Roy v. Jones

• Decision Date: 28 August 1973
• Docket Number: No. 72-1737.,72-1737.
• Citation: 484 F.2d 96
• Parties: Samuel T. ROY, Justice of the Peace, et al., Appellants, v. Benjamin R. JONES, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

484 F.2d 96 (1973)

Samuel T. ROY, Justice of the Peace, et al., Appellants, v. Benjamin R. JONES, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, et al., Appellees.

No. 72-1737.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Submitted May 22, 1973.

Decided August 28, 1973.

Stuart E. Savage, Karl W. Wiedt, III, Savage, Finkel & Love, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellants.

Frederick N. Frank, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pittsburgh, Pa., J. Shane Creamer, Atty. Gen., Harrisburg, for appellees.

Before KALODNER, ALDISERT and ADAMS, Circuit Judge.

Submitted Under Third Circuit Rule 12(6). May 22, 1973.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ADAMS, Circuit Judge.

Appellants are justices of the peace who were elected, and commissioned by the Governor of Pennsylvania, for a six-year term of office expiring on the first Monday of January, 1974. On May 19, 1971, they were temporarily suspended from office by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania acting upon the recommendation of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board.¹ The apparent cause for the temporary suspensions was an alleged violation by appellants of Rule 2, subd. A of The Rules of Conduct, Office Standards and Civil Procedure for Justices of the Peace, which prohibits justices of the peace from, inter alia, being employed by the Commonwealth or a political subdivision or holding office in a political party or political organization.²

On June 1, 1971, appellants, together, with the Squires and Constables Association of Pennsylvania and other suspended justices of the peace, petitioned the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to revoke the suspension orders of May 19, 1971. This petition was denied by order of court dated July 14, 1971. Later, on August 23, 1971, the same group applied to Justice Brennan of the United States Supreme Court for a stay of the May 19th suspension orders pending the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court. Justice Brennan denied the application for a stay on September 19, 1971, and no petition for a writ of certiorari was ever filed seeking appellate review of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's May 19th orders and its refusal to revoke its suspension orders.

Instead, appellants commenced this original action in the district court on December 30, 1971, alleging that their suspensions were effected without notice and without a hearing in violation of both the Commonwealth's "Rules of Procedure Governing the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board" and the United States Constitution.³ They urged the district court (1) to enjoin enforcement of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's suspension order, and (2) to enjoin the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board from conducting hearings and making further recommendations to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.⁴ In an opinion and order dated June 16, 1972, the district court, based on "abstention" principles, granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the suit. 349 F.Supp. 315.

Although we affirm the judgment of the district court, we do so on a ground other than that relied upon by the district court.⁵

I.

It is clear from a recitation of the facts of this case that the appellants have sought, through the vehicle of a section 1983 suit for injunctive relief, to have a lower federal court engage in what essentially constitutes relitigation of issues already decided by Pennsylvania's highest court. Having failed to pursue the only available course for federal review of the state court's determination — a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States — the appellants are now barred by the principles of res judicata from obtaining such review in the lower federal courts.⁶

Guided by the decision in Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 67 S.Ct. 657, 91 L.Ed. 832 (1947), the federal courts have held that litigants may not seek to have redetermined, by original actions in federal district courts, issues already settled in a prior state-court adjudication.⁷ Illustrative of the prevailing view, and similar to the present case, is Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar Assoc.⁸

Coogan, an attorney, was indefinitely suspended as a result of a recommendation of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline and the Cincinnati Bar Association. The Supreme Court of Ohio approved the findings and recommendations of the Board, and issued the suspension order. Coogan failed to seek certiorari from the United States Supreme Court for review of the Ohio court's action. Instead, he brought an original action under the Civil Rights Act.⁹ in the federal district court, seeking to enjoin enforcement of the suspension. He claimed that his suspension contravened certain constitutional guarantees.

