Roy v. City of Little Rock, Civ. No. LR-C-95-303.
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Arkansas |
| Writing for the Court | EISELE |
| Citation | Roy v. City of Little Rock, 902 F.Supp. 871 (E.D. Ark. 1995) |
| Decision Date | 05 October 1995 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. LR-C-95-303. |
| Parties | F. Hampton ROY and Michelle Roy, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF LITTLE ROCK, Defendant. |
William W. Hylton, III, Little Rock, AR, for plaintiffs.
Patricia J. Hays, City Attorney's Office, Little Rock, AR, for defendant.
Before the Court is defendant City of Little Rock's (the City's) Motion to Dismiss, filed in connection with plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (Docket No. 4) alleging two causes of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1994). Plaintiffs have responded to this motion, opposing the relief sought. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 1993). For the reasons expressed in the following opinion, the City's motion will be granted.
The City argues that plaintiffs' § 1983 claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In evaluating the merits of this motion, the Court is required to accept the allegations of plaintiffs' Amended Complaint as true. Albright v. Oliver, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S.Ct. 807, 810, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994); Coleman v. Watt, 40 F.3d 255, 258 (8th Cir.1994). Moreover, the Court may grant the City's motion only if, after so viewing the pleadings, it is patently clear that there is no set of facts that plaintiffs could prove thereunder which would entitle them to relief under § 1983. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984); Frey v. City of Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir.1995).
Plaintiffs have alleged the following facts in their Amended Complaint which, as discussed above, must be accepted as true.1
Plaintiff F. Hampton Roy is the owner of a parcel of real property, commonly known as the "Kramer School," located at 701 Sherman Street in Little Rock, Arkansas.2 The Kramer School is located within the City's McArthur Park Historic District, see Ark.Code Ann. §§ 14-172-203, -207 (Michie Supp. 1993), and is presently the subject of condemnation proceedings instituted by the City in the Pulaski County Circuit Court.3 Amended Complaint ¶ 5; see Ark.Code Ann. §§ 18-15-301(a), -303(a) (Michie 1987).
On June 1, 1993, plaintiffs applied to the City's Historic District Commission (the Commission) for a certificate of appropriateness to demolish the Kramer School, the approval of which was a necessary precondition to the City's approval of a demolition permit for the Kramer School. Amended Complaint ¶ 6; see Ark.Code Ann. § 14-172-208(a)(1) (Michie Supp.1993). The Commission denied plaintiffs' application following a public hearing held on July 1, 1993. Amended Complaint ¶ 7; see Ark.Code Ann. §§ 14-172-209(b),-209(c) (Michie 1987). This hearing was conducted in an informal manner, as there were no formal procedures mandated by statute (or local ordinance). Amended Complaint ¶ 8. The hearing was conducted pursuant to Robert's Rules of Order, rather than the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure and/or the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. Plaintiffs were not allowed to have the merits of their application determined by a jury. And while interested parties (including plaintiffs) were permitted to offer testimony, any such testimony was unsworn and any persons offering such testimony were not subject to cross-examination by plaintiffs (or, apparently, any other interested party). Amended Complaint ¶ 7.
Upon the Commission's denial of their application, plaintiffs did not exercise their statutory right to appeal the Commission's denial to the Chancery Court. Amended Complaint ¶ 9; see Ark.Code Ann. § 14-172-212(a) (Michie 1987). Plaintiffs now claim that during the period spanning the Commission's denial of their application and the City's eventual condemnation of their property, they were denied "virtually any economically beneficial use of the Kramer School." Amended Complaint ¶ 11.
Plaintiffs' causes of action are premised upon 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1994), which provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ..., subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Section 1983 is a remedial statue. It "`is not itself a source of substantive rights, but rather a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 811 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695 n. 3, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). Therefore, in order to evaluate plaintiffs' § 1983 claims, the Court must look to the allegations of their Amended Complaint for a description of the constitutional rights alleged to be at issue. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1068, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992); Gregory v. City of Rogers, 974 F.2d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir.1992) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1265, 122 L.Ed.2d 661 (1993).
Plaintiffs first argue that the Commission's denial of their application for a certificate of appropriateness violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. Specifically, they argue that the Amendment's procedural due process protections were violated when the Commission failed to conduct a "formal" (i.e., adversarial) hearing on their application.4 At the outset, the Court notes that it appears that plaintiffs have waived their procedural due process claim, given that they declined to exercise their statutory right to appeal the Commission's denial of their application as provided by Ark.Code Ann. § 14-172-212(a) (Michie 1987). See Hroch v. City of Omaha, 4 F.3d 693, 696 (8th Cir.1993); Anderson v. Douglas County, supra, 4 F.3d at 578. This fact alone is, arguably, sufficient to dispose of plaintiffs' argument on this point. Nevertheless, the Court will proceed to address the merits of plaintiffs' procedural due process claim.
In their briefs submitted on this point, both parties have devoted their energies to arguing the question whether the hearing procedures followed by the Commission were sufficient to pass constitutional muster. These efforts, however, are misguided, for in deciding the present motion, the Court need not determine whether the Commission's hearing procedures are sufficient to satisfy the Due Process Clause, since the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause are not implicated in this case.
The Supreme Court has explained that "the requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2704, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); see also Schneider v. United States, 27 F.3d 1327, 1332 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 723, 130 L.Ed.2d 628 (1995). Thus, before a procedural due process claim can be mounted, the claimant must show that he enjoys a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to some constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and that interest must be threatened by state action. North Memorial Med. Ctr. v. Gomez, 59 F.3d 735, 740 (8th Cir. 1995); Geddes v. Northwest Mo. State Univ., 49 F.3d 426, 429 (8th Cir.1995). As is clear from plaintiffs' argument on this point, there is no liberty interest at issue in this dispute. Rather, their procedural due process claim is premised upon the Commission's deprivation of their alleged property interest in receiving a certificate of appropriateness for the demolition of the Kramer School. Whether this alleged property interest is constitutionally protected (and is hence sufficient to sustain their § 1983 procedural due process claim) must be answered by reference to Arkansas law, since property interests do not arise from the Constitution, but "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law." Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2708; see also North Memorial Med. Ctr. v. Gomez, supra, 59 F.3d at 740; Williams v. Nix, 1 F.3d 712, 717 (8th Cir.1993).
Therefore, to establish a procedural due process cause of action, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they possessed a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the certificate of appropriateness needed for their proposed demolition of the Kramer School. Scott v. City of Sioux City, 736 F.2d 1207, 1217 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1003, 105 S.Ct. 1864, 85 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985). "This entitlement could be based upon state or local law or upon an express contract or mutual understanding with the defendant ." Id. (). Plaintiffs do not allege that they had any such contract or understanding with either the City or the Commission. Thus, their claim of entitlement must be predicated upon Arkansas law governing the issuance of certificates of appropriateness in historical districts.5 Under the terms of Ark.Code Ann. § 14-172-209(b)(3) (Michie 1987), the Commission is empowered with the authority to grant or deny applications for certificates of appropriateness, provided only that its decisions are "appropriate to the preservation of the historic district,"6 and that its reasons for the denial of any such application are placed on the record. Ark.Code Ann. § 14-172-209(c)(2) (Michie 1987). Moreover, it is clear, under controlling precedent, that the Commission's exercise of its § 14-172-209(b)(3) approval authority is a...
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