Roy v. Edmonds
| Decision Date | 24 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 104,749,104,749 |
| Parties | JARROD W. ROY, Appellant, v. DENNIS E. EDMONDS, Deceased, Appellee, and CAROLYN ROY, Defendant. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1.
When a trial court has granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, an appellate court must assume as true all well-pleaded facts in plaintiff's petition, along with any inferences that can be reasonably drawn therefrom. Nevertheless, the appellate court is not required to accept conclusory allegations as to the legal effects of the events if the allegations are not supported or are contradicted by the description of the events. The appellate court then decides whether those facts and inferences state a claim based on plaintiff's theory or any other possible theory. If so, the dismissal by the trial court must be reversed.
2.
When the issue before an appellate court requires the interpretation of a statute, an appellate court's review is unlimited. The appellate court is not bound by the trial court's interpretation of a statute.
3.
When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed rather than determine what the law should or should not be. The court will not speculate on legislative intent and will not read the statute to add something not readily found in it.
4.
Whether a statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review.
Appeal from Douglas District Court; JEAN F. SHEPHERD, judge. Opinion filed June 24, 2011. Affirmed.
Brant A. McCoy, of McCoy Law Firm, LLC, of Olathe, John P. Gerstle, II of John P. Gerstle, II, P.A., of Olathe, and Michael S. Jones, of The Jones Law Firm, P.A., of Overland Park, for appellant.
David J. Brown, of The Law Office of David J. Brown, LC, of Lawrence, for appellee.
Before LEBEN, P.J., GREEN and MARQUARDT, JJ.
Jarrod W. Roy appeals from a judgment of the trial court dismissing his paternity action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In addition, the trial court held that Jarrod's paternity action was barred by the 3-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. 38-1115(a)(2). Jarrod raises three issues on appeal: (1) that the trial court erred in holding his paternity action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (2) that K.S.A. 38-1115(a)(1) and (2) violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (3) that dismissing his paternity action before genetic testing can be completed violates public policy. We disagree. Accordingly, we affirm.
Jarrod's mother, Carolyn Roy, married Dennis E. Edmonds on June 23, 1965. Later, the couple divorced and a decree of divorce was entered in Franklin County, Kansas, on June 23, 1965. The decree of divorce contained a provision that stated the divorce was not final until 60 days following the date the decree of divorce was entered. Nevertheless, Carolyn married Daniel M. Roy, Jr., on June 3, 1967, only 32 days after the decree of divorce was entered. Carolyn maintains that after she married Daniel, she had sexual intercourse with Edmonds and became pregnant with Jarrod. Jarrod was born on October 9, 1968. Daniel is listed as Jarrod's father on Jarrod's birth certificate. Carolyn and Daniel were divorced in 1970, and both parties signed a stipulation that stated Jarrod and another child were born to Carolyn and Daniel. Moreover, Daniel was required to pay child support for Jarrod, and Daniel was given visitation rights with Jarrod.
According to Jarrod, when he was 15 years old, Carolyn told him that his natural father was Edmonds. Jarrod contended that he attempted to contact Edmonds, but Edmonds' girlfriend rebuffed his attempt to establish a parental relationship with Edmonds.
Edmonds died intestate on December 17, 2008, in Douglas County, Kansas. Barbara Dyer, Edmonds' sister, was appointed administrator of Edmonds' estate. When Dyer learned that Jarrod might be a potential heir, she filed a petition requesting an order for genetic testing. The probate court determined that it did not have jurisdiction to order genetic testing.
In February 2010, Jarrod filed a petition for determination of paternity in Franklin County, Kansas, under the Kansas Parentage Act (KPA), K.S.A. 38-1110 et seq. In the petition, Jarrod alleged that it would be in his best interests to determine that Edmonds was his father, not Daniel, because he would be the sole heir of Edmonds' estate. Jarrod attached to his petition an affidavit from Carolyn. In the affidavit, Carolyn alleged thatEdmonds was Jarrod's father and that she and Jarrod attempted to contact Edmonds when Jarrod was 15 years old but Edmonds' girlfriend prevented them from seeing Edmonds. In addition, Jarrod moved to have genetic testing performed on himself and Edmonds.
Edmonds' estate (Estate) moved to dismiss the petition under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Estate contended that the action was not brought within 3 years after Jarrod reached the age of majority as required by K.S.A. 38-1115(a)(2). The Estate also argued that Jarrod had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. As a result, the Estate asserted that dismissal would be appropriate under K.S.A. 60-212(b)(6). Moreover, the Estate maintained that the paternity action should be dismissed because venue was not proper in Franklin County, Kansas. The Estate contended that the action should have been brought in Douglas County, Kansas, where Edmonds' probate case was filed.
Jarrod responded to the Estate's motion, arguing that K.S.A. 38-1115(a)(1) and (2) violated the Equal Protection Clause. Jarrod also argued that venue was proper in Franklin County, Kansas. The Franklin County District Court disagreed and ordered that venue was proper in Douglas County District Court. When the case was transferred to the Douglas County District Court, the Estate renewed its motion to dismiss for the same reasons it made in the Franklin County District Court.
The Douglas County District Court held that Jarrod's paternity action was barred by the statute of limitations under K.S.A. 38-1115(a)(2). As a result, the trial court dismissed Jarrod's paternity action based on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction and based on a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Jarrod argues that the trial court erred in finding his claim was barred by the statute of limitations provision under K.S.A. 38-1115(a)(2).
The trial court ruled that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear this paternity action because Jarrod had failed to comply with the applicable statute of limitations. The governing statute of limitations for parentage actions is set forth in K.S.A. 38-1115, which states in relevant part:
"(a) A child or any person on behalf of such child, may bring an action: (1) At any time to determine the existence of a father and child relationship presumed under K.S.A. 38-1114 and amendments thereto; or(2) at any time until three years after the child reaches the age of majority to determine the existence of a father and child relationship which is not presumed under K.S.A. 38-1114 and amendments thereto."
To determine whether Jarrod filed his paternity action within the applicable statute of limitations, it is critical to determine which subsection of K.S.A. 38-1115 applies. To answer that question, it is necessary to review K.S.A. 38-1114, which states in relevant part:
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