Rozier v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest
| Decision Date | 01 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14-Civ-20547-COOKE/TORRES |
| Parties | INEZ ROZIER, Plaintiff, v. HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE MIDWEST, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT
This is a diversity action for a declaration of compliance or substantial compliance with all post-loss obligations under an insurance policy and for damages resulting from an alleged breach of contract by Hartford Insurance Company of the Midwest ("Defendant" or "Hartford"), the insurer. See generally Am. Compl., ECF No. 6.1 On February 13, 2014, Hartford removed this matter from state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which allows removal on diversity of citizenship grounds if there is complete diversity among the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Thereafter, on March 13, 2014, Defendant Hartford moved to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. For the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant issued a homeowners insurance policy ("Policy") under which her property, located at 2119 NW 58th St., Miami, Florida 33142, ("Subject Property"), was covered against certain losses. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-10. On October 24, 2005, while the Policy "was in full force and effect," the Subject Property suffered a "covered loss" as a result of a hurricane, and Plaintiff immediately informed Hartford about the damage, which tendered payment of insurance proceeds after inspecting the Subject Property's losses. Id. at 11-12, 14.However, Plaintiff alleges that the amount of losses sustained were greater than Defendant acknowledged; consequently, on March 9, 2010, Plaintiff reopened her claim for damages. Id. at 14-15.
Since Defendant allegedly underpaid Plaintiff and also remained silent on the appraisal matter, Plaintiff invoked the Policy's appraisal clause,2 and claims that Defendant's conduct amounts to a material breach of the Policy that has caused her damages. Id. at 18, 34-35. Plaintiff requests that this Court determines that she complied, or substantially complied, with post-loss obligations contained in the Policy. Id. at 28-30.
The Amended Complaint seeks: (1) a declaration that Plaintiff has complied, or substantially complied, with all post-loss obligations and that appraisal is ripe pursuant to the Policy (Count I); and (2) that judgment for breach of contract be entered in favor of Plaintiff (Count II). See generally Am. Compl.
A complaint "must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In order to survive a motion to dismiss, the allegations contained in the complaint "must be plausible on [their] face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)) (alterations added). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Detailed allegations are not required, however, the complaint must contain more than "'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . .'" See id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544). A court does not have to accept legal conclusions in the complaint as true. See id. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679. Nevertheless, on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. SEC v. ESM Grp. Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
Defendant seeks dismissal of the Amended Complaint on four grounds: (i) failure to add an indispensable party, namely, Roosevelt Rozier ("Mr. Rozier"), deceased and Plaintiff's husband, or in his default his estate or personal representative; (ii) improper reliance on the applicable law to provide declaratory relief, i.e. using Florida procedural law in support of Plaintiff's allegations instead of federal law; (iii) alleging inconsistent claims for legal and equitable relief for breach of contract claim; and (iv) failure to allege this Court's grounds for jurisdiction. See generally Def.'s Mot. Dismiss.
Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs requires joinder, requires a two-part analysis:
First, the court must ascertain under the standards of Rule 19(a) whether the person in question is one who should be joined if feasible. If the person should be joined but cannot be (because, for example, joinder would divest the court of jurisdiction) then the court must inquire whether, applying the factors enumerated in Rule 19(b), the litigation may continue.
Challenge Homes, Inc. v. Greater Naples Care Ctr., 669 F.2d 667, 669 (11th Cir. 1982). "[F]indings of indispensability must be based on stated pragmatic considerations, especially the effect on parties and on litigation." In re Torcise, 116 F.3d 860, 865 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 106 (1968)).
First, it must be determined whether Mr. Rozier, or his estate or personal representative, should be joined if feasible. "Rule 19 provides for joinder of an indispensable party where there is substantial risk of the defendant being subjected to a multiplicity of suits." In re Torcise, 116 F.3d 865 (citing Dudley v. Smith, 504 F.2d 979, 983 (5th Cir.1974)). Rule 19(a)(1)(B)(ii) sets forth the requirements that must be present to add a person to an action: the person (i) is subject to service of process, (ii) the joinder of whom would not deprive the court's subject-matter jurisdiction over the case, (iii) that person claims an interest relating to the subject matter of the action, and (iv) whose absence in the disposition of the case would leave an existing party "subject to a substantial risk of incurring in double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest." Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(ii). Defendant argues that Mr.Rozier, or in the alternative his estate or personal representative, is a proper party for joinder because Defendant potentially could be subject to multiple suits and double recovery if Mr. Rozier, or his estate, is not included as a party plaintiff. Reply Supp. Mot. Dismiss 2. I agree.
First, while Mr. Rozier himself cannot be a party to this action because his death certificate shows that his death occurred on February 27, 2013, see Pl.'s Resp., Ex. A, ECF No. 14, his estate can be subject to service of process. Second, the addition of Mr. Rozier's estate would not deprive this Court of subject matter jurisdiction because complete diversity of citizenship among the parties will not be destroyed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2) (). Both Plaintiffs would be citizens of Florida, and Defendant, a Connecticut corporation, are completely diverse, thus preserving this Court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Am. Compl. ¶ 2-3, ECF No. 6; see also Ex. A, ECF No. 14.
Third, it is undisputable that Mr. Rozier's estate claims an interest relating to the benefits under the insurance policy at issue. Lastly, adhering to Florida law that a personal representative stands in the shows of the decedent, and thus a person has no greater rights against the estate than what he or she would have had against thte decedent during his life, see Magwood v. Tate, 832 So. 2d 1241, 1243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2003) (citing Sullivan v. Sessions, 80 So. 2d 706, 707 (Fla. 1955)), Mr. Rozier's personal representative could, potentially, bring a subsequent suit against the Defendant under the Policy. In other words, there is a substantial risk that if Mr. Rozier's estate or personal representative is not added as a party in this action and Defendant pays the alleged additional damages to Plaintiff, Defendant might face the burden of paying twice in a later action brought by Mr. Rozier's estate.
For these reasons, joinder of Mr. Rozer's estate is feasible and this Court need not consider the analysis under Rule 19(b).
Defendant contains that Count I of the Amended Complaint should be dismissed without prejudice because Florida's Declaratory Judgment Act, which is a procedural statute, cannotform the basis of Plaintiff's declaratory judgment action. See Mot. Dismiss 5-6, ECF No. 12; see also Reply Supp. Mot. Dismiss 3, ECF No. 16. "[F]ederal courts are to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law," Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965) (emphasis added), and in a diversity case "seeking declaratory relief, the federal court applies state law on the substantive issues presented in the declaratory [] judgment action." Townhouses of Highland Beach Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. QBE Ins. Corp., 504 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1309-10 (S.D. Fla. 2007) ().
There is no clear applicable law regarding the application of either the federal or the state declaratory judgment statutes among the districts, and courts have reached different conclusions in actions brought in Florida. See e.g., Diamond State Ins....
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