Ruan Financial Corp. v. US

• Decision Date: 27 December 1990
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 88-1711-B.
• Citation: 765 F. Supp. 985
• Parties: RUAN FINANCIAL CORPORATION and Ruan Transport Corporation, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

765 F. Supp. 985

RUAN FINANCIAL CORPORATION and Ruan Transport Corporation, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.

Civ. No. 88-1711-B.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, C.D.

December 27, 1990.

Mark McCormick, Belin Harris Helmick & Tesdell, Des Moines, Iowa, Keith Martin, Evelyn E. Johnson, Andrew A. Giaccia, Chadburne & Park, Washington, D.C., for plaintiffs.

Christopher D. Hagen, U.S. Atty., Des Moines, Iowa, Roger W. Bracken, Seth G. Heald, Dept. of Justice, Tax Div., Spec. Litigation, Washington, D.C., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RULINGS

VIETOR, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs Ruan Financial Corporation and Ruan Transport Corporation (jointly referred to as "Ruan") brings suit seeking a refund of federal manufacturer's excise taxes, interest and penalties, on 12 highway tractors. Defendant United States of America counterclaims seeking federal manufacturer's excise taxes, plus interest and penalties, on an additional 414 highway tractors. Both parties move for summary judgment. I heard oral arguments and the motions are submitted.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(e). To preclude the entry of summary judgment, the nonmovant must make a sufficient showing on every essential element of its case for which it has the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Continental Grain Co. v. Frank Seitzinger Storage, Inc., 837 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir.1988). Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by affidavits, or by the "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file," designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553; Johnson v. Schopf, 669 F.Supp. 291, 295 (D.Minn.1987). The quantum of proof that the nonmoving party must produce is not precisely measurable, but it must be "enough evidence so that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2515, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Johnson, 669 F.Supp. at 295-96.

On a motion for summary judgment, the court views all the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and gives that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts. Trnka v. Elanco Prods. Co., 709 F.2d 1223, 1225 (8th Cir.1983); Howard v. Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 649 F.2d 620, 623 (8th Cir.1981).

FACTS

The following facts are undisputed. Ruan purchases new highway tractors which it then leases to private businesses. The leases generally run for a period of five years, at the expiration of which Ruan either sells the used tractors or places them in its daily rental fleet.

In 1981, the tractor market was soft and Ruan decided not to attempt to sell the tractors coming in from its 1977 leases. Instead, it started the "Generation II" program which Ruan designed to improve the tractors so that they could be leased for an additional three to four years. This program continued until January 1985, during which time Ruan improved 426 tractors.

The Generation II program began in a warehouse in Corydon, Iowa, where Ruan disassembled the tractors and, on an individual basis, cleaned or replaced worn or damaged parts. Ruan replaced engines on the vast majority of the tractors. Ruan also did extensive cosmetic work including new paint, seats, carpeting and headliners. Ruan requested new Vehicle Identification Numbers (VINs) from the Iowa Department of Transportation, but the Department refused. In 1983, the Iowa General Assembly enacted Iowa Code § 321.1, granting new VINs to the Ruan tractors as "remanufactured" vehicles. Of the 426 tractors, Ruan leased 243, placing the remainder in its daily rental fleet. Ruan sold the tractors three to four years later for prices equivalent to other used tractors of the same age which had not undergone the Generation II process.

DISCUSSION

Prior to April 1, 1983, 26 U.S.C. § 4061 applied an excise tax on manufacturers of highway tractors at the time of manufacture. By amendment effective April 1, 1983, 26 U.S.C. § 4051(a)(1)(E) places the tax on manufacturers at the time of the first retail sale of a highway tractor. A lease or other use by the manufacturer is considered a sale. 26 U.S.C. § 4217. The parties do not dispute that sales have taken place.

Although the Code does not define the term "manufacture", Treasury regulation 48.0-2(a)(4)(i) states:

The term manufacturer includes any person who produces a taxable article from scrap, salvage, or junk material, or from new or raw material, by processing, manipulating, or changing the form of an article, or by combining or assembling two or more articles into a new article.