The district court dismissed the action and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. In so doing, it offered a succinct statement of the relevant principles:

"Coogan had an adequate remedy for review of his suspension by petitioning the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari. He chose not to resort to that remedy.

"The Civil Rights Act was not designed to be used as a substitute for the right of appeal, or to collaterally attack a final judgment of the highest court of a state and relitigate the issues which it decided.

"The final judgment of the Supreme Court is conclusive and Coogan is precluded by the doctrine of res judicata from relitigating not only the issues which were actually involved in the disbarment proceeding, but also the issues which he might have presented."¹⁰

As noted above, on June 1, 1971, appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to revoke the suspension orders of May 19, 1971. In addition to contentions based upon state law, the petition contains specific arguments that the suspension order violated the appellants' federal constitutional rights. In denying the petition, Pennsylvania's highest court necessarily rendered a decision rejecting on the merits the very federal claims asserted by appellants in their complaint filed in the district court. Having been content to forego the prescribed avenue for securing federal review — application for a writ of certiorari — the appellants are now barred from bringing what is, effectively, a collateral attack upon the state court's judgment. Accordingly, the district court's dismissal of this action must be affirmed.¹¹

II.

The district court based its decision on "abstention" principles. There are several legal doctrines that have, at times, been employed under the "abstention" rubric.¹² Thus, the classical abstention principle, or Pullman doctrine,¹³ and the equitable concepts embodied in the Younger rule¹⁴ address different, though similar, concerns. Whichever abstention doctrine is applicable, however, its invocation serves as an impediment to a decision on the merits.

In the present case, the district court stated that "plaintiffs have not suffered or are likely to suffer irreparable injury." As indicated earlier,¹⁵ a hearing before the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board has been scheduled. To the extent that this hearing may be considered a continuing proceeding, the philosophy underlying Younger would counsel that the federal court stay its hand. Of course, if there were no continuing procedure,¹⁶ the doctrine of Younger has no application.¹⁷

Moreover, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania having already construed the statute in question, Pullman abstention would not be apposite.

III.

Our attention has been invited to England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners,¹⁸ which provides an interesting comparison with the present case. In approaching England, it must be noted that the plaintiffs here chose to bring their action originally in state court. And, although England lends philosophical support to the result reached by us here, it embodies somewhat different legal issues and rests upon somewhat different doctrinal underpinnings.

In England, a group of chiropractors brought suit in the first instance in the federal court, seeking an injunction and a declaration that, as applied to them, the Louisiana Medical Practice Act violated the fourteenth amendment. The district court invoked the doctrine of abstention, as set forth in Pullman, supra, on the ground that a state court might effectively end the controversy by determining that chiropractors were not governed by the state statute. Having thus been remitted to the state courts, the chiropractors there "submitted for decision, and briefed and argued"¹⁹ both their state and federal claims. These were rejected by the state courts. Thereafter, the chiropractors returned to the district court and sought to raise the same federal claims that had been turned down in the state court. The district court dismissed the federal action, holding that:

"Since the state courts have passed on all issues raised, including the claims of deprivation under the Federal Constitution, this court, having no power to review those proceedings, must dismiss the complaint. The proper remedy was by appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States."²⁰

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that a litigant may avoid the result reached by the district court by "reserving" his federal contentions during the course of the state litigation.

It is apparent that the procedures outlined in England were engrafted onto the law of abstention to insure that implementation of the Pullman doctrine not run afoul of Congressional mandate. In Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 29 S.Ct. 192, 53 L.Ed. 382 (1909), the Supreme Court stated unequivocally that "the right of a party plaintiff to choose a federal court where there is a choice cannot be properly denied."²¹ Recalling its earlier pronouncement, and mindful of the fact that remitting to state courts litigants who have properly invoked the statutory jurisdiction of the federal courts might be deemed an "abdication" of legislated responsibility,²² the Court in England fashioned the procedure for "reservation" of federal jurisdiction. The litigant who...