Royall's Adm'rs v. Johnson

Decision Date06 May 1823
Citation22 Va. 421
PartiesRoyall's Administrators v. Johnson and Others
CourtVirginia Supreme Court

This was an appeal from the Richmond chancery court. The case is fully stated and discussed in the following opinions.

Spooner for the appellants.

Leigh for the appellees.

Judge Green. Judge Coalter, concurring.

OPINION

Green Judge

The appellants, on the 4th of June, 1803, filed their bill against Gregory Johnson and Thomas Goode, who had severally obtained judgments against them as administrators of J. E Royall, deceased, seeking to injoin any further proceedings upon those judgments, upon the ground, that since the rendition of the judgments, suits had been brought and were depending against them for the recovery of the whole estate of which their intestate died possessed, by a title paramount to his. The injunction was awarded by chancellor Wythe. Goode answered, and relied, that his debt was of equal dignity with any other due from the estate; and that, independent of the property sued for by the claimants mentioned in the bill, other assets of their intestate had come to the hands of the plaintiffs, sufficient to pay his debt in a due course of administration. The bill was amended, and Edwards and Moore, who had severally obtained judgments against the plaintiffs, were made defendants, and an injunction awarded as to them. The bill was again amended, and it was charged that a judgment had been rendered against the plaintiffs in one of the suits mentioned in the original bill for the slaves, from which they had appealed; and that, (if they should lose their slaves,) they had more than fully administered, and were greatly in advance for the estate.

The administration account of the plaintiffs was referred to a commissioner, who reported a balance due the administrators of 60l. 11s. 6 3/4 d.; that they had paid judgments and executions amounting to 721l.; but, that they had paid bond debts and simple contract debts, inferior in dignity to Goode's claim, to the amount of 898l. 11s. 2 1/4 d.; and that Goode's claim, after crediting a small payment, was 254l. 14s. 2d. Upon the coming in of this report, the injunction as to Goode was dissolved. At a subsequent term, the court, without reinstating the injunction, recommitted the said report to the commissioner, with directions to ascertain and report how much of the assets credited to the estate in the report, proceeded from the sales of the slaves in controversy; and from what source the residue of those assets were derived, and to state an account between the plaintiffs and the defendant Goode. In pursuance of this order, the commissioner reported that the balance due the administrators, allowing all debits and all credits, was on the 1st of September, 1808, 132l. 19s. 7d.: that there was credited on account of the sale of slaves up to September 1, 1808, 557l. 16s. 11 1/2 d., of which 197l. 14s. 6d., was injoined; that other assets credited in the account, were injoined to the amount of 45l. 9s. 2 1/4 d.; that setting off Goode's judgment against debts due by him to the plaintiffs individually, he was indebted to them 128l. 17s. 3 1/2 d.; and that the estate of J. E. Royall, was indebted to Goode on simple contract, in the sum of 15l., with interest from the 30th of July, 1800. The account of assets, therefore, as applicable to the payment of judgments on the 1st of September, 1808, was as follows:

Whole amount of assets,

1558l. 19s. 7 1/2 d.

Deduct sales of dis-

puted negroes,

557l. 16s. 11 1/2 d.

And assets in-

joined,

45l. 9s. 2 1/4 d.

603l. 6s. 1 3/4 d.

Applicable to pay off debts,

955l. 13s. 5 3/4 d.

Paid on judgments

and executions,

721l. 0s. 0d.

Paid Goode's judg-

ment,

254l. 14s. 2d.

975l. 14s. 2d.

Over-paid,

20l. 0s. 8 1/4 d.

Paid bonds and simple con-

tracts, including commis-

sions, and expenses of ad-

ministration; which last, to

wit: commissions, and ex-

penses of administration,

had a priority to all debts,

410l. 11s. 2 1/2 d.

Add, according

to 2d report,

72l. 0s. 8 1/4 d.

482l. 11s. 10 3/4 d.

Over-paid, unless the negroes

shall turn out to be assets,

502l. 12s. 7d.

Upon this report, the chancellor decreed on the 21st of February, 1810, that Goode pay to the plaintiffs, the balance reported against him, with interest: That the plaintiffs pay out of the assets of their intestate to Goode, the 15l. and interest, unless they shewed at the next term, that the same had been paid; that Goode's judgment, be perpetually injoined; and that the plaintiffs, should pay to Goode, his costs.

