Roy v. Brittain

• Decision Date: 05 October 1956
• Citation: 201 Tenn. 140,5 McCanless 140,297 S.W.2d 72
• Parties: John E. ROY et al. v. D. J. BRITTAIN, Jr., et al. 5 McCanless 140, 201 Tenn. 140, 297 S.W.2d 72
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 72

297 S.W.2d 72

John E. ROY et al. v. D. J. BRITTAIN, Jr., et al.

5 McCanless 140, 201 Tenn. 140, 297 S.W.2d 72

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

Oct. 5, 1956.

Sims Crownover and Watkins & Crownover, Nashville, for petitioners.

NEIL, Chief Justice.

On September 3, 1956, the complainants, John E. Roy and others, presented to this Court a petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas to review the action of Chancellor Joe M. Carden in refusing to issue writs of injunction to prevent the integration, or desegregation, of the 'Clinton High School', the same being a 'public school' and a part of the public school system of Tennessee. We declined to grant the relief prayed for and thereupon the complainants filed a lengthy petition to rehear. It is now before the Court for consideration.

The original bill charged that complainants were resident citizens of Anderson County, and that the defendant, D. J. Brittain, Jr., was the Principal of the Clinton High School in said county; that he, in violation of the segregation laws of Tennessee, was permitting the enrollment of twelve Negro students in the school.

It is charged in the bill that the segregation laws of Tennessee are in full force and effect, and that the statutes appropriating money for public schools of the State clearly contemplate the maintenance of segregated schools.

The charge is made that D. J. Brittain, Jr., Principal of the school, was made a defendant, along with others, who were members of the County Board of Education, in a law suit that was instituted in the United States District Court at Knoxville sometime prior to April 26, 1952, wherein the said Court, on January 4, 1956, McSwain v. County Board of Education, D.C., 138 F.Supp. 570, 572, pronounced a final decree 'that desegregation as to high school students in [Anderson] county should be effected by a definite date and that a reasonable date should be fixed as one not later than the beginning of the fall term of the present year of 1956'. (The decree of the United States District Court was not made an exhibit to the bill, and hence is not a part of the present record. But we assume that the foregoing quoted language is substantially correct.)

We have the right to assume, as did the Chancellor, that the Principal of the school and the School Board were complying with the aforesaid decree of the United States District Court.

It cannot be doubted that the Judge of said Court was following the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, and consolidated cases, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 692, 98 L.Ed. 873, wherein it was held:

'We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'

It was further held that these are 'class action' and the ruling thus applies to all schools supported by public funds.

Regardless of what we may think of the soundness of the foregoing decision we are bound by it under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution U.S.C.A.Const. art. 6.

In the same case the Court requested further argument on the question of relief. Many able lawyers from a number of states argued the difficulties to be confronted in integrating the races in our public schools. 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 757, 99 L.Ed. 1083. The cases were remanded to District Courts to enter such orders and decrees 'consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases.' In this latter opinion the Court incorporated by reference its former opinion 'declaring the fundamental principle that racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional, * * *. All provisions of federal, state, or local law requiring or permitting such discrimination must yield to this principle.' (Emphasis ours.)

Now in the face of the foregoing express holding of the Supreme Court at Washington the complainants continue to insist that our segregation laws are 'still in full force and effect'. We respectfully disagree.

The complainants seek to evade the question by insisting that the Court did not decree a forced integration, but only there should be no discrimination; 'that the State may avoid integration in many ways yet to be determined.' The language of the Supreme Court, above quoted, is capable of but one meaning, viz. that all State laws on segregation must yield to the paramount authority of the Federal Constitution.

The complainants in their original bill expressly recognized the fact that the enrollment in the Clinton High School of the twelve Negro students was in compliance with the mandate of the United States District Court. Neither Mr. Brittain, the school Principal, nor the School Board could evade it. Any refusal to admit their enrollment would have been an act of discrimination in plain violation of the Federal Court's decree. While it is argued by counsel that the Board of Education had not ordered integration of the school, and Brittain was acting without authority, we think the silence of the Board amounted to a ratification of the action of the school Principal in his effort to comply with the decree of the Federal Court. Moreover the Board was a party defendant in the suit pending in the United States District Court. The decree, directing the enrollment of Negro students, was directed to the Board as well as the school Principal. Each and every defendant was required to take notice of it.

Now we are asked, as was the Chancellor, to issue an injunction to 'restrain and enjoin' D. J. Brittain, Jr., Principal of the Clinton High School, from complying with the aforesaid order of the United States District Court.

We know of no case, and none has been cited by counsel, in which the courts of this State may enjoin the enforcement of a Federal District Court decree that is based upon the express mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States. 'It is a well-established general rule that...