Royal Drug Co., Inc. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co.

Decision Date08 August 1977
Docket NumberNo. 76-2746,76-2746
Parties1977-2 Trade Cases 61,578 ROYAL DRUG COMPANY, INC., d/b/a Royal Pharmacy of Castle Hills and Disco Prescription Pharmacy, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GROUP LIFE AND HEALTH INS. CO., a/k/a Blue Shield and/or Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Texas, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Joel H. Pullen, Stephen F. Lazor, San Antonio, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Keith E. Kaiser, R. Laurence Macon, J. Burleson Smith, San Antonio, Tex., for Group Life & Health.

William C. Church, Jr., San Antonio, Tex., for Walgreen Texas Co.

Richard B. Moore, San Antonio, Tex., for Sommers Drug Stores Co.

Charles R. Shaddox, San Antonio, Tex., for Rieger-Medi-Save Pharmacies, Inc.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before GOLDBERG and HILL, Circuit Judges, and KERR, * District Judge.

JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge:

The plaintiffs in this civil antitrust action are eighteen independent pharmacy owners doing business in San Antonio, Texas. 1 Blue Shield is a Texas insurance company authorized by the State Board of Insurance of Texas to sell life, health and accident insurance. Three other defendants, Walgreen Texas Company, The Sommers Drug Stores Company and Rieger Medi-Save Pharmacies, Inc., also operate pharmacies in San Antonio, Texas.

The plaintiffs contend that the defendants have violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, by agreeing, combining and conspiring to fix the retail price of drugs and pharmaceuticals, and that the activities of the defendants have caused Blue Shield's insureds not to deal with certain of the plaintiffs, thereby constituting an unlawful group boycott. Plaintiffs also allege violations of Texas antitrust law over which the district court took pendent jurisdiction. The defendants affirmatively alleged in their answers that pursuant to the provisions of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011, et seq., ("McCarran Act") the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. On the basis of the McCarran Act, each defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b), F.R.Civ.P. The defendants also moved that the court treat their motions as motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, F.R.Civ.P. Defendants further moved the court to dismiss the claims based upon state law if the court found there was not a proper cause of action based upon federal law. The district court held that: (1) the conduct complained of by the plaintiffs constitutes the business of insurance; (2) the State of Texas has regulated and is actively regulating such business of insurance within the meaning of the McCarran Act; (3) that the boycott exception to the McCarran Act is inapplicable to the instant case; and (4) that the federal antitrust laws are, therefore, rendered inapplicable. We reverse.

I. The Facts.

Plaintiffs are challenging a plan of operation under which Blue Shield issues certain prescription drug insurance policies which entitle Blue Shield's insureds to purchase drugs from any pharmacy. If the pharmacy selected by the policyholder has entered into a written contract ("Pharmacy Agreement") with Blue Shield, the insured is required to pay only two dollars ($2.00), the amount of the drug deductible set forth in the policy. On the other hand, if the insured has his prescription filled by a pharmacy other than a Participating Pharmacy, he is required to pay the full price charged by the pharmacy, as well as the $2.00 deductible, and then to apply to Blue Shield for reimbursement. Blue Shield will then reimburse the insured only for 75 percent of the usual and customary charge for the drug, less the $2.00 deductible. 2

In 1969, Blue Shield sought approval from the Texas State Board of Insurance to begin issuing prescription drug insurance coverage. The Commissioner, however, disapproved the issuance or use of such a policy. The policy remained under the consideration of the Commissioner and in September, 1969, the Commissioner issued an order exempting the policy from the approval requirements of Texas law. The defendants contend that there is uncontradicted evidence showing that an exemption order exempts the policy from nothing more than the requirement of approval by the State Board of Insurance, and that exempted policies, as well as approved policies, are subject to all statutory requirements of the Texas Insurance Code and the continuing regulation, control and supervision of the State Board of Insurance.

When the Commissioner issued his orders concerning the plan, disapproving it in the first instance, and then exempting the plan, he advised the Texas Attorney General in writing of his actions on each occasion. After receiving the exemption order, Blue Shield made a statewide mailing to licensed pharmacies offering them the privilege of entering into the Pharmacy Agreement. As a result, Blue Shield has issued the policy to various groups and has entered into the Pharmacy Agreement with pharmacies throughout the State of Texas.