Afterwards, Enoch Moore answered. He does not state the dignity of his claim; but says he sued in 1808, and obtained judgment; and in the next year, (notwithstanding the injunction,) he sued and obtained judgment, for a devastavit. He states, that he knows nothing of the situation of the estate, or of the claims to a part of it set out in the bill; but that the plaintiffs had repeatedly promised him payment. In 1817, the injunction as to Moore was dissolved. In 1816, an order was made at the rules, abating the suit as to Goode, by his death, and awarding a scire facias to revive against his executors; and there was afterwards an order to revive at rules against them. They appeared and filed exceptions to the commissioner's last report, the particulars of which it is not necessary to state.

Upon the hearing of the cause, the chancellor, declaring that the injunction ought not to have been granted, set aside all the orders in the cause which conflicted with what followed, and decreed that the injunctions awarded against Goode, Johnson, and Edwards, be dissolved, and the plaintiffs' bill dismissed with costs as to all of the defendants.

The first question which occurs, is, whether this was a fit case for the jurisdiction and relief of a court of equity. If the title of John E. Royall, to the slaves for which his administrators were afterwards sued, and which were recovered against them, had been questioned, before the judgments of Johnson and Goode were recovered against them, the administrators, in defending themselves at law, must either have admitted those slaves to have been assets, in which case, they would have been conclusively bound; or must have denied that they were assets, in which case the title must have been tried in those suits; and if found to be assets, that finding must at law have been conclusive, even although the slaves should afterwards be recovered upon a title, adverse to that of John E. Royall. Or if they had, in those suits, been found not to be assets, that finding, in like manner, would at law be conclusive upon those creditors, even if they should have been afterwards ascertained to belong to J. E. Royall. In such case, there would have been no possible means of avoiding the hazard of great, and at law irremediable injustice, to one or other of the parties, but through the aid of a court of equity, by suspending the proceedings at law, until the title to the slaves in question could be ascertained, in a way which would be binding on all the world, when complete justice could be done to all parties. In such a case, where the law affords no adequate remedy, I think a court of equity has jurisdiction, upon its general principles. And this view of the subject, applies to Moore's and Edwards's judgments also, inasmuch as the title to the negroes was not settled, when those judgments were rendered, if indeed it is yet settled, which does not appear in this record. But, there is a stronger reason for supporting the jurisdiction of a court of equity, as to Goode's and Johnson's judgments, which were rendered, before the suits for the recovery of the negroes were instituted against the appellants. Those judgments were, when this bill was exhibited, conclusive evidence at law, of assets against the appellants; for, the act declaring that executors should not be personally liable beyond the assets of their testator, by reason of any mis-pleading, false-pleading, or non-pleading, did not pass, until 1807. The consequence would have been, that acting bona fide, in the belief that they had, in their hands, sufficient assets for the payment of debts, and submitting without defence to judgments, as in justice they were bound to do in such case, these executors might have been bound without default or even negligence on their part, to pay the debts out of their own pockets, because of an unknown and unsuspected defect in their testator's title to a large portion of the property, which came to the hands of his executors as his, unless a court of equity in such case could give relief.

The next question is, whether, the court having jurisdiction, such a case is made out by this record, as to entitle the plaintiffs to relief. As to the judgments of Goode and Johnson, it does not appear which was entitled to priority. But, both were entitled to priority over those of Edwards and Moore. If Goode's had a priority over Johnson's, then, from the state of the accounts, (Goode's judgment being paid by the administrators,) it appears that all the assets which are ascertained to belong to J. E. Royall's estate, which came to the hands of his administrators, have been duly applied to the payment of debts of dignity superior to that of the claims of Johnson, Moore and Edwards; and the decree, as to those parties, ought to be reversed with costs, against Moore, the injunctions against those parties reinstated, and the cause remanded to the superior court of chancery for further enquiry to be made, as to the state of the assets of J. E. Royall.

As to Goode's case, it seems that the claims against him which were set off against his judgment, and upon which he was found to be indebted to the plaintiffs, were individual claims against him by them, arising...

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2 cases
  • McAuslan v. McAuslan
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • July 6, 1912
    ...as to that defendant. Such decree is final as to him, although the cause may be still pending in the court, as to the rest. Royall's Adm'rs v. Johnson, 22 Va. 421; Dickinson v. Codwise, 11 Paige (N. Y.) 189. Of this nature was the decree considered in Doty v. Oriental Print Works Company, 2......
  • Dearing v. Walter
    • United States
    • Virginia Supreme Court
    • June 10, 1940
    ...to Evans v. Spurgin, 11 Grat. 615, 52 Va. 615, Virginia Reports Annotated. Since the decision of this court in Royall's Adm'rs v. Johnson, 1 Rand. 421, 22 Va. 421, the fixed doctrine has been that a decree may be final as to one party and not final as to another party in the same cause. It ......

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