Roy v. United Elec. Rys. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 February 1933
• Docket Number: Nos. 7161, 7162.,s. 7161, 7162.
• Citation: 164 A. 513
• Parties: ROY v. UNITED ELECTRIC RYS. CO. (two oases).
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

164 A. 513

ROY

v. UNITED ELECTRIC RYS. CO. (two oases).

Nos. 7161, 7162.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 15, 1933.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Alexander L. Churchill, Judge.

Actions by Lucia Roy and Joseph Roy, respectively, against the United Electric Railways Company. Verdicts were directed for defendant, and plaintiffs bring exceptions.

Exceptions sustained, and cases remitted for a new trial.

Everett D. Higgins, of Providence, for plaintiffs.

Clifford Whipple and Earl A. Sweeney, both of Providence, for defendant.

SWEENEY, J.

These actions on the case for negligence are before the court on plaintiffs' exceptions to the direction of verdicts for the defendant at the conclusion of the testimony.

On February 10, 1930, about 11 o'clock p. m., plaintiff Lucia Roy was a passenger on a bus operated by the defendant on Huntington avenue. She alleges in her declaration that defendant's servant negligently brought the bus to a sudden and violent stop, and thereby caused her to be violently thrown from her seat against a seat in front of her so that she was injured.

It is agreed that Mrs. Roy was a passenger on the bus when it stopped for the purpose of taking on a passenger. Mrs. Roy and her sister sat on the left side of the bus in the third seat from the front; her sister being next to the window. Mrs. Roy testified that, after the bus turned into Huntington avenue, she saw a man running toward the bus and almost even with it, and that the driver made a very sudden stop. She explained this by saying: "When he put on the brakes fast it stopped quick," and "When he put on the brakes the bus stopped so fast I hit on the front seat." She testified that, when the man was stepping into the bus, an automobile ran into the rear of it. She also testified that, when the operator was taking the names of the passengers, she told him that she "had an awful bang on the front seat," and that he laughed and said nothing. She testified that after she left the bus she was obliged—on account of her injuries—to ride the short distance to her home, and that her pain was so intense she sent for a doctor. The doctor testified that he called on plaintiff early the next morning and found her suffering from a chest injury and threatened miscarriage; that he bandaged and treated her; that she had a miscarriage the next day, and that, in his opinion, it was caused by the accident.

The operator of the bus testified that he drove around the sharp corner from Westminster street into Huntington avenue in second speed, going slowly—about seven miles an hour—that he saw a man standing at a bus stop about 40 feet from the corner; that he slowed down to 4 miles an hour, threw out the clutch, and let the bus roll to a gradual stop; that he then put on the brakes and opened the door; that, as the man was stepping into the bus, there was a slight jar at the rear; that he investigated and found that an automobile had run into the bus; that he took the name of its operator; that soon after he started the bus he took the names of the passengers as witnesses to the collision; and that plaintiff did not complain that she had been hurt. This testimony as to the speed and stopping of the bus was corroborated by the prospective passenger. The absence of plaintiff's sister at the trial was explained by testimony to the effect that she had deceased.

The trial justice directed verdicts for the defendant on the ground that the evidence did not show the bus was improperly operated at the time of the alleged accident.

We have repeatedly held that a verdict should not be directed for a defendant if, upon any reasonable view of the testimony, the plaintiff can recover. Saunders v. Kenyon, 52 R. I....