In 1974, Blue Shield entered into a health care agreement, which included prescription drug insurance, to provide insurance benefits to groups in Bexar County, Texas. In order to implement this agreement, in September, 1974, a policy form virtually identical to the one submitted in 1969 was filed with the State Board of Insurance for approval prior to its issuance or use. This policy was approved in October, 1974. Subsequently, Blue Shield has issued the policy to various groups in Bexar County and has offered to virtually all licensed pharmacies in San Antonio the opportunity of entering into the Pharmacy Agreement. Nine of the plaintiffs in this case accepted Blue Shield's offer and now operate Participating Pharmacies. In recent years, the number of pharmaceutical sales covered by this policy have risen dramatically. For example, between early 1972 and October, 1975, there was a 3,100 percent increase in the number of pharmaceutical claims processed by Blue Shield under the policy. In October, 1975, Blue Shield was handling these claims at the rate of approximately 31,000 claims per month as compared with only 1,000 claims per month in early 1972.

For each sale made under the plan, a Participating Pharmacy is limited to a $2.00 markup, which is known as a "professional dispensing fee," irrespective of its actual acquisition cost for a particular drug. The plaintiffs note that, with respect to highly expensive drugs, the Pharmacy Agreement can result in a markup of no more than two percent, which will not even cover the interest on its investment in inventory.

II. Summary of Contentions on Appeal.

The plaintiffs argue that the retail sales price, as fixed in the Pharmacy Agreement between Blue Shield and the defendant pharmacy chains, has been set at a level below that at which small independent pharmacies can profitably conduct business. They claim that only large, high volume chains that sell many items in addition to drugs can afford to operate pursuant to the Pharmacy Agreement. They also contend that the Agreement fixes the retail price of drugs at a level which eliminates the only effective means by which small independent pharmacies can compete with the large chains the provision of services. They argue that, since signatories of the Pharmacy Agreement are limited to the same retail sales price whether they provide home deliveries, twenty-four service, or no service at all, the ability of the independents to compete is effectively destroyed. The plaintiffs contend that Blue Shield's plan of operation not only encompasses the fixing of prices in the defendant pharmacy chains, but it extends to the pharmaceutical industry as a whole. They contend that small independent pharmacies are given the choice of either signing the price fixing agreement or being forced out of business.

The plaintiffs also argue that there are two types of coercion of Blue Shield's subscribers inherent in the plan. First, the subscriber receives markedly reduced benefits if he patronizes a pharmacy that refuses to sign the price-fixing agreement. Although he would pay only the $2.00 drug deductible for each prescription filled by a participating pharmacy, he would ultimately pay an amount representing 25 percent of a reasonable charge for the drug, in addition to the $2.00 drug deductible, for each prescription filled by a nonsigning pharmacy. The plaintiffs also point out that the differential in benefits between participating and nonparticipating pharmacies is intended to coerce Blue Shield's policy holders not to patronize nonsigning pharmacies in Texas and thereby to coerce such pharmacies to sign the price-fixing agreement. This allegation is based on the policy itself, which provides that the subscriber will be reimbursed 100 percent of a reasonable charge for the drug, less the $2.00 drug deductible, when he patronizes a nonsigning pharmacy outside the State of Texas.

The plaintiffs also contend that there is a second and more subtle step to the coercion. If a pharmacy signs the Pharmacy Agreement and agrees to charge only the stipulated amount for drugs sold to Blue Shield subscribers, it will be reimbursed directly by Blue Shield in the amount of the acquisition cost, and the subscriber will be obligated to pay the pharmacy at the time of purchase only the $2.00 drug deductible. If the pharmacy has refused to sign the Agreement, however, Blue Shield will not deal with the pharmacy directly, and the subscriber must pay the entire retail sales price at the time of purchase, in addition to the $2.00 fee. After paying the entire sales price at the time of purchase, he must file a claim with Blue Shield seeking reimbursement. Thus, an insured has the additional burden of filing a...

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