Royce v. Denby's Estate, 7751

Decision Date31 October 1977
Docket NumberNo. 7751,7751
Citation379 A.2d 1256,117 N.H. 893
Parties, 99 A.L.R.3d 718 David ROYCE v. ESTATE of Elizabeth DENBY et al. Sidney WESTERMAN, Administrator v. ESTATE of Elizabeth DENBY et al.
CourtNew Hampshire Supreme Court

David Royce, by brief and orally, pro se.

Sidney Westerman, Everett, Mass., by brief and orally, pro se.

Perkins, Holland, Donovan & Beckett, Exeter (Robert B. Donovan, Exeter, orally), for defendants.

BOIS, Justice.

Two appeals were taken to the superior court from a decision of the probate court disallowing plaintiffs' respective claims to share in the defendant estate. Randolph Royce was a child of the decedent not named or referred to in her will executed in compliance with the laws of the state of New York. Plaintiff David Royce is an heir at law of Randolph who has since deceased. Plaintiff Sidney Westerman is administrator of the estate of Randolph. The cases were heard by a Master (Leonard C. Hardwick, Esq.) on an agreed statement of facts with some oral testimony, and a ruling was returned in favor of the plaintiffs. The master's report was approved by Mullavey, J., and all questions of law raised by the exceptions taken and any exceptions appearing in the transcript were reserved and transferred by Perkins, J.

The issues raised were set in motion in the summer of 1963 when Kenneth R. McElheny, grandson of Elizabeth R. Denby, moved to Exeter, New Hampshire. The grandmother, who was in her early eighties and who had been a domiciliary of New York for many years, approached Kenneth and his wife about moving to New Hampshire to be close to them. Arrangements were made and Mrs. Denby gave up her New York apartment, shipping all her possessions to Exeter, where they arrived in the fall of 1963. Prior to her own removal to New Hampshire, she left on a prolonged trip abroad and did not return to New York until March of 1964, where upon she visited with a friend. While there she suffered a stroke which caused her to become permanently and mentally incapacitated, deprived of speech and the ability to write or otherwise communicate. In early April 1964, as soon as she was able to travel, she was taken from New York to Exeter by ambulance. Kenneth was appointed her guardian on June 8, 1964, and continued in that capacity until her death on February 21, 1966.

Mrs. Denby's will executed on January 21, 1963, while she was domiciled in New York, was allowed in the Rockingham County Probate Court and Kenneth was appointed administrator w.w.a. The court decreed that, pursuant to the terms of the instrument, the entire net balance of the estate should be paid to a trust providing for the benefit of her daughter, Katherine, and her daughter's two children, Victor K. McElheny and Kenneth R. McElheny. Katherine had a history of mental illness and needed to be supervised and financially provided for. Mrs. Denby also had a son, Randolph Royce, who, from his earliest infancy, had lived with his grandparents, who provided his care and maintenance. Randolph never married, had no issue and died intestate. He also had a history of mental illness spending the last thirty of his sixty years in the state hospital at Westboro, Massachusetts.

It is agreed that at the time Mrs. Denby executed her will, the laws of the state of New York, where she was then domiciled, did not require a testatrix to name or refer to a child in order to prevent that child from sharing in her estate. In contrast thereto New Hampshire RSA 551:10 provides:

"Every child born after the decease of the testator, and every child or issue of a child of the deceased not named or referred to in his will, and who is not a devisee or legatee, shall be entitled to the same portion of the estate, real and personal, as he would be if the deceased were intestate."

The plaintiffs are now claiming an interest in the estate of Elizabeth Denby on behalf of the estate of Randolph Royce pursuant to the New Hampshire statute. The master, reasoning that the distribution of personal property should be governed by the law of the domicile at death, gave the statute full force and effect and found for the plaintiffs.

We hold that under the facts of the instant case, RSA 551:10 should not apply to give the estate of Randolph Royce a share of Elizabeth Denby's estate.

The New Hampshire statute reverses the general presumption that a person is deemed to know and approve all dispositions and omissions in her will. 2 Page on Wills (Bowe-Parker rev.ed.) § 21.105, p. 529. The effect of our statute is to create a rule of law that pretermission of a child or issue of a child, is accidental. In the Matter of Thomas M. Jackson, 117 N.H. ---, 379 A.2d 832 (Decided this day). This rule is conclusive unless there is evidence in the will itself that the omission was intentional. It is important to note that the statute thus is not a limitation on the power to make testamentary dispositions but rather is an attempt to effectuate a testator's presumed intent. It prevents forgetfulness, not disinheritance.

RSA 551:10 affords protection against inadvertence for two classes: New Hampshire omitted heirs and New Hampshire testators. Both classes are shielded against the inequitable result of enforcing a will containing an inadvertent omission.

The instant will was drafted in New York while the testatrix was a domiciliary of that state. It specified certain distributions of...

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13 cases
  • Lotz v. Atamaniuk
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • 29 Marzo 1983
    ...personal property in its borders, then she can apply her own law without regard to testatrix's domicile.See also, Royce v. Denby, 117 N.H. 893, 379 A.2d 1256, 1259 (N.H.1977).5 A person who is interested in the result of a will proceeding is incompetent to testify about declarations of the ......
  • Estate of Jones v. Jones
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • 8 Agosto 1988
    ...was intentional"); Crump v. Freeman, 614 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Okl.1980) (same statutory language as in Cooke ). See Royce v. Estate of Denby, 117 N.H. 893, 379 A.2d 1256, 1258 (1977). The purpose of the pretermission statute is to protect the omitted child's right to take unless the will itself......
  • Simpson v. Calivas
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • 21 Septiembre 1994
    ...effort, the probate court is always permitted to consider the "surrounding circumstances" of the testator, id.; Royce v. Denby's Estate, 117 N.H. 893, 379 A.2d 1256 (1977), and where the terms of a will are ambiguous, as here, extrinsic evidence may be admitted to the extent that it does no......
  • Sayewich's Estate, In re, 79-219
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • 31 Marzo 1980
    ...We adhere to the principle that the testator's intent is the sovereign guide in the interpretation of his will, Royce v. Estate of Denby, 117 N.H. 893, 379 A.2d 1256 (1977), and reaffirm our policy against voiding terms of a will because of a mistake in drafting. In re Morrison Estate, 106 ......
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1 books & journal articles
  • FEDERAL TRANSFER TAXES AND THE PROTEAN IRREVOCABLE TRUST.
    • United States
    • Albany Law Review Vol. 85 No. 1, March 2022
    • 22 Marzo 2022
    ...of Walters, 343 P.2d 572, 574 (Nev. 1959); In re Sayewich's Estate. 413 A.2d 581. 585 (N.H. 1980) (citing Royce v. Estate of Denby, 379 A.2d 1256, 1259 (N.H. 1977)); Wilson v. Flowers. 277 A.2d 199, 207 (N.J. 1971); Wollard v. Sulier, 232 P.2d 991. 995 (N.M. 1951); In re Will of Fabri. 140 ......

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