Rozycki v. Yantic Grain & Products Co.

• Citation: 99 Conn. 711,122 A. 717
• Parties: ROZYCKI v. YANTIC GRAIN & PRODUCTS CO.
• Decision Date: 17 November 1923
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut

122 A. 717

99 Conn. 711

ROZYCKI v. YANTIC GRAIN & PRODUCTS CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

November 17, 1923

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, New London County; Charles B Waller, Judge.

Action by Martin Rozycki against the Yantic Grain & Products Company, for negligent operation of a motor truck. From judgment for plaintiff on a trial to the court, defendant appeals. No error.

The standard of care to be exercised in driving an automobile at night is one for the trior of fact in a negligence case there being no standard derived from express legal enactment or the universal custom and practice of the community.

The trial court found that on October 23, 1922, at about quarter past 6 in the afternoon, a driver employed by defendant was operating an auto truck belonging to it, southerly on the road leading from Norwich Town to Norwich, and that, owing to the breaking of the pump shaft, he stopped the truck, and left it on the highway and proceeded to a telephone station to communicate with his employer. He stopped the truck in the highway, with its rear projecting at a considerable angle from the curb, so that its front wheels were near the gutter on the westerly side of the highway which was the right-hand side thereof as the defendant's driver proceeded along the highway, and so that the rear part of the truck was close to the middle of the highway. He left the red tail light on the truck unlighted, and had the same been in fact lighted it was so obscured by mud and was so placed upon the truck that, in the position in which the truck was left, the light could not have been seen by a person approaching from the rear. The driver left the truck unattended, and made no examination to discover whether the light, if lighted, could have been seen by one approaching from behind. After the collision the driver lighted the red light. At the time the truck was stopped, it was dark thundering and lightening, and raining hard.

Within a few minutes after the driver left the truck the plaintiff operating a touring car, going in a southerly direction along this highway, collided with the truck, and the right rear body of the car came into contact with the left rear part of the truck. Prior thereto plaintiff was operating his car at a reasonable speed, having regard to the width, use, and condition of the highway, the traffic thereon, the time of day, and the condition of the weather, and had full and complete control of his car, which he was driving at the rate of about 12 miles an hour, and by reason of the condition of the weather and of the highway could not see ahead for a distance of over 20 feet. The plaintiff did not discover the truck until he was within 10 or 12 feet of it, and was so close that he was unable to stop his car in time or within a sufficient distance to avoid collision with the truck.

The surface of the highway for about 1,000 feet back from the place of collision was of macadam and wet and slippery. There was nothing on the rear of the truck to warn a person approaching it from the rear. The plaintiff's car was fully and adequately equipped with brakes and proper headlights. The damage to the car from the collision was $550, and the plaintiff received personal injuries by reason of the collision, confining him to his bed and home for two weeks, and preventing him for a long time from attending to his business.

The trial court reached the conclusion that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of the defendant's employee in leaving the truck in the situation described on the highway, unattended and without a red signal lighted on the rear of the truck, and that the plaintiff at the time of the collision was operating his automobile in the exercise of all due care on his part, and was free from any negligence materially contributing to the cause of the collision.

The plaintiff had judgment for $726.

The defendant made the following claims of law:

(1) That the plaintiff, while operating his motor vehicle at night, was bound to drive at a rate of speed that would enable him to stop his motor vehicle within the distance that he could see or distinguish an object in the highway ahead of it.

(2) That the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in operating his motor vehicle at night at such a rate of speed that he could not stop his motor vehicle within the distance that he could see or distinguish an object in the highway ahead of him.

The defendant assigns error in the overruling of these claims, and also contends that the conclusion of the trial court is not sustained by the facts found, and does not logically follow therefrom.

Charles V. James, of Norwich, for appellant.

Edwin W. Higgins, of Norwich, for appellee.

KEELER, J. (after stating the facts as above).

In attacking the conclusion arrived at by the trial court defendant urges that the plaintiff was bound to exercise due care, which due care must be inferred from relevant facts, and specifically that due care is not shown...