Royal Oil Corporation v. FTC, 7693.

• Decision Date: 05 January 1959
• Docket Number: No. 7693.,7693.
• Citation: 262 F.2d 741
• Parties: ROYAL OIL CORPORATION, a corporation, and Alden C. Jocelyn and Joseph A. Inciardi, individually and as officers of Royal Oil Corporation, Petitioners, v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

262 F.2d 741 (1959)

ROYAL OIL CORPORATION, a corporation, and Alden C. Jocelyn and Joseph A. Inciardi, individually and as officers of Royal Oil Corporation, Petitioners, v. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Respondent.

No. 7693.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued October 16, 1958.

Decided January 5, 1959.

Joseph S. Kaufman and Harry D. Kaufman, Baltimore, Md., for petitioners.

E. K. Elkins, Atty., Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D. C. (Earl W. Kintner, Gen. Counsel, and James E. Corkey, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D. C., on brief), for respondent.

Before SOBELOFF, Chief Judge, HAYNSWORTH, Circuit Judge, and BRYAN, District Judge.

SOBELOFF, Chief Judge.

The petitioner, Royal Oil Corporation, is engaged in the general petroleum business and, among other activities, reclaims and markets used crank case oil drainings discarded by motorists at service stations. After impurities are removed, the oil is of high viscosity and good quality, comparable to oil that has not been previously used. The finished product is then packaged and sold in cans marked plainly and in large type "Reprocessed Oil." The Federal Trade Commission, however, has ruled that the labels on the cans did not sufficiently inform the public of the nature of the product. Royal and its officers, the individual petitioners, were ordered not to advertise such oil, or offer it for sale, without disclosing that it had been previously used. This proceeding is to review the Commission's order.

Twenty-one states have enacted legislation regulating the sale of previously used motor oil. North Carolina has a statute which requires that containers of reclaimed used oil be clearly marked "Reprocessed Oil."¹ While Royal's plant is located in Baltimore, Maryland, and it sells oil in South Carolina, Virginia and Maryland, the words required by the North Carolina statute have been added to its labels because the company sells principally in that state.²

I

The petitioner's position is that since its labels are in compliance with the North Carolina law, the Federal Trade Commission has no authority to require any other disclosure. The company's argument is that Congress has not entered the field of regulation, and that therefore the Commission may not nullify a valid state statute.

We think this argument unsound for two reasons. First, while Congress has not specifically designated what disclosures must be made when reclaimed used oil is sold in interstate commerce, it has clothed the Commission with the power to enjoin unfair business competition. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45. Unless Congress specifically withdraws authority in particular areas, the Commission, upon its general grant of authority, can restrain unfair business practices in interstate commerce even if the activities or industries have been the subject of legislation by a state. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 1944, 322 U.S. 533, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1440; McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1011-1015; Federal Trade Commission v. National Casualty Co., 1958, 357 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 1260, 2 L.Ed.2d 1540; 66 Stat. 632, exempting from the antitrust laws agreements to fix prices made under State Fair Trade Laws, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (a). If the Commission determines upon a reasonable basis that certain conduct constitutes an unfair method of competition, it may order those responsible to cease and desist even if the conduct is authorized by state law. Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis v. Federal Trade Commission, 8 Cir., 1926, 13 F.2d 673, 684.³

While the existence of a fairly uniform legislative judgment among the states, that the use of certain words sufficiently discloses the nature of a product, would be a circumstance for the Federal Trade Commission to consider, it would not be bound by the judgment prevalent in the states. If the Commission concluded that a more precise description was necessary to avoid public deception, it could lawfully go beyond the states' requirements.

In this case there is not even uniformity of opinion among the states as to which words best disclose the nature of the product. North Carolina is the only state requiring the word "reprocessed." Certainly in such a situation the Federal Trade Commission is not prohibited from requiring a more precise disclosure simply because the petitioner sells a substantial proportion of its product in that state.

However, we think that the order of the Commission in this case does not in reality conflict with the North Carolina law. The state statute does not prohibit the use of additional descriptive words, and the Commission has indicated that it is not the use of the word "reprocessed" which it considers deceptive, but rather the failure to make the additional specific disclosure that the reprocessed oil had been previously used. The order is clearly not in conflict with the state's requirement, and the petitioner can readily comply with both.

Nor is there any merit in the petitioner's contention that he has been "deprived of the equal protection of the North Carolina law." If the petitioner, who engages in interstate commerce, finds himself with less latitude in his methods of competition than the North Carolina law permits his intrastate competitors, this furnishes him no ground of complaint. The Supreme Court has held that intrastate commerce is not subject to federal regulation even though it may competitively affect interstate commerce, Federal Trade Commission v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 1941, 312 U.S. 349, 61 S. Ct. 580, 85 L.Ed. 881; but certainly the Federal Trade Commission does not lose its jurisdiction over interstate commerce merely because it is in competition with intrastate activities beyond federal control.

II

The petitioner next asserts that the record affords insufficient basis for the Commission's order. It is claimed that in other cases the Commission indicated its view that "reprocessed" alone would be a legally sufficient description, and that to overcome the effect of these decisions, the trial examiner attempted in the present proceedings to prove by the testimony of witnesses that "reprocessed" was not a sufficient disclosure. The petitioner asserts that the trial examiner failed in this attempt, because none of the witnesses testified that they were led by the label to believe the petitioner's cans contained new oil.

A. The opinions of the Commission from which the petitioner argues that "reprocessed" was deemed a sufficient disclosure are Pennsylvania Oil Terminal, Inc., 48 F.T.C. 356 (1951) and several cases pending before the Commission when the present case was considered: Double Eagle Refining Co., Docket No. 6432, Salyer Refining Co., Inc., Docket No. 6339, and Mohawk Refining, Inc., Docket No....