Roy v. Department of Transp.
Decision Date | 01 July 1987 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 78864 |
Citation | 428 Mich. 330,408 N.W.2d 783 |
Parties | , 68 A.L.R.4th 193 William G. ROY and Susan M. Roy, his wife, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
John R. Rinn, Troy, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., Brenda E. Turner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, for defendant-appellant.
M.C.L. Sec. 691.1402; M.S.A. Sec. 3.996(102) provides an exception to governmental immunity for tort liability in favor of "[a]ny person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his property by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel...." However, the statute provides that the governmental agency's duty to repair and maintain, and its potential liability, "shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, crosswalks or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel." In this case, the Court of Appeals has held that this exception to governmental immunity extends to injuries suffered on a bicycle path which is detached from, but runs parallel to, the traveled roadway portion of a limited-access highway. We disagree. The exception to governmental immunity is limited to injuries which arise from the agency's failure to repair and maintain the traveled roadway portion of the highway. It does not extend to injuries which arise from detached, ancillary installations, such as sidewalks, crosswalks, and bicycle paths.
Plaintiffs William and Susan Roy filed a complaint in the Court of Claims on September 20, 1984, against defendant Michigan Department of Transportation. The complaint alleged 1 that, on July 19, 1984, plaintiff William Roy 2 was riding his bicycle on a bicycle path adjacent to a portion of I-275. The bicycle path and highway were under the jurisdiction of defendant. The complaint alleges that there was a "substantial asphalt bump" which posed a hazard to bicyclists. Defendant's agents had cut weeds and negligently piled them over the area of the bump. Plaintiff William Roy was unable to see the bump. The complaint states, "[W]hen he drove over the bump, the handlebars of his bicycle were wrested out of his hands and he was thrown to the pavement, sustaining severe and permanent, personal injuries" which included a shoulder separation, lacerations, contusions, and torn muscles, tendons, and ligaments.
Defendant answered the complaint and advanced a defense of immunity pursuant to M.C.L. Sec. 691.1407; M.S.A. Sec. 3.996(107). 3 On February 13, 1985, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment under former GCR 1963, 117.2(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The motion argued that defendant was immune under M.C.L. Sec. 691.1407; M.S.A. Sec. 3.996(107). Plaintiffs argued that defendant was liable under the exception to immunity contained in M.C.L. Sec. 691.1402; M.S.A. Sec. 3.996(102), which provides:
(Emphasis supplied.)
Defendant countered that the bicycle path was an installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. As such, the accident site was not within the exception. The Court of Claims agreed with defendant and granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. 4
Plaintiffs appealed of right to the Court of Appeals. The Court held that a bicycle path is not an "installation outside of the improved portion of the highway." 152 Mich.App. 34, 36, 391 N.W.2d 514 (1986). It noted that Johnson v. Michigan, 32 Mich.App. 37, 39, 188 N.E.2d 33 (1971), held that shoulders of a highway were designed for vehicular traffic and that the statutory duty of governmental agencies to maintain and repair highways extended to shoulders as "adjuncts of the paved portion of the highway." In the instant case, the Court of Appeals concluded that a bicycle path was analogous to the shoulder of the road. It stated:
152 Mich.App. 36-37, 391 N.W.2d 514.
The Court of Appeals reversed the summary disposition of the Court of Claims and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings.
Defendant has filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court.
We believe that the Court of Appeals decision turns on a criterion different from that employed by the Legislature when it adopted M.C.L. Sec. 691.1402; M.S.A. Sec. 3.996(102). The Court of Appeals opinion appears to be based primarily on the perceived benefits to motorists and bicyclists from having parallel but separate paths for travel. We do not disagree with the perception of benefits. However, it appears to have played no part in the legislative enactment. If it had, there would be no reason to distinguish between the benefits of separating pedestrians from motorists and the benefits of separating bicyclists from motorists. Like bicyclists, pedestrians are permitted to use highways when sidewalks are not provided, M.C.L. Sec. 257.655; M.S.A. Sec. 9.2355. Like bicyclists, pedestrians are forbidden to use limited access highways, 5 M.C.L. Sec. 257.679a; M.S.A. Sec. 9.2379(1). Yet, M.C.L. Sec. 691.1402; M.S.A. Sec. 3.996(102) expressly indicates that the exception for liability does not extend to sidewalks, crosswalks, and any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular traffic. While the statutes which provide for separation of bicyclists and pedestrians from motorists may be based on a legislative perception of the benefits of separation, the statute under scrutiny is not. Indeed, to the extent it shows any legislative judgment on the benefits of separation, the exclusion of sidewalks, crosswalks, and other installations from the duty of maintenance and repair, reflects a conclusion that pedestrians and users of these installations have been sufficiently protected by the separation of them from motorists, without any need to impose a duty of maintenance and repair enforced by liability for resultant injuries.
The fact that the Legislature made an express decision to exclude liability arising from sidewalks, crosswalks, and other installations is reflected not only in the wording of M.C.L. Sec. 691.1402; M.S.A. Sec. 3.996(102), but in the history of that statute.
At common law, municipalities were not liable for damages in consequence for lack of repair to highways, Nile Twp. Hwys. Comm'rs v. Martin, 4 Mich. 557 (1857). In 1879 P.A. 244, 1 How Stat 1442, the Legislature 6 provided for liability against a municipality in favor of any person "sustaining bodily injury upon any of the public highways or streets in this state, by reason of neglect to keep such public highways or streets, and all bridges,...
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