Rubin v. Brutus Corp.

• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: ZEHMER; SHIVERS; BOOTH
• Citation: Rubin v. Brutus Corp., 487 So.2d 360, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 903 (Fla. App. 1986)
• Decision Date: 15 April 1986
• Docket Number: No. AY-242,AY-242
• Parties: , 11 Fla. L. Weekly 903, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 10,978 Janice RUBIN, Appellant, v. BRUTUS CORPORATION and Galaxy Boat Manufacturing Co., Inc., Appellees.

Page 360

487 So.2d 360

1988 A.M.C. 416, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 903,

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 10,978

Janice RUBIN, Appellant, v. BRUTUS CORPORATION and Galaxy Boat Manufacturing Co., Inc., Appellees.

No. AY-242.

District Court of Appeal of Florida First District.

April 15, 1986.

Rehearing Denied May 14, 1986.

J. Richard Moore, Jacksonville, for appellant.

John Moffitt Howell, of Howell & Howell, Jacksonville Beach, for appellee, Brutus Corp. Sam Daniels and Elizabeth K. Clarke, of Daniel & Hicks, Miami, for appellee, Galaxy Boat Mfg. Co.

ZEHMER, Judge.

In this personal injury action plaintiff appeals a summary judgment for defendants, manufacturers of a boat and its components. Summary judgment was granted on the ground that the crashworthiness doctrine recognized in product liability cases is not applicable to accidents involving persons riding in pleasure boats. Finding no substantial reason on the record before us for legally differentiating between the duty of care owed by the manufacturer of the pleasure boat in this case and manufacturers of other types of vehicles to which the crashworthiness doctrine has been applied, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

On August 30, 1980, appellant, Janice Rubin, was a passenger in a motor boat traveling about thirty miles per hour and pulling a waterskier when the boat was negligently steered into a collision with a fixed channel marker. The seat on which Rubin was seated came loose and collapsed on impact, resulting in her being thrown forward over the seat into a bulkhead and railing located near the forward part of the boat. Rubin suffered a broken neck and is now a quadraplegic.

Rubin sued Galaxy Boat Manufacturing Company for defective design and assembly of certain components of the boat, and sued Brutus Corporation for defective design, manufacture, or installation of the seats and padding. The complaint included counts for negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability. ¹ The record contains evidence, disputed by appellees, that indicates that the seat installation was defectively designed and manufactured in a number of respects which, for purposes of this opinion, we need not describe in detail. After substantial discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the undisputed facts established as a matter of law that defendants did not breach any legal duty owed to plaintiff. The trial court granted summary judgment for both defendants on the express ruling that "the crashworthiness doctrine does not apply to pleasure boats in this state", citing Outboard Marine Corp. v. Apeco Corp., 348 So.2d 5 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Plaintiff has appealed this ruling.

We first deal with the law to be applied in determining liability. Appellee Galaxy contends, and plaintiff now agrees, that federal maritime law, not state law, governs the liability issue in this case. ² We find no compelling reason not to accept this contention. Even though this is a maritime claim, the savings clause in 28 United States Code, section 1333, permits plaintiff to bring her action in state court. Still v. Dixon, 337 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Rountree v. A.P. Moller Steamship Co., 218 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969). The boat in question was being operated upon navigable waters within the state when the collision occurred, and claims for injuries occurring on navigable waters based on negligent design and manufacture of boats and components, even though the defendants' complained-of conduct may have occurred ashore, are governed by maritime law. Moser v. Texas Trailer Corp., 623 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir.1980); Cigarette Racing Team, Inc. v. Gandee, 418 So.2d 337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Rountree v. A.P. Moller Steamship Co., 218 So.2d 771; Ingram River Equipment, Inc. v. Pott Industries, Inc., 573 F.Supp. 896 (E.D.Mo.1983); In re Oil Spill By Amoco Cadiz, 491 F.Supp. 170 (N.D.Ill.1979). General maritime law has usually adopted and followed the principles of general tort law, including products liability doctrines. See generally, 1 Norris, The Law of Maritime Personal Injuries, § 175, et seq. (3rd ed. 1975). For this reason, it is necessary to look to general tort cases for guidance in determining whether the crashworthiness doctrine applies to pleasure boats. Before doing so, however, we first consider appellee Galaxy's argument based on the Federal Boat Safety Act.

Galaxy contends that by reason of the enactment of the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, 46 U.S.C., §§ 1451-1489 (now codified, in part, as 46 U.S.C., §§ 4301-4311), Congress has preempted the field of regulating boat safety requirements for manufacturers and therefore precluded the application of state law crashworthiness standards. In effect, Galaxy argues that this act is the exclusive basis for a boat manufacturer's liability and that the record shows that the seat installation did not violate any regulations promulgated under the act. It relies specifically upon the preemption provisions in section 1459, entitled "Federal preemption in issuance of standards." ³ As we read this section in context with the other language of the act, its purpose is to standardize regulations applicable to the manufacture of boats by precluding states from adopting requirements that conflict with federal standards. We are equally sure, however, that compliance with federal standards promulgated under this act was not intended to "relieve any person from liability at common law or under State law." 46 U.S.C., § 1489 (now § 4311). We do not believe that the federal act is intended to be the exclusive basis for a boat manufacturer's liability for damages under maritime or civil law because the act recognizes, by express language in section 1464 (now § 4310), entitled "Repair or replacement of defects," that manufacturers of boats are under a duty to give notice that "a boat or associated equipment subject to an applicable standard or regulation prescribed pursuant to section 1454 of this title either fails to comply with such standard or regulation, or contains a defect which creates a substantial risk of injury to the public " (emphasis added). That section further provides that the notice "shall contain a clear description of such defect or failure to comply, an evaluation of the hazard reasonably related thereto, a statement of the measures to be taken to correct such defect or failure to comply, and an undertaking by the manufacturer to take such measures at his sole cost and expense." The reference in this section both to noncompliance with the regulations and to defects creating substantial risks of injury rather strongly suggests a legislative intention that compliance with regulations promulgated under the act does not necessarily satisfy the manufacturer's duty of care to the public.

The language and purpose of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431, is quite similar to that of the Federal Boat Safety Act; yet it too contains a provision that compliance with the act does not exempt persons from liability under the common law. 15 U.S.C., § 1397(c). That act has been construed to mean that compliance with regulations governing manufacturing does not necessarily relieve the manufacturer of liability under general tort law. Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir.1981). We believe the reasoning of that decision is persuasive support for a similar construction of the Federal Boat Safety Act.

We now turn to the crucial issue on appeal, viz., whether, under the general maritime law, the crashworthiness doctrine recognized by general tort law should be held inapplicable, as a matter of law, to the pleasure boat accident in this case. That doctrine is predicated on the legal duty of a manufacturer to use reasonable care in the design and manufacture of a product to eliminate unreasonable risks of foreseeable injury to persons using it, and imposes liability on the manufacturer for "injuries sustained in secondary collisions between occupants and components of the vehicle in which they were riding when the injury was caused or enhanced by some such design or manufacturing defect and was reasonably foreseeable and reasonably could have been avoided." E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327 So.2d 201, 203 (Fla.1976); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391...