta, Georgia.

At Home's facilities in Marietta, the cargo was transferred to another Home trailer. The transfer was necessary in order to comply with Mississippi regulations governing the number of axles required on a trailer carrying a load of this weight. The Home trailer was then attached to a Jones tractor, operated by a Jones employee. From Marietta to Fruithurst, Alabama, the termination point of Home's ICC authority, the tractor was spot leased to Home giving it control of the driver and the shipment. Under the interchange agreement, Jones received 80% of the revenues from this portion of the shipment as consideration for the use of its tractor and driver.

At Fruithurst, the spot lease terminated and Jones assumed full control of the shipment for the balance of the journey. For convenience, and because of a lack of facilities at Fruithurst, the cargo remained on the Home trailer. The trailer was loaned to Jones at no charge. This is a common practice in the trade, which Jones has reciprocated.

The accident occurred on December 10, 1965, twenty-five miles south of Montgomery, Alabama. Cargo damages of $19,680 were sustained and satisfied by Jones. The accident occurred on routes for which Jones had ICC authority and during a portion of the shipment from which Jones received all of the revenue.

Jones proceeded to trial on alternative theories alleging negligence in Home's inspection of the trailer and claiming indemnity by virtue of an agreement with Home. The jury's verdict, in the form of answers to seven specific questions propounded by the court, negated any basis for recovery. In this appeal Jones has abandoned its negligence theory, and makes three allegations of error relating to its claim for indemnity. Jones contends that the court erred in: (1) submitting questions relating to the intention of the parties to the jury since the contract was not ambiguous; (2) excluding evidence and argument relating to insurance coverage; and (3) limiting cross-examination of certain witnesses.

I

The indemnification agreement between the parties provides:

Home Transportation Company, Inc. hereby agrees to hold Roy L. Jones, Inc. harmless of any liability in connection with the use and operation of automotive equipment owned by Home Transportation Company, Inc. over routes in connection with and pursuant to operating rights heretofore issued by various motor carrier regulatory bodies to Roy L. Jones, Inc. for any loss of damage which they may sustain by reason of such use and operation of said equipment owned by Home Transportation Company, Inc.

In determining the applicability of this agreement to the accident in question, the court submitted two interrogatories to the jury:

QUESTION NO. ONE
In plaintiff\'s Exhibit No. 3 the phrase "automotive equipment" is used. At the time of the execution of this exhibit did the parties intend this phrase to include a semi-trailer owned by Home when such semi-trailer was being pulled by a truck-tractor owned and operated by Jones?
QUESTION NO. TWO
At the time of the execution of plaintiff\'s Exhibit No. 3, did Home and Jones intend that Home would indemnify Jones for damages that might occur at a time when Jones was operating Homes\' sic trailer over routes in connection with which Jones had a permit from the Interstate Commerce Commission?

The jury answered both of these questions in the negative.

Jones contends that submission of either question was improper, since the agreement is...

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4 cases
  • Wesson v. Jefferson Sav. & Loan Ass'n
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • November 10, 1982
    ...term is ambiguous, and extrinsic evidence may be introduced to show an agreement between the parties. See Roy L. Jones, Inc. v. Home Transp. Co., 422 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir.1970); Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Ponsford Bros., 423 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Tex.1968); Amistad, Inc. v. Frates Comm......
  • Lee v. Hunt
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • December 1, 1980
    ...Association, 486 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1973); Hennigan v. Chargers Football Co., 431 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1970); Roy L. Jones, Inc. v. Home Transportation Co., 422 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1970). Hugh Hunt's interpretation of the intent of the January 16 agreement is arguable on the basis of vague and ......
  • Pletz v. Christian Herald Association, 72-1923.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • November 15, 1973
    ...the exclusiveness of the agency relationship. The language of the letters was capable of more than one meaning. Jones v. Home Transp. Co., 422 F. 2d 179, 181 (5th Cir., 1970). The court properly submitted this issue to the Whether the court erred in submitting to the jury the issue of servi......
  • Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. First State Bank of Abilene, 85-1363
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • December 27, 1985
    ...(10th Cir.1966); see also United States v. Lewiston Lime Co., 466 F.2d 1358, 1359 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1972); Roy L. Jones, Inc. v. Home Transp. Co., 422 F.2d 179, 181-82 n. 3 (5th Cir.1970).2 Thonen v. Jenkins, 517 F.2d 3, 6 (4th Cir.1975).3 421 U.S. 240, 247, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1616, 44 L.Ed.2d 14......

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