Court decisions and IRS rulings have found "manufacture" in a number of situations: (1) when the combining or assembling of parts is so extensive that one brings about the production of a new or different article; (2) when one changes the form of an article; (3) when one rehabilitates an article that was of scrap or salvage value; and (4) when one rebuilds, as opposed to reconditions, an article. The parties also suggest that extending the useful life of an article constitutes manufacture.

1. Combining or Assembling Parts

The regulation provides that combining or assembling two or more articles into a new article constitutes manufacture. Applied to highway tractors, the use of a "glider kit" constitutes manufacture. Boise Nat'l Leasing, Inc. v. United States, 389 F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir.1968); Rev.Rul. 71-584, 1971-2 C.B. 358; Rev.Rul. 77-447, 1977-2 C.B. 384; Rev.Rul. 78-205, 1978-1 C.B. 345; Rev.Rul. 86-130, 1986-45 I.R.B. 5, 1986-2 C.B. 179; TAM 7836003, IRS Letter Rulings Reports (CCH), Apr. 28, 1978. A glider kit "usually consists of a cab, fenders, dash instruments, wiring, steering wheel, steering gear, seats, chassis frame, front axle, and copper tubing for the brake system," Rev.Rul. 86-130, and when a company joins these parts with other parts obtained from a tractor, a functionally new vehicle results. An actual kit need not be used if the repairs are as extensive as a glider kit. Boise, 389 F.2d at 636; TAM 7836003.

In Boise, the court explains that a glider kit constitutes manufacture because

the old trucks had been permanently stripped of all their form, all their identity, and all their utility as vehicular structures and entities. * * * The dismantling had as its very purpose the permanent severance from the old truck structures and entities of some of the major components thereof and the incorporation of them as elements in other structures which were to be assembled.

389 F.2d at 636. The IRS made the same point in a private letter ruling.

With these components removed, a wrecked vehicle, is no longer identifiable as a specific article. The remaining components do not have the form or substance of a truck-tractor, but are rather only an assemblage of parts.

TAM 7836003.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Ruan, it did not use glider kits or glider kit equivalents. Ruan states that its Generation II program was a "mirror image" of the kits in that it focused on necessary replacement of all parts except the major components of a glider kit, i.e., the cab and chassis. Ruan further states that, unlike Boise, parts that were removed and rebuilt or cleaned were returned to the same chassis, with no interchanging of parts between tractors. Summary judgment for the government on this issue is inappropriate.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the government, Ruan replaced many of the parts of a glider kit, including dash instruments and steering wheel gear, and it reinforced the cab on most of the tractors. I do not believe that replacement of the minor components of a glider kit, as opposed to the cab and chassis, constitute repairs so extensive as to create a new article under the regulation. Because parts were not interchanged between tractors, with salvaged parts being returned to the same cab and chassis from which they came, and because the main structural components of the cab and chassis remained intact, the tractors remained identifiable throughout the process. As Boise observes, "a dismantling of an old truck, with a repairing, reconditioning, replacing of some parts, and a reassembling of the truck elements, might not constitute the manufacturing of another truck." Boise, 389 F.2d at 636.

According to the government, "Ruan's Generation II program focused primarily, but not exclusively, on rebuilding or replacing" the "power train (engine, clutch, transmission and rear axles)" of a highway tractor. Noble Affidavit ¶ 9. Engine replacement, however, does not constitute manufacture. See Rev.Rul. 75-509, 1975-2 C.B. 420 (distinguishes Rev.Rul. 60-310 as involving change of transportation function of vehicles); TAM 8620003, IRS Letter Rulings Reports (CCH), Feb. 4, 1986. But see Rev.Rul. 60-310, 1960-2 C.B. 334. Ruan's motion for summary judgment on this issue will be granted.

2. Changing the Form

Manufacturing occurs when one significantly changes the form of a vehicle. See Rev.Rul. 60-155, 1960-1 C.B. 410 (shortens chassis); Rev.Rul. 69-418, 1969-2 C.B. 195 (chassis height lowered); Rev.Rul. 78-205 (lengthens trailer); Rev.Rul. 78-217, 1978-1 C.B. 346 (lengthens chassis); Rev. Rul. 82-157, 1982-36 I.R.B. 7, 1982-2 C.B. 288 (shortening chassis six inches not significant, and therefore, not manufacture); Rev.Rul. 83-149, 1983-2 C.B. 186 (lengthens trailer). Changing the...