Rozenfeld v. Mta Bus Co.
| Decision Date | 16 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | 13 Civ. 4847 (KPF) |
| Parties | ROMAN ROZENFELD, Plaintiff, v. MTA BUS COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
On July 11, 2013, Plaintiff Roman Rozenfeld filed this action alleging violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 ("Title VII"), the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 to 301 (the "NYSHRL"), and the New York City Human Rights Law, N.Y. City Admin. Code §§ 8-101 to 8-131 (the "NYCHRL"). Plaintiff contends that he was suspended from work without due process, and that he was subject to employment discrimination and retaliation based on his national origin (Russian). Defendant MTA Bus Company ("MTA Bus")1 has moved for summary judgmenton all of Plaintiff's claims. For the reasons set forth in this Opinion, Defendant's motion is granted in its entirety.
Plaintiff, an individual of Russian national origin, was hired by Command Bus Company in 2003 as a "fueler" at the Spring Creek Bus Depot in Brooklyn. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 1; Rozenfeld Dep. 11-12). Sometime after 2006,when MTA Bus took over the operations of Command Bus Company and several other private lines, Plaintiff was promoted to "mechanic." (Def. 56.1 ¶ 2; Pl. Opp. 2). While Plaintiff did take an examination for the promotion, that examination was not a civil service examination because, as Plaintiff understood it, he was not a civil servant. (Rozenfeld Dep. 7). In late 2009, in response to a job vacancy notice, Plaintiff applied for a promotion to the position of "bus maintenance supervisor," also called a "line supervisor." (Def. 56.1 ¶ 3). No civil service examination was administered for the purposes of this promotion, either. (Id. at ¶ 4). After an interview, Plaintiff received the promotion to line supervisor in 2010. (Id. at ¶ 5).
The line supervisor position is a non-managerial position whose members are represented by the Transport Workers Union/Transit Supervisors Organization Local 106 ("Local 106"). (Def. 56.1 ¶ 5). At the times relevant to this action, Local 106 did not have a collective bargaining agreement with MTA Bus. (Id. at ¶ 6). In the absence of an applicable provision in a collective bargaining agreement specifying a particular disciplinary procedure, MTA Bus employees, including members of Local 106, were afforded a two-step hearing process. (Id. at ¶ 7). During the process, the employee was entitled to a union or other representative and given an opportunity to contest the disciplinary charge. (Id.). If at the first hearing (the "Step I" hearing), the hearing officer upheld the charge, the employee was entitled to appeal the disposition in a second hearing (a "Step II" hearing). (See id. at ¶ 21).
Plaintiff encountered this disciplinary process at least twice. The first time was in September 2012, when Plaintiff was charged with insubordination and conduct unbecoming a supervisor. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 8). At his Step I hearing, Plaintiff accepted a two-week suspension for the infraction. (Id.). A few weeks later, Plaintiff was again subject to discipline after an incident on November 8, 2012, when Plaintiff and Robert Hiltz, a fellow line supervisor, engaged in a verbal altercation over the allocation of overtime. (Id. at ¶ 9). Each employee was directed by a superintendent to submit a written statement describing what, in his view, had occurred. (Id.). Plaintiff asserted in his statement that Hiltz had called him a "Russian piece of shit." (Id. at ¶ 10). Hiltz asserted in his statement that Plaintiff had called him a "lying motherfucker" and a "racist cocksucker." (Id. at ¶ 11).
Robert Picarelli, MTA Bus's Chief Officer for Internal Studies & Operations Improvement, conducted an investigation into the incident. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 12). Picarelli separately interviewed both Plaintiff and Hiltz, each of whom was accompanied by his own union representative during the interview. (Id. at ¶ 13; Efron Decl. Ex. H). Both employees denied using any derogatory epithets during their argument. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 13). Picarelli discounted their denials, concluded that "Hiltz and Rozenfeld made highly inappropriate comments which violated the Respectful Workplace Policy," and recommended that "appropriate action" be taken against both employees. (Id. at ¶ 14).3
Hiltz's disciplinary action report charged him with having "acted in a foul, profane, and abusive manner" and with having "made ethnic comments to a MTA Bus Company employee." (Def. 56.1 ¶ 16). Hiltz had no prior disciplinary infractions. (Id. at ¶ 19). At his Step I hearing, Hiltz accepted a ten-day suspension, coupled with other conditions. (Id. at ¶ 18). Plaintiff's disciplinary action report charged him with having "acted in a foul, profane, and abusive manner" and with having "made sexually disparaging comments to a MTA Bus Company employee." (Id. at ¶ 17). Plaintiff received a copy of both the Picarelli report and his disciplinary action report. (Id. at ¶ 20). At his Step I hearing on November 21, 2012, Plaintiff was accompanied by a union representative, and protested his innocence of the charge. (Id.). The Step I hearing officer upheld the charge, imposed a penalty of dismissal, and removed Plaintiff from service; Plaintiff appealed that disposition to Step II. (Id. at ¶ 21).
A Step II hearing was held on November 26, 2012, before Carl Macchio, MTA Bus's Director of Labor Relations. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 22). At this appeal, Plaintiff was also accompanied by a union representative, and again he maintained that he had not used profanity in his argument with Hiltz. (Id. at ¶ 22; Rozenfeld Dep. 62). At the conclusion of the hearing, Macchio offered Plaintiff, in resolution of the charge, a further five-day suspension plus an additional fifteen days served at 70% pay. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 23). Plaintiff rejected the offer. (Id.). Several days later, Plaintiff rejected a second offer that wouldhave reduced the penalty of dismissal to a multi-day suspension. (Id. at ¶ 24). Macchio rendered a written decision on the Step II hearing on December 7, 2012, sustaining the charge and imposing a 25-day suspension. (Id. at ¶ 25). In considering the appropriate penalty to impose, Macchio viewed Plaintiff's conduct "in conjunction with the recent two-week suspension [he had] served for a conduct unbecoming violation." (Id. at ¶ 26).
Plaintiff filed this action on July 11, 2013 (Dkt. #1), and filed an amended complaint on September 20, 2013 (Dkt. #3). Plaintiff's Amended Complaint contains four counts, alleging violations of (i) his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, (ii) the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (iii) the NYSHRL, and (iv) the NYCHRL. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15-18). Because the Amended Complaint "invoke[s]" this Court's jurisdiction under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (id. at ¶ 2), the Court understands Plaintiff to bring his constitutional claims pursuant to that statute. Likewise, because both parties address Plaintiff's claims brought under "the Civil Rights Act of 1964" as if they were brought pursuant to Title VII of that Act, the Court accordingly understands Plaintiff's federal discrimination claims to be brought under Title VII.4 Following discovery, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment onall of Plaintiff's claims on July 7, 2014 (Dkt. # 23); the motion was fully briefed on October 9, 2014 (Dkt. #23-26, 31-32, 34-35, 37).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment may be granted only if all the submissions taken together "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating "the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and is genuinely in dispute "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Anderson). The movant may discharge this burden by showing that the nonmoving party has "fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; see also Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 711 F.3d 253, 256 (2d Cir. 2013) ().
If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must "set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial" using affidavits or otherwise, and cannot rely on the "mere allegations or denials" contained in the pleadings. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 250; see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24; Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 2009). The nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), and cannot rely on "mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment," Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 12 (2d Cir. 1986). Furthermore, "[m]ere conclusory allegations or denials cannot by themselves create a genuine issue of material fact where none would otherwise exist." Hicks v....
To continue reading
Request your trial