Royal Food Products, Inc. v. Buckeye Union Ins. Co.

Decision Date13 January 1993
Docket NumberNo. 92-3201,92-3201
Citation985 F.2d 561
PartiesRICO Bus.Disp.Guide 8203 NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. ROYAL FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BUCKEYE UNION INSURANCE COMPANY; Seasonings Etcetera, Inc.; American States Insurance Company; Lane, Alton & Horst; Wirtz & Kohn; Crabbe, Brown, Jones, Potts & Schmidt; Timothy McCarthy; and Florence Nay, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Before ALAN E. NORRIS and SILER, Circuit Judges, and EDGAR, District Judge. *

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff-Appellant Royal Food Products, Inc. appeals the district court's order of dismissal and sanctions for Defendants-Appellees. The primary issue is whether the district court properly granted defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), based upon its finding that plaintiff failed to establish the requisite elements in its pleading under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"). For reasons stated hereinafter, we AFFIRM the judgment.

I.

Plaintiff was a tenant at 407 North Grant Avenue in Columbus, Ohio. Defendant Seasonings Etcetera, Inc. ("Seasonings") occupied space in the same building on a floor above plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Seasonings was a trespasser, as it stored its inventory and equipment without paying rent. On August 9, 1988, the third floor of the building collapsed onto the second floor, fracturing a water main, which, according to the complaint, caused the flooding of the lower two floors. As a result, plaintiff alleged damage to its inventory, furniture, and equipment in the amount of $450,000. Defendant Buckeye Union Insurance Co. ("Buckeye"), the insurance carrier for plaintiff, investigated these allegations, using outside experts to determine the cause of the collapse, and concluded that the weight of Seasoning's inventory caused the third floor to collapse. Buckeye paid plaintiff the policy limit of $29,500.

Plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against Buckeye, American States Insurance Company ("American"), and their respective legal counsel: Lane, Alton & Horst ("Lane") and Wirtz & Kohn ("Wirtz"). Plaintiff also named as defendants Crabbe, Brown, Jones, Potts & Schmidt ("Crabbe"); Timothy McCarthy ("McCarthy"), an attorney employed by Buckeye; Seasonings; Florence Nay, an officer, director, and shareholder of Seasonings; and two unnamed persons.

Count I alleged RICO violations by all defendants. Count II alleged that Buckeye breached its fiduciary duty owed to plaintiff as a result of its insurance contract with plaintiff. Count III sought treble damages under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Count IV requested that all licenses, franchises, and permits held by any of the defendants be canceled, pursuant to Chapter 2393 of the Ohio Revised Code.

On October 28, 1991, the district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss and for sanctions. Then, on November 12, 1991, plaintiff moved for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) and moved for a stay of proceedings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(b). On January 27, 1992, the district court filed its Opinion and Order and set the specific dollar amount of sanctions to be imposed against plaintiff's attorney. On February 20, 1992, plaintiff filed its notice of appeal.

II.

Whether the district court correctly dismissed a suit pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is a legal question subject to de novo review. Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 475 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 182 (1990). The court must construe the complaint in the plaintiff's favor, accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of his or her claims that would entitle him or her to relief. Id.

III.

Defendants argue that plaintiff filed an untimely appeal. However, though it is prima facie evidence that a decision or judgment has been made after the judge signs the document, Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 323 F.2d 114, 116 (6th Cir.1963), here the district court could not enforce its judgment until after determining the sanction amount. See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988). Thus, the decision did not become final until after the amount was determined. Id. Accordingly, plaintiff filed a timely appeal on February 20, 1992, from the district court's January 27, 1992, order.

The essence of plaintiff's conspiracy theory is contained in Count I, which alleges that

[a]ll three insurance companies and their three law firms then joined together in a collusion and conspiracy to exculpate Seasonings and the Nays from the damages arising from the calamity caused by them. Buckeye had its 'in house' counsel, Timothy McCarthy, file an answer in the state court in [sic] behalf of plaintiff as part of the design to cripple plaintiff from any effort to pursue its claim.

Defendants argue, however, that a "pattern of racketeering activity" must be shown to impose civil or criminal RICO liability upon its violators, and that plaintiff has failed to allege facts which constitute a "pattern" under the RICO statutes. However, before the pattern requirement is considered, "racketeering activity" must be presented. 18 U.S.C. § 1961. The district court found, and we agree, that only four sections have possible relevance to this case: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (obstruction of justice); (2) 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant); (3) 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant); and (4) 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (engaging in monetary transactions and property derived from specified unlawful activity).

First, it is a crime to "corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavor[ ] to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1503. In the present litigation, plaintiff has failed to allege any conduct on the defendants' part which would satisfy this definition of "racketeering activity."

Second, "racketeering activity" includes "knowingly us[ing] intimidation or physical force ... with intent to cause or induce any person to withhold testimony ... from an official proceeding." 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A). Additionally, "racketeering activity" includes "knowingly engag[ing] in any conduct and thereby caus[ing] bodily injury to another person or damag[ing] the tangible property of another person ... with intent to retaliate against any person for" the attendance, testimony, or taking part in an official proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 1513. In the present litigation, plaintiff has failed to allege improper influence over the state court proceedings adequate to constitute "racketeering activity."

Third, it is a crime to "knowingly engage[ ] or attempt[ ] to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property that is of a value greater than $10,000." 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a). In the present appeal, plaintiff has failed to allege any monetary transaction, particularly one containing criminally derived proceeds. Plaintiff has failed to plead racketeering activity and, thus, we need not consider whether a racketeering pattern existed. For the above stated reasons, plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under RICO. Accordingly, the district court's dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is affirmed.

In Count III, plaintiff requested treble damages under 18 U.S.C. § 1964. As it failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, plaintiff is not entitled to treble damages. Accordingly, the district court appropriately granted defendants' motion to dismiss Count III.

Count II and IV allege state law claims. As plaintiff's RICO claims have been dismissed, the next determination is whether jurisdiction is proper over the remaining claims. "The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if ... the district court has dismissed all claims over...

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